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A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims 
J. Maria Glover*
Procedural law in the United States seeks to achieve three interrelated 
goals in our system of litigation: efficient processes that achieve “substantive 
justice” and deter wrongdoing, accurate outcomes, and meaningful access to 
the courts. For years, however, procedural debate, particularly in the context of 
due process rights in class actions, has been redirected toward more 
conceptual questions about the nature of legal claims—are they more 
appropriately conceptualized as individual property or as collective goods? At 
stake is the extent to which relevant procedures will protect the right of 
individual claimants to exercise control over their claims. Those with 
individualistic conceptions of legal claims tend to object to procedures that 
operate at the expense of claimant autonomy. Conversely, those who endorse 
collectivist views tend to downplay claimant autonomy. In the class action 
context, the debate between individualistic and collectivist views of legal 
claims has been waged as a proxy war between more fulsome and more limited 
availability of class procedures—a debate that has been rightly described as 
“intractable.” 
This Article does not seek to resolve that debate, but to broaden it. The 
individualistic versus collectivist debate about legal claims arises not just in 
the class action context but in other contexts as well—a point long overlooked 
in legal scholarship. 
Taking this broader view yields significant insights. It turns out that 
this conceptual debate has different implications for key normative questions 
in our litigation system and procedural law. For example, in the class action 
context, the individual-autonomy conception of legal claims is used as an 
argument for procedures that often frustrate access to justice. In litigation 
finance, individual-autonomy conceptions are critical to access. The debate 
between individualistic and collectivist conceptions of legal claims thus does 
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not point consistently to any set of normative goals, but instead it cuts in 
precisely opposite directions. 
Two central insights emerge from this stalemate. First, formalist 
theories of legal claims provide a poor baseline for determining the scope of 
litigant autonomy and for guiding procedural law. Second, they should be 
replaced by a theory for legal claims that not only accounts for, but also better 
aligns with, foundational normative goals of our litigation system.  
This Article therefore proposes a regulatory theory of legal claims, 
which has three fundamental components. First, and drawing upon 
intellectual foundations of property, economic, and litigation theory literature, 
this Article posits that litigant autonomy over legal claims—though a strong 
norm—can be regulated in appropriate instances. Second, it provides a 
theoretical basis for the notion that the judiciary may appropriately regulate 
litigant autonomy over claims, including through procedural mechanisms. 
Third, it sets forth a key component of an overall theory of procedure itself—
specifically, as appropriately directed toward regulating litigant autonomy to 
reduce transaction cost barriers to claiming. By then operationalizing this 
theory within various litigation contexts, this Article demonstrates in concrete 
ways how its regulatory theory of legal claims points a way forward on the 
resolution of numerous difficult questions in today’s litigation landscape. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Procedural law in the United States has long sought to achieve 
three related, and often overlapping goals: (1) efficient processes and 
institutions that achieve “substantive justice” and deter violations of 
law,1 (2) consistent and accurate outcomes based on the merits of 
parties’ claims,2 and (3) meaningful legal access for those who have 
 
 1.  See Elihu Root, The Layman’s Criticism of the Lawyer, 26 GREEN BAG 471, 479 (1914) 
(describing the procedural issues resulting from the growth of new provisions in the New York 
Code); see also Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REV. 
163, 167–68 (1915) (comparing the size and scope of Field’s Code of Civil Procedure in the United 
States with the English Judicature Act); Adolph J. Rodenbeck, The New Practice in New York, 1 
CORNELL L.Q. 63, 66 (1916) (describing the excessive level of procedure in the court system and 
the need for reform in the interest of not only the “bench and bar, but in the interest of those who 
have the occasion to resort to the courts for the enforcement of their substantive rights”); John H. 
Wigmore, The Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions, 9 ILL. L. REV. 529, 538 (1915) (criticizing 
evidence statutes as “rigid steel-work” that are “never allowed to bend”). 
 2.  See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1182 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that a basic philosophy of the Federal Rules is to 
facilitate a “determination of litigation on the merits”); J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of 
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claims3 for relief. These goals underlie the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure themselves. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for example, reformers like Roscoe Pound4 and 
Charles Clark5 railed against stifling procedural codes that “together 
with the sporting attitude toward litigation, frustrated the ability of 
courts to adjudicate disputes on their merits” and deliver substantive 
justice.6 Procedure was supposed to be the “handmaid” of justice—yet 
all too often, formalist “nitpicking” over essentialist questions about 
procedure became an end in itself.7 
Underscoring the progressive procedural reform movement 
that gave rise to the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the 
very first of those rules, and it commands that disputes involving legal 
claims be “determin[ed]” in a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” manner.8 
To the extent those claims are deemed meritorious through unbiased 
adjudication, or meritorious enough to move forward in the process 
toward trial or, more likely, settlement——compensation, some 
 
Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (2012); Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & 
Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 148 (2009), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-U-
Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-141.pdf [http://perma.cc/4ML2-TYLM] (“The drafters of the Federal 
Rules objected to fact pleading because it . . . too often cut[ ] off adjudication on the merits.”); Jay 
Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 527 (2006) (stating that one 
goal of the new procedural rules in 1938 was “the resolution of cases on their substantive 
merits”). 
 3.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 10.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(describing the central “object of aggregate proceedings” as “enabling claimants to voice their 
concerns and facilitating the rendition of further relief that protects the rights of affected 
persons”). 
 4.  Pound described the prevailing mentality as follows: “The inquiry is not, What do 
substantive law and justice require? Instead, the inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been 
carried out strictly?” Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, 29 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906) [hereinafter Pound, Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction]; see also Roscoe Pound, Appendix E. Principles of Practice Reform, 33 
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 611, 635 (1910) (referring to the “archaic formalism” of procedure). 
 5.  Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 73 (1927); Charles E. 
Clark, Comment, Pleading Negligence, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 490 (1923).  
 6.  Hiro Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1939, 1969 (2014). 
 7.  Id.; see, e.g., Elihu Root, Reform of Procedure, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 87, 89 (1911) (“Rules and formulas originally 
designed as convenient aids to the attainment of ultimate ends become traditions and dogmas.”); 
Thomas W. Shelton, Greater Efficacy of the Trial of Civil Cases, 33 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 661 (1928). 
For example, Pound and Shelton often lamented how the pages of the appellate reporters were 
saturated with cases that turned solely on points of procedure rather than substantive law. See, 
e.g., Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 64th Cong. 5, 9 (1916) (statement of Thomas W. Shelton); Roscoe Pound, The Place of 
Procedure in Modern Law, 1 SW. L. REV. 59, 76–77 (1917). 
 8.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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modicum of access to justice, and, to the extent a defendant changes 
its wrongful behavior, deterrence of wrongdoing can be achieved. As 
the “handmaid” of legal claims, the reformers envisioned that 
procedural rules would assist the effectuation of those claims in a way 
that took into account these broader normative goals. 
Since that time, scholars and courts have long grappled with a 
related, and hotly debated, question of whether and to what extent 
individuals may exercise autonomy over their legal claims.9 Though 
not always expressed in these precise terms, this debate is concerned 
fundamentally with whether legal claims are properly conceptualized 
primarily as individualistic, over which claimants exercise fulsome 
individual autonomy,10 or primarily as collectivist, over which litigant 
autonomy is appropriately sacrificed in favor of, say, overall 
compensatory interests of a group of claimholders or public interests, 
like deterring wrongdoing and filling regulatory gaps in the 
enforcement of substantive directives.11 In this debate, conception has 
 
 9.  See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1066 
(2012) (arguing that protecting litigant autonomy values in mass tort context is self-defeating); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) (relying upon individual autonomy 
values to prevent principal agent problems); Mark Moller, Separation of Powers and the Class 
Action, NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478953 [https://perma.cc/2ZRC-
28GF]; Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in an Age of 
Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2015); Martin Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class 
Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1573 (2007) (defending values of litigant autonomy); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One 
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural 
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2015) (cautioning against a collective view of class claims); 
David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort 
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) (arguing for a collective conception of class claims). 
 10.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9; Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the 
Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1065–66 (2002) (challenging the 
extent to which we afford fulsome protection for litigant autonomy); Redish & Larsen, supra note 
9, at 1616–18 (insisting that litigant autonomy is the cornerstone of due process); Ryan C. 
Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599 
(2015). 
 11.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 661–66 (2013) (noting that at least in certain 
contexts, legal claims serve a public function that must be accounted for in determining how to 
apply procedural rules, though not arguing for a purely public conception of legal claims); Owen 
M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against 
Settlement] (arguing for a public conception of legal claims); Owen M. Fiss, The History of an 
Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273 (2009) [hereinafter Fiss, The History of an Idea] (reiterating his 
1984 argument for a public conception of legal claims); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of 
Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1141–42 (2012) 
(making arguments similar to those espoused in Private Enforcement); David Rosenberg, Class 
Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) 
(arguing for a collective view of class claims); Rosenberg, supra note 9 (arguing that opt-out 
rights should not be permitted in mass tort cases); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as 
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consequences: the “appropriate” conception of legal claims dictates the 
appropriate content, contours, and application of procedural rules and 
doctrine. 
This fundamental debate is most developed, feverish, and long-
standing in the class action context. In that corner of the procedural 
landscape, the Court’s recent jurisprudence has come down firmly on 
the side of litigant autonomy over legal claims, with distinct 
consequences for procedural law.12 For example, in Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court rejected arguably the most 
promising means for resolving thousands of asbestos cases by way of a 
global settlement.13 It did so in large part because the settlement 
purported to resolve the claims of those who had not yet manifested 
injury, and the Court did not believe opt-out rights under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) sufficiently protected litigants’ due 
process right to pursue one’s individual day in court for these claims.14 
The Court’s invocation of an individual day-in-court conception of due 
process vis-à-vis legal claims necessarily rejected more collective 
conceptions of the class claims—perhaps as inextricably interrelated 
as a matter of any claimant obtaining compensation, or as a matter of 
achieving otherwise elusive resolution to a massive public-health 
disaster.15 
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to litigant autonomy over 
class claims most recently in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.16 
Plaintiffs, female employees of Wal-Mart, brought Title VII 
discrimination claims and sought both injunctive and monetary relief 
under the mandatory class provision of Rule 23(b)(2).17 A unanimous 
 
Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917 (1998) (arguing that the class functions as a 
collective entity, not a collection of individuals, though not going so far as to demand mandatory 
treatment of all class actions). 
 12.  The Supreme Court has come down firmly on the side of treating legal claims as 
property rights over which litigants should have unfettered autonomy in class action decisions, 
see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–50 (2011); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–25 (1997); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807–08 (1985); 
in arbitration decisions, see, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–
10 (2013); in preclusion decisions and preclusion law, see, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 
892–93 (2008); and in the Erie doctrine, see, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–09 (2010). 
 13.  521 U.S. at 628–29. 
 14.  Id. at 628; see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 
77–78 (noting that the Court in Amchem viewed the deal as an impermissible delegation of 
power to class counsel to sell plaintiffs’ claims). 
 15.  See NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 79–80 (describing the Amchem deal as a “rival[ ] to 
the legislative process”). 
 16.  564 U.S. at 366–67. 
 17.  Id. at 363. 
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Court rejected this attempt to combine monetary damages in the form 
of back pay with injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2), noting that 
removing opt-out rights would “depriv[e] people of their right to sue” 
in violation of the Due Process Clause, at least vis-à-vis monetary 
damages—though the Court expressed skepticism about the 
mandatory nature of the class action for claims involving injunctive 
relief as well.18 The Court’s emphasis on litigant autonomy extends 
beyond the class action context; indeed, it underlies a broad swath of 
the Court’s procedural jurisprudence.19 
Class action scholars continue to debate whether class claims 
are appropriately conceptualized as individualistic or collectivist, and 
those on either side of the conceptual divide seem no closer to 
agreement.20 This debate, however, has largely ignored the other 
areas of litigation in which this same question about the proper 
conception of legal claims arises. Indeed, virtually no scholarly 
attention has been given to the ways in which that debate pervades 
our civil justice system throughout numerous procedural issues across 
the litigation landscape. 
This Article is the first to take a broader view, by looking at the 
ways in which the debate between a litigant autonomy and a collective 
view of legal claims plays out across current and seemingly unrelated 
issues in modern litigation. This broader frame yields significant 
insights. The debate over the proper formalist conception of legal 
claims is largely orthogonal to the key normative values in our 
litigation system like access to justice, compensation, and deterrence. 
Take access to justice as an example. An individualistic conception of 
legal claims tends to constrain the use of the class action procedure 
and impedes the claim-facilitative function that it can serve; in other 
procedural contexts, like alternative litigation finance, an 
individualistic conception of claim ownership is central to the claim-
facilitative effects of funding. Across procedural contexts, the 
individualistic conception cuts exactly the opposite way. The same is 
true of the collectivist conception. Rather than providing formalism’s 
oft-promised clarity of answers,21 these formalistic conceptions yield 
completely conflicting results. 
 
 18.  Id. (noting that injunctive mandatory classes are permitted under Rule 23(b)(2) “rightly 
or wrongly”). 
 19.  See Campos, supra note 9, at 1060 n.1 (listing a variety of cases where the Supreme 
Court has focused on individual litigant autonomy). 
 20.  See Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 
(2011) (setting out the collective versus individual property views of class actions). 
 21.  See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 625–26 (1990) (extolling the 
virtues of formalism—chief among them, clarity—in an opinion by Justice Scalia). 
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Therefore, rather than looking to formalist conceptual 
frameworks to dictate the scope of litigant autonomy, this Article 
provides a new way. Building on insights from property, economic, and 
litigation dynamics literature, this Article develops a theory for 
regulating individual litigant autonomy in ways that align with 
foundational goals of our litigation system. To be clear, regulation of 
litigant autonomy justified under this Article’s theory need not be 
embodied in the procedural design, interpretation, and doctrine of the 
judiciary; for instance, Congress could regulate litigant autonomy 
through legislation. However, if this Article’s regulatory theory of 
legal claims is to provide an alternative to formalist theories of legal 
claims used within the judicial system, it must provide a theoretical 
basis for that sort of regulation. Accordingly, this Article also provides 
a theory both of the judicial role and of procedure as legitimate 
sources of regulation for legal claims; it also sets forth a theory of 
procedure as appropriately directed at regulating litigant autonomy in 
order to reduce or prevent the generation of substantial transaction 
cost barriers to claiming. 
Part I of this Article briefly sets forth the long-standing 
conceptual debate about the nature of class members and class 
actions, situating that debate as one fundamentally about the 
appropriate conception of legal claims. Part II broadens the frame. By 
exploring the implications of these dichotomous conceptual views of 
claims within three current, and seemingly unrelated, areas of the 
litigation landscape, the following insight emerges: the conceptual 
theories of legal claims generate precisely opposite results vis-à-vis 
fundamental normative goals of our litigation system, depending on 
context. Unsurprisingly, this incentivizes and generates strategic 
gamesmanship by advocates who switch from one conception to 
another when it serves their overall procedural aim. 
Part III offers a new theory—namely, a regulatory theory of 
legal claims. Under this theory, individual autonomy over claims can 
be regulated in limited circumstances, and the judiciary is an 
appropriate body (among others) for regulating litigant autonomy. 
Part III also posits that procedure is one appropriate mechanism for 
regulating litigant autonomy, and it provides a theory of procedure’s 
role as properly encompassing the reduction of transaction cost 
barriers to claiming as part of its regulatory role,. Part III concludes 
by operationalizing this regulatory function for procedure within the 
various litigation contexts discussed in Part II and to the class 
certification debates set forth in Part I. In so doing, it demonstrates 
the ways in which this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, and 
the prescriptive framework it will (continue to) generate, provides a 
       
2017] A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS 229 
better way forward on the achievement of key aims of our litigation 
system. 
I. THE LONG-STANDING CLASS ACTION DEBATE  
ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE CONCEPTION OF LEGAL CLAIMS 
The procedural reform movement that culminated in 1938 with 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stemmed in large part from the 
notion that procedural law at the time was divorced from notions of 
fairness and led to the appearance of injustice.22 Substantive rights 
were often subsumed by the formalities of procedure, frustrating both 
the effectuation and merit-based determination of recognized legal 
claims.23 In response, reformers greatly simplified procedure to 
conform more closely to the expectations of “farmers and business men 
and workmen,” in the hopes that simplification would help procedure, 
as the handmaid of legal claims, achieve substantive justice24 through 
the efficient resolution of claims on their merits so that (when 
warranted) substantive law could achieve its aims of compensation, 
deterrence, and the like.25 
In debates about procedural design, interpretation, and scope, 
scholars and courts have for decades focused on a related, but quite 
different, question for guidance: whether and to what extent claimants 
can exercise control over their legal claims.26 Fundamentally, this is a 
question about the proper conception of legal claims as either 
 
 22.  Aragaki, supra note 6, at 1970. 
 23.  See Charles E. Clark, Methods of Legal Reform, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 106, 111 (1929) 
(advocating for procedure as a means to an end rather than an end itself, which is a major defect 
of common law); see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 962 (1987) (noting that 
the problem of “procedural technicality stand[ing] in the way of reaching the merits” as a key 
point of Clark’s work). 
 24.  Root, supra note 1, at 478. 
 25.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules] should be construed, administered, and 
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding.”); see also Pound, supra note 4, at 404–06 (arguing that 
procedure should enable courts to administer justice according to the law). 
 26.  See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 114–34 (evaluating the merits of a mandatory 
class action regime); Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–87 (discussing the problems of litigant 
autonomy); Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6–24) (same). To some degree, the adoption of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure aided in this transition. Under the Field Code rules of 
pleading, cases would frequently go stagnant for many years, leaving claimants with no ability to 
do anything with their claims, one way or another. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact 
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (noting 
that “[t]he high hopes for the Field Code were not realized” because the reformulation of pleading 
rules caused difficulties “for even the most common claim” and “led to stagnation that interfered 
with resolution of disputes on their merits”). 
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individualistic27 or collectivist in nature.28 At stake for procedure is 
whether and to what extent its rules and doctrines may interfere (or 
not) with litigant autonomy. This fundamental debate has occurred, to 
some degree, throughout the procedural landscape,29 but it has long 
been at the center of the scholarly and judicial debate over claims in a 
certified class action.30  
Class action scholars have taken different positions, with some 
arguing for a conception of claims over which litigants should be given 
full, or nearly full, autonomy.31 Moving away from this position are 
scholars who describe the class and all its claims as an entity—whose 
collective goals must be placed ahead of the autonomous incentives 
and desires of an individual litigant in most instances.32 On the 
opposite end of the spectrum are scholars who argue that the 
collective needs of the class action require any and all class actions to 
be mandatory; no one may exercise autonomy over her claim 
individually.33 
Underlying these approaches to class claims—particularly 
those at either end of the conceptual spectrum—is a rather stark, 
binary view of litigant autonomy. Under a view that places a premium 
 
 27.  See sources cited supra note 2. 
 28.  See sources cited supra note 10.  
 29.  See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–41 (1985) (finding 
that the nature of procedural due process turned heavily on the corresponding characterization 
or conception of the property right of a legal claim); see also Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–85 
(mentioning other contexts in which the individualistic versus collectivist views of claimants 
come up in the litigation landscape). 
 30.  Some recent work has also debated whether the class action is best viewed from a 
communitarian or a civil republican perspective. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND 
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE x-xi (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the communitarian conception of goods); 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Groups, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1, 2–8 (2009) (discussing the 
ramifications of viewing group litigants as members of a community from which certain 
obligations flow); see also Burch, supra, at 4 (“Alasdair MacIntyre emphasized human association 
as a source of self-identity and the building of society.” (citing ADRIAN LITTLE, THE POLITICS OF 
COMMUNITY 19 (2002))).  
 31.  See, e.g., Redish & Larsen, supra note 9, at 1574–75 (arguing that litigant autonomy is 
a foundational element of procedural due process analysis); see also NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 
84 (arguing against the use of mandatory class actions in mass tort litigation on the grounds that 
“the delegation made in the [Rules Enabling] Act must stop short of the legislative power that 
Congress might wield to alter preexisting rights”); Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 3–5) 
(arguing that due process concerns for property rights do not alone justify litigant autonomy, but 
that separation of powers concerns provide the rest of the justification). 
 32.  See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 13, 26–32 (1996) (explaining the benefits to the overall group of treating a class like an 
entity); Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917–18 (“[T]he notion of the class as entity should prevail over 
more individually oriented notions of aggregate litigation.”). 
 33.  See Campos, supra note 9, at 1064 (arguing that protecting litigant autonomy in the 
mass tort context is self-defeating); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 831–34 (arguing that opt-out 
rights should not be permitted in mass tort cases). 
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on party control, an individual has almost complete dominion over her 
claim, almost as a natural right. At the other end of the spectrum is 
the view that the party’s control over her claim is at the grace of 
someone else—a judge, a class attorney, or a rulemaker. 
Part A provides a brief overview of individual-autonomy-
focused views of the class action. Part B then sketches more collective, 
or representational views of the class action. Part C then situates 
these two ends of the class action debate within a framework of 
analysis about the conception of legal claims more generally, setting 
the stage for Part II’s exploration of these dichotomous conceptions 
across the procedural landscape. 
A. Individual Autonomy Views of the Class Action 
Countless scholars have explored the interaction between 
individual autonomy and due process rights in the class action 
context.34 Without recounting the vast literature here, perhaps the 
strongest position in favor of individual autonomy for class members 
comes from the work of Martin Redish. Redish has argued that 
litigant autonomy should be protected to the greatest extent possible 
by the Due Process Clause, not simply because it is a compelling 
interest that frequently, if not almost always, outweighs other 
procedural values,35 but primarily because liberal democratic thought 
demands a belief in the “centrality of individual autonomy” when a 
person seeks to advance or protect her interests—one might even say 
property—through governmental processes.36 
Values of litigant autonomy—the individual right to control 
one’s legal claim37 in litigation, the right, if one wants, to a “day in 
 
 34.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
651 (2014); Issacharoff, supra note 10; Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic 
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 71; Redish & Larsen, supra note 9.  
 35.  See Redish & Larsen, supra note 9, at 1577–78 (rejecting as misguided the balancing 
test in Mathews v. Eldridge and in Connecticut v. Doehr as ignoring due process’s “moorings in 
the values of liberal political theory” which would protect a “foundational belief in the value of 
allowing individuals to make fundamental choices about the judicial protection of their own 
legally authorized rights”). 
 36.  Id. at 1575. 
 37.  As Mark Moller has explained, the concept of a “claim” could have various constituent 
parts: (1) what he terms the “primary right,” which is the protected interest that the right to 
relief protects; (2) what he terms the “remedial right,” which is the right to a remedy for the 
infringement of the primary right; and (3) the “right of action” or the “claim,” which is the right 
to sue. Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6). Often the three travel together (though they do 
not necessarily have to). See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2010) (“[C]ivil law need not necessarily define the scope of the right 
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court”—provide the foundation for the Supreme Court’s class action 
jurisprudence in recent decades. Specifically, it has skewed largely 
against certification in favor of preserving individual control of one’s 
claim,38 no matter how unrealistic that an individual could pursue her 
claim alone.39 In fact, the Court has described notions of litigant 
autonomy vis-à-vis one’s claim—her “day in court”—as the “usual 
rule” from which Rule 23 only narrowly departs.40 The notion here is 
that a procedural rule—Rule 23—should not be interpreted to 
interfere with individual autonomy. The source of protection invoked 
for these individual autonomy values is due process.41 
The contours of Rule 23 in Supreme Court class action 
jurisprudence flow not only from a strong individual autonomy 
conception of due process; they also stem from a particular view of 
Rule 23 as a “mere joinder” device. As recently as 2010, the Supreme 
Court compared the class action device under Rule 23 to other rules 
governing simple joinder—therefore, the class action device is merely a 
joinder device, merely a mechanism for collecting individual claims for 
more efficient adjudication.42 For purposes of engaging in procedural 
decisionmaking and interpretation, then, the joinder conception of the 
 
of action in a manner that synchronizes with either the wrong or the remedy.”). For purposes of 
this Article, I treat the term “claim” as generally encompassing all three, unless otherwise 
stated. 
 38.  The emphasis on a litigant’s control over his own claim is a feature of the federal 
system itself. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 91 (2005) (“In general, the 
plaintiff is the master of the complaint and has the option of naming only those parties the 
plaintiff chooses to sue, subject only to the rules of joinder [of] necessary parties.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting 16 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c] 
(3d ed. 2005))); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003) (“The [well-pleaded 
complaint] rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987))). 
 39.  See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (antitrust class 
action); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (antitrust class action); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (Title VII class action alleging sex discrimination); 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (asbestos litigation). 
 40.  See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363 (noting that due process likely requires notice and opt 
out in (b)(2) actions that involve claims for monetary relief); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 839–41 (1999) (discussing the history of the principle in favor of treating claim owners 
equally); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979) (“[T]he Rule 23 class-action device 
was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf 
of the individual named parties only.”).  
 41.  Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 9) (noting that individual control over one’s claim 
derives from conceptions of property in the nineteenth century, which “viewed the right to 
exclusive use as the core feature of property”). 
 42.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–08, 450 
(2010) (stressing that the class action is like joinder and does not change anything about the 
parties’ rights or duties, nor does it bear on the functioning of substantive remedial schemes 
despite, as the dissent pointed out, the New York Legislature’s arguably clear view to the 
contrary). 
       
2017] A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS 233 
class action forecloses as inappropriate consideration of collective 
values potentially served by Rule 23, such as the ways in which it 
makes small-value claims marketable and provides the class as a 
collective with greater leverage against defendants, among others.43 
The implications of a joinder view of the class action—at least 
taken to its literal extreme—would of course be absurdly rigid and 
impractical.44 As Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals famously traced, a joinder conception of the class action would 
call for according precisely the same due process to absent class 
members as if they had been joined under Rule 20.45 According to 
Judge Wood, at least, such a requirement would destroy the class 
action device merely through the expense of serving each and every 
class member with process.46 
While necessarily short of demanding the extreme set of affairs 
identified by Judge Wood,47 the Court has invoked litigant autonomy 
associated with a joinder view of the class action in its application of 
various Rule 23 certification requirements as well as its application of 
the Erie doctrine to the class action device.48 Extrapolating from the 
Court’s jurisprudence, a particular view of procedure emerges—one 
that ought to preserve, or at least not interfere with, the individual 
character of claims and the ability of individual claimants to exercise 
control over those claims. 
 
 43.  The Court did note, in separate cases, that the ability of the class action to impose 
settlement pressure on defendants was a negative feature of the device. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664–65 (2010) (discussing the “basic precept that 
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion,’ ” and the potential pitfalls of class action 
arbitration).  
 44.  Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. 
CT. REV. 459, 491 (describing both potential models of the class action).  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  The joinder model “imposes the same procedural requirements on every class member, 
whether representative or absent.” Id. at 478. Thus, every member of the class would have to be 
served with process because each “must independently satisfy all procedural requirements for 
appearing before the court in question.” Id. at 459 (contrasting this aspect of the joinder model 
with the representational model’s emphasis placed upon the named class representative—
allowing the individual to act as the legal representative once her right to come before the court 
was established). 
 47.  One could point to the collective action provision under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012), or under the Magnuson Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (2012), 
which affirmatively requires members of the collective action to opt in, as comprising even more 
extreme positions on the litigant autonomy spectrum. However, since those provisions do not 
come under the purview of Rule 23, or typically get discussed in the individualistic versus 
collectivist conceptual debates about the class action, it is sufficient for this article simply to 
mention them here. 
 48.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010). 
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B. Representational, or Collective, Views of the Class Action 
Under representational or collective views of the class action, 
the basic notion is that a representative party litigates alone, but on 
behalf of absent class members until liability is established.49 Once 
that has occurred, the judgment is held open so that absent class 
members can come and establish their rights to share in the 
recovery.50 This view departs from notions of preserving as much as 
possible the individual character and participation rights of individual 
class members and their claims. Instead, collectivist conceptions are 
grounded in other normative concerns: efficiency and economy of 
litigation for litigants and the role of the class action as a mechanism 
for enforcing legislative prerogatives and supplementing public law 
enforcement efforts.51 Indeed, even before Rule 23 took its modern 
form in 1966, scholars identified the class action as a vehicle to 
“explore the possibilities of revitalizing private litigation to fashion an 
effective means of group redress.”52 This view was reinforced in the 
1966 amendments to Rule 23.53 
This fundamental tension between the value of individual 
autonomy, which is protected and emphasized by the joinder model on 
the one hand, and values like collective justice, which are promoted on 
the other, continues to be debated in some form or another today.54 
 
 49.  Hutchinson, supra note 44, at 471. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 480; see also Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary 
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 691–95 (1941).  
 52.  See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 51, at 687. 
 53.  See Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. INDUS. 
& COM. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (1969); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 
(1967); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“A class action solves 
this [disproportionate expense and claim value] problem by aggregating the relatively paltry 
potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 54.  For examples of scholars who took stances in favor of placing a premium on values of 
individual autonomy, see Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical 
Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 5–14 (1990); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials 
in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69–76. Others advocated in favor of a 
more “collective” approach to class actions. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN 
MASS TORT LITIGATION 1–2 (1995); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and 
Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Bruce L. Hay, Asymmetric Rewards: Why 
Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1991); David 
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 
B.U. L. REV. 695, 695–98 (1989). For a sample of recent views on this debate, see Elizabeth J. 
Cabraser, The Rational Class: Richard Posner and Efficiency as Due Process, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
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Scholars espousing representational theories of the class action fall on 
somewhat of a spectrum. One of the most famous proponents of a 
representational view of the class action is David Shapiro, who set 
forth an “entity” model of the class action.55 This (somewhat moderate) 
“entity” model56 holds that the class action should not be viewed 
fundamentally as involving the claims of a number of individuals or 
even an aggregation thereof, but rather as “an entity in itself for . . . 
determining the nature of the lawsuit, the role of the lawyer and the 
judge, and the significance of the disposition.”57 Under this model, the 
entity, not various individuals, is the litigant—and by extension, one 
could say, the master of the claims. 
Under Shapiro’s entity model, individual class members are 
still permitted to seek private counsel, to participate in some way in 
the litigation if desired, or even to opt out (though only under certain, 
somewhat narrow, conditions58) in the case of a 23(b)(3) class action. 
Overall, however, the entity model calls for sublimation of individual 
autonomy values in favor of collective ones. A number of consequences 
follow from this conception, including an increased need under Rule 23 
for cost-benefit weighing vis-à-vis notice to class members, 
particularly those with low-value claims, and a need to limit the opt-
out right in Rule 23(b)(3) so as not to interfere with the collective 
functioning of the class device and the compensatory interests of the 
collective, among others.59 
Further along the spectrum of collectivist class action 
conception is David Rosenberg’s view that all class actions must be 
mandatory.60 This view is grounded in the normative premise that the 
law should achieve the public, social objective of promoting individual 
welfare, which Rosenberg argues is best achieved by bringing about 
 
REV. ARGUENDO 85 (2014); Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–85; and Moller, supra note 9 
(manuscript at 17–28).  
 55.  Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917–18. 
 56.  The term “entity” model of the class action was coined by Edward Cooper. See Cooper, 
supra note 32, at 26. 
 57.  Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917; see also Cooper, supra note 32, at 26. 
 58.  In support of the entity model of class action, Shapiro argued that unconditional opt-
out rights of members would undermine the substantive interests of the class as a whole. See 
Shapiro, supra note 11, at 938 (“If there is a clear need for an unconditional right to opt out, one 
wonders about the soundness of the underlying decision to allow class treatment.”). However, 
Shapiro noted that “a conditional or limited ability to opt out as part of a litigated or negotiated 
outcome may be consistent with class treatment of a claim,” listing conditions such as the 
specified limits on attorney fees paid to those who opt out, a requirement that an individual 
contribute to the common costs incurred by the class, a cap on recovery, and some limits on 
punitive damage awards. Id. at 957–58, 958 n.128. 
 59.  Id. at 935–38. 
 60.  Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 831. 
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optimal deterrence.61 Along those lines, Rosenberg has argued that the 
deterrent purpose of the class action is predominately public, and that 
too great a focus on compensation can actually frustrate that 
purpose.62 This view, even though ultimately aimed in part at 
promoting individual welfare, requires complete sublimation of 
individual autonomy so that individuals can collectively pool their 
litigation resources in order to maximize wealth.63 Absent organized 
collective action by a plaintiff class—and the associated economies of 
scale—defendants can wield the distinct litigation advantages that 
derive from aggregate stakes, thereby reducing optimal deterrence 
and the related compensation. 
The collective views of the class action all differ somewhat in 
their precise conceptual contours. Fundamentally, though, whether 
presented as a representative model, an entity model, or a social goods 
model, the driving notion is that a legal claim does not belong, 
exclusively or primarily, to an individual claimholder. 
C. Conceptual Debates About the Nature of Class Actions  
as Debates About the Nature of Legal Claims Themselves 
Underlying these dualities in the class action context are not 
just competing views of the class action device specifically, but a 
tension between the appropriate conceptions of legal claims 
themselves. For instance, individualistic, joinder-type views of the 
class action give precedence to the individual’s ownership and control 
of legal claims.64 Implicit in that view is the notion that a legal claim 
is personal property over which a claimholder exercises significant 
control—control that can only be taken away rarely, if ever. 
Relatedly, (often implicitly) underlying individualistic 
conceptions of the class action are strong notions of claim ownership 
and property rights, like alienation and exclusion. Mark Moller has 
made this underpinning explicit, arguing that litigant autonomy 
arguments are rooted in very specific nineteenth-century property 
views of legal claims as conferring upon claimholders strong rights of 
 
 61.  Id. at 831–32. 
 62.  See id. at 846–47; see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too 
Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2046–47 (2010) (arguing that at least for small-value claims 
class actions, the purpose of the class is to achieve deterrence, not compensation). 
 63.  David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 427–28 (2000). 
 64.  See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 11, at 918 (noting that a joinder, or aggregation model, of 
the class action entails the sacrifice of as little individual autonomy as possible). 
       
2017] A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS 237 
exclusive use.65 An individualistic conception of the class action, with 
its implicit directive to preserve as much of an individual’s control 
over her claim (particularly over alienation), departs little from this 
particular eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of 
property.66 
Underlying representational or collectivist views of the class 
action (again, usually implicitly) is a conception of claims more as 
parts of an overall “entity” or “collective.” It is to this collective that all 
members’ fortunes are joined and to whose collective purposes rights 
of individual autonomy must submit.67 Viewing class claims this 
way—as mechanisms for achieving deterrence, for effectuating 
legislative prerogatives, and/or, in the presence of other similar 
claims, for achieving an overall better compensatory result for the 
collective and the individuals within it68—requires a much weaker 
conception of individual ownership of legal claims. 
Procedural law does not explicitly resolve doctrinal issues with 
reference to this underlying debate over the nature of legal claims. 
However, Supreme Court class action jurisprudence in the past two 
decades has implicitly embraced strong individual autonomy 
approaches to the legal claims of absent class members. Perhaps the 
most prominent example of this trend is the Court’s decision in 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, in which the Court reviewed a 
class action and accompanying settlement that sought to resolve all 
unfiled asbestos claims.69 The Court concluded that common issues did 
not predominate over individual ones, and thus the proposed class and 
class settlement ran afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).70 
In doing so, the Court noted that individual issues define mass torts—
suggesting that certification of any class in a mass tort case would run 
afoul of the strictures of Rule 23,71 and, as a matter of litigant 
 
 65.  Moller, supra note 9 (manuscript at 9). 
 66.  See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (N.Y. 1856) (“Property is the right of any 
person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing.”); Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1054, 1055 
(C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (“Property is the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying and disposing of a 
thing which is in itself valuable.”). 
 67.  Some argue that conceptualizing legal claims as individual property for which property 
holders can obtain value in the form of compensation relegates the public deterrent goals of our 
system of litigation to (at best) second-place status, as (at best) incidentally achieved through 
compensation of a sufficient number of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 9, at 1081–83; 
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the 
Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 900 (1984) (arguing that a private law view of mass tort 
claims “squander[s] the system’s resources” and “deprives the system of their deterrence value”). 
 68.  See Issacharoff, supra note 10, at 1060; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 924–25. 
 69.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
 70.  Id. at 622. 
 71.  Id. at 624–25; see also NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at xv–xvi. 
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autonomy, with claimholders’ due process rights to have their day in 
court on these individual issues. 
As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the majority ignored the 
collective view—and by extension, the collective values—of class 
claims, which would counsel in favor of upholding the settlement. He 
argued that the majority placed too great a focus on individual day-in-
court ideals—ideals that meant, as a practical matter, no one in this 
class would ever receive compensation for their injuries.72 At least in 
Amchem, the litigant autonomy the Court fought so fiercely to protect 
was worth precisely zero to these claimants in the way of actual 
compensation.73 
The strong individual autonomy conception of claims in 
Amchem is now well established in case law.74 It is the dominant 
conception of legal claims in much of the Court’s recent procedural 
jurisprudence,75 and it is a cornerstone of its class action 
jurisprudence.76 Nonetheless, and particularly given that most 
 
 72.  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 73.  In the end, the plaintiffs to the Amchem deal received no compensation through 
adjudicative processes, and the various asbestos companies entered into bankruptcy, leaving 
issues of compensation to be dealt with even today. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA ET AL., THE LAW OF 
CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER AGGREGATE LITIGATION 135 (2d ed. 2013); see also, e.g., Campos, 
supra note 9, at 1082–84 (arguing that litigant autonomy is self-defeating in the context of mass 
tort class actions). 
 74.  See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 424 (1982) (deciding whether a 
state’s termination of an individual’s cause of action violates due process); Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307 (1950) (discussing the violation of individual control 
over claims via an inadequate notice campaign to class members); Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of 
Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the “Government–as–Monopolist” Theory 
of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491 (1982) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of causes of action as property). 
 75.  See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (rejecting the notion of injury 
absent some harm to pre-existing “property”); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 670, 
672 (2016) (holding that an unaccepted settlement offer does not moot the named plaintiff’s claim 
in a class action, but leaving open the questions of whether an accepted offer would moot that 
claim and whether the claim of a named plaintiff in a class action has any collective component 
in addition to the individual property component of that claim); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (making clear that potential legal claims are tradable via 
contract for goods and services); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–22 (emphasizing the individual due 
process protections for absent class members’ claims that are paramount at the certification 
stage). 
 76.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 
(1999); Amchem, 521 U.S. 591. These litigant autonomy ideals arguably trace back to Hansberry 
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 38 (1940), and extend through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence all the way 
to today. See Bone, supra note 54, at 214–18 (tracing Hansberry and its progeny and criticizing 
the Court for consistently insisting on a “day-in-court” ideal). 
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everything in life is “only for now,”77 the conceptual debate 
continues.78 
The class action, however, does not exist in a vacuum. Missing 
from the debate over the conceptual nature of class claims is a cross-
cutting analysis of the implications of this debate across various 
procedural contexts. The next Part undertakes that analysis by 
situating the fundamental tension regarding the proper conception of 
legal claims underlying the class action debate within various, largely 
unrelated, contexts across the broader procedural landscape. This 
analysis produces a somewhat unexpected insight: as a matter of 
foundational goals of our litigation system,79 adopting a single 
conception of legal claims generates precisely opposite results. 
II. SITUATING THE FORMALIST DEBATE ABOUT  
THE PROPER CONCEPTION OF LEGAL CLAIMS WITHIN  
THE BROADER PROCEDURAL LANDSCAPE 
For class actions, proponents of collectivist theories may be 
right that an individualistic conception of claims frustrates goals like 
compensation, deterrence, and access to justice.80 This argument is 
arguably most compelling when class claims are small value, though 
few collectivists offer that as a reason for conceptual distinction.81 In 
any event, at least in the post-certification class action context, an 
individualistic conception of legal claims may often prove claim 
disabling.82 
 
 77.  ROBERT LOPEZ & JEFF MARX, For Now, on AVENUE Q (RCA Victor 2003). 
 78.  See infra Part II. 
 79.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating the disputes must be resolved in a “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive” manner). 
 80.  Campos, supra note 9, at 1092; Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 833–34; Shapiro, supra note 
11, at 916, 931. 
 81.  See, e.g., Campos, supra note 9, at 1074–79 (explaining that class actions in small 
claims litigation may solve problems with asymmetric stakes between plaintiffs and defendants); 
Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 415–17 (arguing that even with marketable claims, an individual 
mass tort plaintiff lacks aggregate stakes and the corresponding bargaining leverage for 
settlement); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 62, at 2067–74 (arguing that the purpose of many 
class actions, certainly those involving small-value claims, is deterrence, not compensation). 
 82.  See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 54, at 104 (arguing that individual property conceptions 
of due process in certain class action contexts are essentially smokescreens for preventing 
certification, and thus, any compensation, deterrence, or access to justice for claimants); Campos, 
supra note 9, at 1081–85 (arguing that individual rights to opt out interfere with the functioning 
of the mass tort class action, and offering a paternalistic approach to those rights—that they 
should be limited to achieve compensation and deterrence for the individual, and overall, the 
group); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 831–34 (making similar arguments to Campos); Shapiro, 
supra note 11, at 935–37 (noting that, at least in small-value claims class actions, the economies 
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Across the procedural landscape, however, whether an 
individualistic conception of legal claims disables claiming is far from 
clear. Indeed, an individualistic view of legal claims that would 
support fuller commoditization of claims may well facilitate claiming. 
The converse is also true. The same is true with regard to other 
normative metrics. As seen in the class action context, an individual-
autonomy view of claims may well frustrate access to justice, 
deterrence, and compensation—as Justice Breyer lamented in 
Amchem. Yet precisely the opposite is true in the context of litigation 
financing: absent a robust individual-autonomy view of claims, 
alienation of claims to a funder becomes difficult. 
These binary conceptual dichotomies obscure and confound 
various normative goals of our legal system in any number of 
procedural contexts. They include, but are not limited to, attorneys’ 
fiduciary duties to claimants that limit informal claim settlement;83 
judicial review of consent decrees brokered with public actors to 
promote “fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy”;84 various 
procedural rules governing settlement set-offs among jointly liable 
defendants with the same plaintiff;85 and rules governing contingency 
arrangements between lawyers and clients, just to name a few. Over-
constrained by one formalist conception of legal claims or another, all 
of these doctrines struggle to identify the appropriate balance between 
the near-absolute form of litigant autonomy required by 
individualistic conceptions and the near-absolute permission to 
interfere with that autonomy permitted by collectivist conceptions. 
The conceptual debates tend to occur within the confines of 
procedural silos. This Part takes a broader view. It focuses for the first 
time on three seemingly unrelated and important controversies in 
modern litigation: offers to settle with named plaintiffs pre-
certification of a class under Rule 68, alternative litigation financing, 
 
of scale achieved through the certification of a class outweigh the individual benefits of 
autonomous actions such as opting out). 
 83.  See Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing 
attorneys’ fiduciary duty to their clients when negotiating settlements). 
 84.  “When reviewing a proposed consent decree, the trial court is to review the settlement 
for fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.” EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 666 F.3d 1170, 
1172 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing lower court’s rejection of motion for approval of consent decree). 
 85.  For instance, the Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act provides that if a 
plaintiff settles with Defendant A and proceeds against Defendant B, the second recovery is 
offset by the percentage that Defendant A was found liable for, even if that would have been 
more than what the plaintiff actually recovered. In contrast, for instance, the New York rule 
provides that the second settlement or verdict will be offset by only the absolute amount 
Defendant A settled for. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 2007). The California rule 
provides that the second settlement will be offset by whichever of the former two is the smallest 
amount. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 2012). 
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and mandatory arbitration agreements in individual consumer and 
employment contracts. What this broader analysis reveals is this: at a 
systemic level, debating between binary conceptions of legal claims 
fails to point a coherent way forward for procedure to achieve any 
number of fundamental goals of our litigation system. 
A. Rule 68 Offers to Settle with  
the Named Class Plaintiff Pre-certification 
Moving just beyond the world of certified class actions lies a 
problem at the intersection of not-yet certified class actions and Rule 
68 offers to settle. In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, decided this term, 
the Supreme Court grappled with the question of whether a 
defendant’s unaccepted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer of 
settlement to the named plaintiff in a putative class—a class yet to be 
certified—moots both the named plaintiff’s claim and the claims of the 
class members as well.86 By way of background: When a class 
complaint is filed, the complaint must identify one or more named 
plaintiffs. A class action may not proceed without a named plaintiff.87 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 then requires the court to analyze, 
for purposes of certification, whether that named plaintiff is an 
adequate representative of the class and whether that plaintiff’s 
claims are typical of those of the absent class members. 
Since the advent of Rule 23 in 1966, defense counsel have 
employed any number of strategies to defeat class certification. Most 
of those strategies involve arguments, grounded in individualistic 
conceptions of claims, that the requirements of Rule 23 are not 
satisfied. More recently, defendants have turned to Rule 68, which 
permits defendants to make settlement offers to plaintiffs. The 
strategic gambit is this: in the context of putative class actions, 
defendants attempt to entice the named plaintiff to settle under Rule 
68, with the hopes that (1) the settlement (or even offer of settlement) 
will render the claims of remaining class members moot, and (2) that 
remaining class members will be unable to continue their suit 
 
 86.  Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669–70 (2016). 
 87.  Continuation of a class action without a representative would “jettison the last vestiges 
of the case-or-controversy requirement . . . .” Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 233 (7th Cir. 1988). 
“Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires that a plaintiff with a personal stake in the dispute 
be present at all times in the litigation.” David Hill Koysza, Note, Preventing Defendants from 
Mooting Class Actions by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs, 53 DUKE L.J. 781, 798–99 (2003) (noting 
a logical solution to a named plaintiff being picked off is to find a substitute); see also Howe v. 
Varity Corp., 896 F.2d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Class representatives must have a personal 
stake in the outcome of the case at the time the district court rules on class certification in order 
to prevent mootness of the action.”). 
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elsewhere—given that it can be time-consuming and expensive to 
replace the initial named plaintiff in a class action.88 Defendants’ 
gambit is potentially attractive for the named plaintiff: with the 
leverage of the class behind him, the named plaintiff may well be able 
to capitalize on defendants’ broader strategic aims in the form of a 
settlement premium on his own claim. 
The particular instantiation of this problem involved in 
Campbell-Ewald arose after the named plaintiff received an 
unsolicited text message and filed a class claim against Campbell-
Ewald Company alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 1991.89 Pursuant to Rule 68, the defendant offered 
the plaintiff $1,503 for “each unsolicited text message,” costs, and a 
stipulation to an injunction.90 This settlement offer exceeded, by three 
dollars, the statutory maximum awardable for unsolicited text 
messages91—arguably not much of a premium as a matter of the 
underlying substantive law (and perhaps a poor strategic move by the 
defendant, in the end). However, even though the named plaintiff had 
not yet accepted the settlement offer, the defendant rightly noted that 
the offered amount constituted “complete relief” for the named 
plaintiff under the statute. Therefore, the defendant argued, the offer 
of “complete relief” made the case moot and deprived the lower court 
of jurisdiction over the entire case.92 
The defendant’s two principal arguments were driven by an 
individualistic view of claims. First, the defendant argued that the 
named plaintiff should not be prevented from exchanging his claim for 
compensation simply because he is part of a putative class. Second, 
the defendant argued that when a named plaintiff is offered full 
compensation for his claim, there is no property left to exchange, and 
thus, no remaining interest in the lawsuit.93 Driving that second 
argument is the individualistic conception claims that the defendant 
proffered: the named plaintiff’s only interest in his claim is individual 
compensation, and that interest was extinguished once the defendant 
made an offer of complete relief. 
 
 88.  Koysza, supra note 87, at 798–99. 
 89.  Brief for Petitioner at 2, Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663 (No. 14-857), 2015 WL 
4397132, at *2; Brief for the Respondent at 7, Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663 (No. 14-857), 2015 
WL 5064005, at *7. 
 90.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 6–7; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 9. 
 91.  The statute provides five hundred dollars for each violation and the possibility of treble 
damages if there is a knowing and willful violation. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 3, 7. 
 92.  Id. at 10–11. 
 93.  Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 26–35.  
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The defendant also explicitly urged the Court to reject 
collectivist views of legal claims. First, the defendant asserted that the 
named plaintiff “lack[ed] any personal interest in representing others 
in this action”94 and thus there was no “‘real need’ for the court to 
exercise its judicial power.”95 Second, the defendant characterized the 
named plaintiff’s possible collective interests either in helping the 
class vindicate claims or in achieving deterrence as unrelated to the 
nature of claims; instead, those interests were mere “ancillary 
procedural right[s]” that were “extinguished” when the defendant 
made an offer of complete relief.96 Third, as an alternative argument, 
the defendant urged the Court to keep any collective conceptions of 
claims firmly within the boundaries of the class action universe, 
arguing that any such interests vis-à-vis putative class members were 
inconsequential to the mootness analysis because class certification 
had not yet occurred.97 
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the Solicitor General, unsurprisingly, 
adopted a more collective view of the named plaintiff’s claim; both also 
vigorously contested the individual-autonomy framing of the claim by 
the defendant. First, Gomez argued that part of the interest for a 
named plaintiff in his putative class claim is a collective one—of 
recovery for the class, even at the expense of immediate relief to 
himself.98 The government similarly linked the named plaintiff’s 
interest in his claim with those of the class—namely those involving 
the economies of scale achieved for the group via the class device.99 
Second, Gomez argued that an individualistic conception of claims 
would allow defendants to “pick off” class representatives,100 thereby 
forcing remaining claimants to go it alone, often an uneconomical 
choice given the high costs of litigation.101 
 
 94.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 89, at 28 (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 
133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013)). 
 95.  Id. at 16 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). 
 96.  Id. at 27. 
 97.  Id. at 28 (“Thus, when Plaintiff’s individual claim became moot, the absent class 
members were not parties to the lawsuit and had no legal status.”). 
 98.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 34 (“But it is the very nature of 
representative litigation for the lead plaintiff to pursue recovery for the class—even if that comes 
at some cost or delay to his personal recovery.”). 
 99.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Campbell-
Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (No. 14-857), 2015 WL 5138588, at *20. 
 100.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 38; see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 99, at 19 (“[R]equiring multiple plaintiffs to 
bring separate actions, which effectively could be ‘picked off’ by . . . defendant[ ] . . . would 
frustrate the objectives of class actions . . . .”). 
 101.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 89, at 41. 
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The Court rejected the defendant’s mootness argument, but not 
necessarily its conception of legal claims—it left that question 
unanswered. Instead, the Court based its holding on the fact that the 
named plaintiff had not yet accepted the defendant’s settlement offer. 
Because the settlement offer was just that and no more—an 
unaccepted offer, unsupported by any binding judgment or even a 
guarantee that the offer would not be rescinded by the defendant at 
any moment—it did not moot claims. 
Because the Court declined to address the more difficult 
questions raised by the parties’ diametrically opposite conceptions of 
legal claims, the state of the law on the pick-off settlement issue 
remains largely uncertain. Indeed, would the mootness analysis 
change if the defendant actually deposited the funds with the Court, 
thus avoiding the possibility that the offer could be withdrawn? 
Alternatively, do the named plaintiff’s collective interests in 
representing a class affect the conception of his claim such that 
mootness is avoided even if the named plaintiff receives full 
compensatory relief? 
The theoretical questions about the nature of named plaintiffs’ 
claims and the relationship between the named plaintiff and the 
absent class members pre-certification do not only go unanswered in 
Campbell-Ewald.102 Although the literature is robust regarding the 
relationship between the named plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of 
class members post-certification and, relatedly, with regard to the 
individual or collective nature of a class plaintiff’s claim,103 whether a 
named plaintiff’s claims or the plaintiff himself bears some 
relationship to the rest of the class claims or class plaintiffs pre-
certification has not been explored. 
Here, it is difficult to achieve coherence between the 
“appropriate” conception of legal claims and the normative purposes of 
our litigation system. An individualistic view of claims enables the 
named plaintiff to alienate his claim and obtain compensation, 
perhaps more compensation than he could obtain individually, given 
his ability to leverage the class for his own gain. For remaining class 
members, however, a view of claims that affords the named plaintiff 
full autonomy over his own claim may well impede the effectuation of 
their claims, thereby frustrating goals of access to justice and 
 
 102.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. 663 (No. 14-857), 
2015 WL 241891, at *i (presenting the question, which was left unanswered by the Court, if the 
fact that a plaintiff has asserted a class claim has an effect on if that plaintiff’s case becomes 
moot when plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on his claim). 
 103.  See supra Part I. 
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compensation for those plaintiffs and frustrating goals of deterrence 
achievable through group litigation. 
A collective view of legal claims also presents difficulties. At 
first blush, viewing a legal claim as a mechanism for achieving 
collective goals may seem conceptually justified here, as has been 
argued in the post-certification context,104 and perhaps normatively 
justified as well. However appropriate (or not) that collective 
conception is in the post-certification context, it is problematic in the 
pre-certification context. For one, though the named plaintiff is listed 
on a class complaint, until the class is certified, his claim is still 
untethered to any other claim; if there is an “entity,”105 it does not yet 
exist—a conceptual point the Campbell-Ewald defendant made in its 
brief. Largely missing from the defendant’s brief—which primarily 
offered its own formalist account of claims as justification for a 
mootness holding—are arguments about the undesirable normative 
consequences that a strong collectivist view of pre-certification class 
claims would generate. And untethered from a formal entity, that 
claim conception—and its implications for claims involving mass 
harm—has no principled limit; any claims stemming from related 
conduct by a common defendant could now impose collectivist duties 
and responsibilities on claimholders vis-à-vis control over their claims. 
Now, whether to adopt an individualistic or collectivist view of 
legal claims cuts in opposite directions within this same procedural 
context: Access to justice for whom? Compensation for whom? 
Claiming for whom? 
Moreover, even if the Court declared, based upon the particular 
considerations at work in the Rule 68 pick-off context, that the 
collectivist view is the theoretically appropriate conception of legal 
claims, that decision would send shock waves through the system. As 
the next Section discusses, the individual autonomy conception of 
claims has a wholly different normative valence in the context of 
alternative litigation finance. In that context, the road to greater 
access to justice, compensation, and deterrence (at least if one accepts 
the argument that deterrence flows from compensation) is paved with 
money to fund one’s suit. The ability to obtain third-party funding for 
litigation, however, largely demands a view of legal claims as 
individual pieces of property—commodities even—over which 
claimants exercise a great deal of control. 
 
 104.  See supra Part I. 
 105.  See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 917 (stating a class action should be viewed as an 
“entity” and not as an “ ‘aggregation’ of individuals”). 
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B. Limitations on Alternative Litigation Financing Arrangements 
Alternative litigation finance, also referred to as third-party 
litigation funding, is “a group of funding methods that rely on funds 
from insurance markets or capital markets instead of, or in addition 
to, a litigant’s own funds.”106 Undergirding the connection between 
legal claims and litigation funding is a conception of legal claims as 
fully alienable pieces of individual property—property that can be 
sold, in full or in part, to a non-party funder who assists the claimant 
financially in pursuing her claim. 
The emergence of alternative litigation finance is a fairly 
recent phenomenon in the United States.107 In its modern form, third-
party litigation funding enables a party with no relationship to a given 
lawsuit to pay upfront costs facing a litigant (usually a plaintiff or a 
class plaintiff).108 These non-party funders are typically specialist 
funding companies or hedge funds whose business model is to finance 
 
 106.  Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011) (quoting Demand for Third Party Litigation Funding Rises as Supply 
Becomes Volatile, BAKER & MCKENZIE, LLP (2008) (link no longer operative)); see also John P. 
Rafferty, You Have to Spend Money to Make Money: The Rise of Third-Party Litigation Finance 
in International Litigation, PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. BLOG (Mar. 3 2016), http://sites.psu.edu/ 
jlia/you-have-to-spend-money-to-make-money-the-rise-of-third-party-litigation-finance-in-
international-litigation/#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/YLB2-SP8J] (quoting same). 
 107.  The practice of litigation funding is more developed in Australia and the United 
Kingdom, where third-party funders have been investing in lawsuits for many years. In 
Australia,  
the litigation funding industry has since 1995 enjoyed a statutory exception to the 
earlier common law prohibition against maintenance and champerty, in order to 
assisted [sic] company administrators and liquidators to pursue debts on behalf of 
creditors of a company. The industry subsequently expanded in Australia to fund 
class actions and large single plaintiff actions as successive superior court judgments 
overturned common law principles against “maintenance” and “champerty”, imported 
from the British common law. In 2006, the High Court of Australia confirmed the 
legitimacy of third parties funding litigation, or agreeing to indemnify litigants for 
costs, in exchange for a percentage of any recovery. 
Regulation of Third Party Litigation Funding in Australia, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL. 4 (2011), 
https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/ 
RegulationofthirdpartylitigationfundinginAustralia.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WQ2-9XLE]; see also 
Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1279–80 (discussing litigation funding in Australia). The United 
Kingdom has also permitted litigation funding for a number of years. The United Kingdom 
abolished both tort and criminal liability for maintenance and champerty in 1967. Anthony J. 
Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 
453, 453 n.3 (2011) (citing Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third-Party Funding of 
Litigation: A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312, 318 (2008)). In 2007, the Civil Justice 
Council, a court advisory body, recommended against new regulations of the litigation financing 
industry out of concern that such regulations would hinder access to the legal system. Susan 
Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United 
States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 112–13 (2008). 
 108.  Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1275–77. 
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litigation costs in exchange for a portion of any eventual award or 
settlement.109 
However, these modern practices have been compared to 
historical practices of purchasing claims or paying the costs of 
another’s suit—practices that date back at least to feudal England,110 
and practices that, for most of that history, have been prohibited 
under common-law doctrines of champerty and maintenance. In the 
United States, champerty is generally defined as a claim sale between 
a plaintiff or a defendant and a third party for a portion of the 
proceeds of the suit; maintenance is the financing of a suit by the third 
party.111 The person or entity that purchases the interest in the suit is 
known as the champertor and, by definition, has no other interest in 
the suit besides a financial one.112 The purposes behind laws 
prohibiting champerty and maintenance are to prevent “multitudinous 
and useless lawsuits” and to prevent “speculation in lawsuits.”113 
Under English common law, claims and rights could not be 
assigned, and suits not brought in one’s own name were forbidden.114 
As a workaround to the prohibition on assignment of legal claims, 
wealthy people agreed to pay a litigant’s expenses on a legal claim—
frequently one involving title to land—through which the funder could 
potentially become a joint owner of a landed estate.115 Unsurprisingly, 
these claimholders were often poor; further, their opponents were 
frequently enemies of the financer. Through these suits, third parties 
not only sought to gain riches, but also sought to inflict financial or 
political injury upon the enemy defendants.116 The suits were proxy 
battles for separate, feudal wars.117 
Agreements to fund lawsuits were rampant in feudal England; 
neither clerical nor secular courts were able to police them. The King’s 
ministers, the landed gentry, sheriffs, and even judicial officials 
themselves colluded to obtain money through agreements to finance 
 
 109.  Id. at 1276. 
 110.  See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 64 (1935) (“The 
movement against maintenance . . . began as early as the growth of the power of the Crown.”). 
 111.  State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379, 400 (1830); 14 C.J.S. Champerty & Maintenance 
§ 2 (2016); 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty and Maintenance § 3 (2016).  
 112.  14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 17.  
 113.  Id. § 2. 
 114.  Noland v. Law, 170 S.C. 345, 353 (1933); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *135 (stating that champerty is “abhorred” by English law). 
 115.  Radin, supra note 110, at 58–64. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
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strangers’ lawsuits.118 The King’s attempts to eliminate these 
agreements were thwarted by his own law enforcement officials—often 
the worst offenders in the collusive agreements to gain wealth through 
champerty and maintenance.119 
Nonetheless, the abhorrence of the practice by the King and his 
courts traveled across the pond. The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
described the practice of champerty thusly in 1830:  
[Champerty is a practice by which] one lend[s] money to promote and stir up suits . . . 
[he is the] busy-body, the deceiver, the vile knave, or unthrift[; he] excites others to 
litigation, with an intention to vex, and oppress, and by this means extort money, [he] 
is . . . an offender against public justice.120  
Implicit in this view of the champertor was a clear belief that full 
individual autonomy over claims was inconsistent with a strong public 
policy against the vexatious stirring up of litigation by speculators and 
other miscreants. 
At the time of their founding, around half of the states, either 
through common law or by statute, prohibited claimholders from 
selling an interest in their claims in order to effectuate them. Other 
states, even at the time of their founding, recognized that these 
doctrines were outdated and never incorporated them into their 
common law.121 Currently, most states—though not all122—have 
softened their views on doctrines of champerty and maintenance, 
either by abolishing them altogether123 or by limiting the application 
of these restrictions to the scenarios in which financial assistance was 
not solicited by the plaintiff.124 
This doctrinal turnaround, and the rise in alternative litigation 
financing that accompanied it, is predicated on at least two 
interrelated views of legal claims: one conceptual, one normative. The 
first is that legal claims are appropriately conceptualized as 
commodities that can be exchanged, sold, and otherwise alienated by 
 
 118.  Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and Champerty, 35 L.Q. REV. 50, 57–68 
(1919). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379, 399–401 (1830). 
 121.  Radin, supra note 110, at 67–68. 
 122.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (West 2016) (prohibiting maintenance and champerty in 
all situations except contingent fee arrangements); Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. DuPont 
De Nemours & Co., 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 103, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 2014) 
(recognizing champerty and maintenance in Delaware); Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 438 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (noting that in Pennsylvania, maintenance and champerty doctrines are 
alive and well). 
 123.  Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277–78 (2000). 
 124.  Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 725 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(emphasizing that Illinois only prohibits “officious intermeddling” with another’s suit). 
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the claimholder—indeed, according to some scholars, that property is 
an asset that carries risk and therefore can and should be able to be 
transferred either through insurance or litigation funding.125 The 
second view is, as a normative matter, that the effectuation of claims 
is impeded by the high costs of litigation in the United States—costs 
that may be defrayed by litigation funding.126 Litigation funding also 
increases plaintiffs’ bargaining power,127 thereby reducing the costs 
generated by our expansive system of procedure.128 
Opposition falls into two basic camps: those who believe that 
alternative litigation funding harms plaintiffs and those who believe it 
harms defendants. The former believe that, as in feudal England, 
litigation funders take advantage of plaintiffs for their own personal 
gain, leaving plaintiffs with little compensation.129 Moreover, those 
needing litigation funding are “vulnerable” to unfavorable funding 
terms with “sky-high” interest rates,130 terms that should at least be 
made transparent.131 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce currently leads the charge 
against alternative litigation finance as harmful to defendants. It has 
argued that litigation funding creates a “secret” operation against 
defendants who are not “aware that a funder is involved in litigation 
against them.”132 The Chamber and others have also argued that 
 
 125.  Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment, 
Insurance Law, and Double Standards, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833, 848 (2015); Charles Silver, 
Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 
618 (2014). 
 126.  See J. Maria Glover, Alternative Litigation Financing and the Limits of the Work 
Product Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 911 (2016) (analyzing recent discovery cases involving 
alternative litigation financing and concluding that implicit in the various holdings is a belief 
that litigation funding enables otherwise impecunious plaintiffs to pursue their rights). 
 127.  Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1305–06. 
 128.  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural 
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 103 (2010) (arguing that litigation finance arrangements could provide 
compensation for those who cannot otherwise access the expensive litigation system); see also 
Sebok, supra note 125, at 894 (raising similar arguments); Silver, supra note 125, at 618–23 
(arguing that litigation funding is similar to liability insurance and thus permissible and 
desirable in our litigation system). 
 129.  See, e.g., Thurbert Baker, Paying to Play: Inside the Ethics and Implications of Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 23 WIDENER L.J. 229, 231–32 (2013) (noting that lawsuit lenders 
charge rates so high that consumers recover “little or no money” after settling the case); Martin 
Merzer, Cash-Now Promise of Lawsuit Loans Under Fire, FOX BUS. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www 
.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/03/29/cash-now-promise-lawsuit-loans-under-fire/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZP8T-SKBW] (“[L]itigation funding is intended for the desperate . . . .”). 
 130.  Baker, supra note 129, at 232. 
 131.  Bert I. Huang, Litigation Finance: What Do Judges Need to Know?, 45 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS., 525, 527 (2012). 
 132.  Third Party Litigation Funding, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www 
.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) 
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litigation funding will plague defendants with longer lawsuits—as 
plaintiffs reject “reasonable” settlements and hold out for larger 
payouts at the behest of funders—and with nuisance lawsuits—as 
litigation funders bring into court otherwise meritless lawsuits to 
extract settlements.133 Still others criticize litigation funding as 
enabling third parties to fund litigation in order to harm defendants 
for the funder’s own gain—say, to settle old scores.134 
Opponents of litigation funding ground many of their 
arguments in a collectivist conception of legal claims and present that 
view as intertwined with interests of the litigation system as a whole. 
In the context of litigation funding, that conception is internally 
coherent enough. But that position is directly at odds with the 
individualistic conception of claims urged by the Chamber and others 
in the class action context135 and in the context of arbitration 
agreements, discussed below.136 
Putting aside the strategic maneuvering behind this cross-
context incoherence, the important conceptual takeaway is this: in the 
context of alternative litigation finance, the normative implications of 
an individualistic conception of legal claims are inconsistent with, 
 
[https://perma.cc/7SUX-WHXZ] (explaining that third-party litigation funding prolongs litigation 
which hurts defendants who are “forced to divert additional time and money from productive 
activity.”). 
 133.  Id.; see also Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1324 (expressing concern that litigation funders 
will influence the decision of whether and when to settle). 
 134.  A recent example of this possible problem involved Peter Thiel, cofounder of PayPal 
and initial investor of Facebook, who provided approximately ten million dollars to help Hulk 
Hogan (Terry Bollea) sue Gawker Media. See Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, This Silicon Valley 
Billionaire Has Been Secretly Funding Hulk Hogan’s Lawsuits Against Gawker, FORBES (May 24, 
2016, 7:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/05/24/this-silicon-valley-billionaire-
has-been-secretly-funding-hulk-hogans-lawsuits-against-gawker/#3d3785eb7805 
[https://perma.cc/P6BN-GZ2P]. The $140 million awarded to Hogan drew attention to the suit as 
well as to third-party litigation funding. Thiel had “hired a legal team several years ago to look 
for cases” for him to support financially. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire, 
Reveals Secret War With Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/ 
26/business/dealbook/peter-thiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/CV98-9J78]. While Thiel views his litigation funding as “one of [the] greater 
philanthropic things” he has done, others see his funding as a revenge against Gawker for outing 
Thiel as homosexual. Id. Thiel viewed Gawker as a pioneer of a “damaging way of getting 
attention by bullying people” and funded Hogan’s suit for “specific deterrence” of Gawker. Id. 
 135.  See, e.g., Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 17, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-
893), 2010 WL 3167313 (stating that most arbitral consumer claims would not survive the “close 
look” of a trial court). 
 136.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) 
(2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5L9-T4L2] [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY] (finding that 
arbitration contracts disfavor claimholders, often to a large degree).  
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even diametrically opposite to, the implications of an individualistic 
conception of legal claims in the class action context and the Rule 68 
offers of settlement context. In the class action and Rule 68 pick-off 
settlement contexts, an individualistic view may impede claiming; in 
the context of litigation funding, it effectuates claiming.137 The next 
Section explores this conceptual dissonance in one final illustrative 
context: mandatory arbitration agreements in consumer, employment, 
and finance contracts. 
C. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding contractual 
agreements to arbitrate reinforces its largely individualistic 
conception of legal claims. Indeed, it advances an exclusive view of 
legal claims as such.138 This individualistic view of legal claims in the 
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is explicitly indifferent to whether 
that conception impedes claiming, access to justice, compensation, and 
deterrence. 
The Court’s strong individualistic view in this space evolved 
over time. Very briefly, the Supreme Court in the 1980s interpreted 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) as evidencing a “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements.”139 Armed with this language, 
the Supreme Court took a new and relatively aggressive stance vis-à-
vis the conception of legal claims—even those arising under federal 
statutes—as property to be exchanged between private parties, subject 
to private contracts, in private proceedings, with private adjudicators. 
In doing so, the Court simultaneously rejected collective values, such 
as airing of grievances in public courts, providing information about 
wrongdoing through public proceedings, and generating legal 
 
 137.  To be clear, a collectivist view of claims does not absolutely foreclose the ability to 
alienate claims, at least in part. One modern debate about litigation financing is whether 
customary forms of funding through debt—for instance, borrowing for the lawyer working on a 
contingent arrangement or by the client—may be substituted with equity financing, which 
creates, in effect, a limited purpose partnership or corporation. These latter arrangements have a 
historical precedent in state charters, which are set up to further a private aim with a public 
purpose (for instance, disputes over the Harvard and Dartmouth charters). See, e.g., Trs. of 
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (upholding Dartmouth College’s original 
private charter, which predated the formation of the state of New Hampshire, against the New 
Hampshire legislature’s attempt to make Dartmouth a public institution whose trustees would 
be appointed by the Governor). Whatever this debate’s resolution, though, an individualistic view 
of claims no doubt provides the strongest case for alienation and litigation funding. 
 138.  See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015) (detailing Supreme Court jurisprudence’s shift towards dispute 
resolution in arbitration). 
 139.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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precedent. Nonetheless, the Court for decades indicated that its 
willingness to promote values of individual autonomy rested upon a 
critical premise: those values were consistent with, and indeed helped 
achieve, the efficient, cost-effective resolution of claims. 
However, faced with contractual provisions designed by 
defendants to make arbitration more onerous for claiming, the Court 
ultimately resolved what had become, at the Court’s behest, a tension 
between individual-autonomy conceptions of claims and the notion 
that arbitration existed to resolve claims firmly in favor of individual 
autonomy.140 The coup de grâce was its 2013 decision in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,141 wherein the Court held 
that plaintiffs’ waiver of class procedures in an arbitration contract 
was enforceable under the FAA even though—as defendants 
stipulated—those claims could not be brought individually.142 In one 
fell swoop, the Court jettisoned the notion, expressed in prior 
opinions,143 that it “would have little hesitation” to strike down 
arbitration contracts if they impaired parties’ ability to bring federal 
statutory claims.144 
After Italian Colors, consumers, employees, and others are free 
to exchange any and all potential legal claims for, say, something as 
simple (but usually necessary) as a credit card. Or a cell phone. Or a 
job.145 Given now-permissible terms in arbitration contracts that 
frustrate claiming, however, those legal claims are almost never 
effectuated,146 much less exchanged for compensation.147 
 
 140.  See Glover, supra note 138, at 3058–74 (discussing Supreme Court weighing of freedom 
of contract with enforcement of substantive rights). 
 141.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 142.  Id. at 2310–12. 
 143.  See Glover, supra note 138, at 3068 n.67 (tracing multiple cases). 
 144.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 
(1985). 
 145.  Maureen Sherry, Opinion, A Colleague Drank My Breast Milk and Other Wall Street 
Tales, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/opinion/a-colleague-drank-
my-breast-milk-and-other-wall-street-tales.html [https://perma.cc/67UZ-RUP2] (detailing various 
incidents of discrimination she and others faced while working as brokers; neither she nor her 
colleagues could bring claims under Title VII because they had signed binding arbitration 
agreements requiring dispute resolution by entities tied to the financial industry). 
 146.  This was the case in Italian Colors. Even though the individual claims were of 
relatively high value, the cost of an antitrust expert far exceeded the value of any individual’s 
claim, rendering it a negative-value claim and thus non-pursuable. 133 S. Ct. at 2308. 
 147.  Of the 244 cases in which companies made counterclaims against plaintiffs in 
arbitration, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found, in its Final Report on Arbitration, 
that those companies obtained relief in ninety-three percent of the cases; of “341 cases filed in 
2010 and 2011 that were resolved by an arbitrator,” consumers obtained relief in nine percent of 
disputes. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 1, at 12. Even when claims are 
brought in arbitration, the deck is stacked against them. See, e.g., Arbitration: Is It Fair When 
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Here, an individualistic conception of unfettered rights of claim 
ownership—unmoored from any other purpose or limitation—disables 
claiming, frustrates access to justice, compensation, and, potentially, 
deterrence.148 The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence—which enables 
defendants to use any number of procedural provisions to frustrate 
claiming—stems in part from the efforts of proponents who advocated 
for an individualistic conception of claims149 and touted its virtues,150 
at least in this context.151 Compensation for claims need not be in the 
 
Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Forced 
Arbitration Hearing] (discussing the Minnesota Attorney General’s shutdown of the National 
Arbitration Forum for being biased against consumers and for having taken money from 
financial institutions). Corporations fare far better in arbitration than individuals do, with 
individuals prevailing in about nine percent of cases and corporations, on counterclaims, in about 
ninety-three percent. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 1, at 12. Further, 
compared to class litigation, individuals fared far worse in arbitration vis-à-vis compensation 
and entry of judgments. Id. at § 6. 
 148.  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise 
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005) (arguing that the threat of class 
action liability plays a vital role in deterring corporate wrongdoing); Glover, supra note 138, at 
3075–83 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence effectuates a functional removal of 
substantive law from the books without legislative approval); Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. 
Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 807 (2009) (arguing that the 
privatization of “the enforcement of statutory rights erodes those rights”); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1634 (2005) (“[T]he use of 
mandatory arbitration is curtailing the use of jury trials and class actions . . . and is limiting 
public access to our justice system.”); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class 
Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2006) 
(noting that many courts have emphasized that class actions provide access to justice for claims 
that would otherwise be economically impossible).  
 149.  See Opening Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC at 36–43, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 08-56394), 2009 WL 2494186, at *36–43 (arguing that the fact that a 
class action may be barred is of no consequence because litigant still had a right to their 
individual claim). 
 150.  See, e.g., Forced Arbitration Hearing, supra note 147, at 14–16, 151–63 (statements of 
Christopher R. Drahozal, John M. Rounds Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and 
Faculty Development, University of Kansas School of Law, and Victor E. Schwartz, U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform and U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (focusing on freedom of 
contract values and benefits of arbitration to consumers in the form of bringing claims and 
exchanging litigation for cost savings); The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7–8 
(2007) (statement of Peter B. Rutledge, then Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law, 
Catholic University of America) (arguing that “eliminating predispute arbitration agreements 
would not make individuals as a whole better off”); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against 
Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 
270 (2008) (arguing that individuals should have control over their claims and that arbitration 
benefits consumers); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90–93 (raising similar arguments). 
 151.  The individualistic conception of claims was not the ultimate gambit; it was the 
contractual provisions it enabled. See, e.g., File a Complaint, AT&T.COM, https://www.att.com/ 
esupport/article.html#!/wireless/KM1041856 (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) [https://perma.cc/LKG3-
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form of remediation for wrongdoing; instead, proponents argued, it 
could be exchanged ex ante in a contractual trade that benefited 
consumers.152 Indeed, proponents posited that this individualistic 
approach to claims enabled potential claimholders to obtain, say, a cell 
phone, at a lower price.153 There is no empirical support for this cost-
savings claim.154 
 
* * * 
 
This conceptual incoherence across the litigation landscape has 
real consequences. Consider the following not-unexpected combination 
of all the foregoing examples. It illustrates the inability of formalist 
conceptions of legal claims to achieve either conceptual or normative 
coherence across the procedural landscape. 
Say that a group of female employees are allegedly 
discriminated against at a Wall Street firm. They wish to bring a Title 
VII class action against the firm, but they cannot afford to pay the 
litigation costs, including hefty expert fees, to prove their claims. 
Therefore, their attorney seeks out a third-party funder, who agrees to 
finance the suit in exchange for a portion of any eventual award. The 
employer immediately files a Motion to Compel Arbitration, noting 
that all employees signed a binding arbitration agreement with a class 
action prohibition as a part of their employment contracts. Under a 
strong individualistic view of legal claims, as has been adopted by the 
 
MP6J] (containing a blow-up provision that requires a court to strike the entire agreement if it 
strikes the class action prohibition clause). 
 152.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013) (discussing 
limitations that are in place to ensure arbitration’s benefits); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 
(arguing that “the principal advantage of arbitration” is its informality, which creates a faster, 
more efficient, and less costly process). 
 153.  Such cost savings were said to result from the reduced litigation burden on the contract 
drafter. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Nonmutual Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 J. CORP. L. 
537, 541 (2002) (arguing that consumers will benefit from arbitration in the form of cost savings); 
Ware, supra note 150, at 90–93 (arguing that mandatory arbitration lowers consumer prices 
because litigation cost savings are passed on from corporations to consumers). But see 
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 771 
(acknowledging that there may not be cost savings for consumers because of mandatory 
arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
75, 93–98 (2004) (arguing that Ware’s arguments about cost savings for consumers are based 
upon oversimplified economic assumptions). To date, no definitive empirical evidence has 
demonstrated this to be the case. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136. 
 154.  When the CFPB conducted an empirical investigation of the claim that mandatory 
arbitration agreements result in lower prices for consumers in the form of passed cost savings, it 
found that there was no support at all for the alleged phenomenon. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION 
STUDY, supra note 136, § 10.3, at 15–17. 
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Supreme Court in its arbitration jurisprudence, these agreements are 
enforceable, and the suit is over. 
Imagine, however, that the opposite conception of legal claims 
is taken—that they are intertwined with other class members’ claims, 
that they are also mechanisms of deterrence—and thus they cannot so 
freely be traded away like chits of property in a form contract. The 
court thus denies the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and the case 
proceeds—financed by the litigation funder. The defendant employer 
moves to compel the discovery of various funding documents, arguing 
in part that litigation-funding arrangements are illegal under 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty. Now it is the defendant 
arguing that claims cannot be freely alienated. Plaintiffs’ counsel 
argues that such alienation is permissible, and, as such, the requested 
documents are irrelevant and/or protected by the work product 
doctrine. Assume the court agrees, and in its opinion notes that 
impecunious parties should be free to alienate their claims in whole or 
in part in order to pursue those claims. Very early in the suit, the 
court has already taken two separate conceptual views of legal 
claims—a collective one to deny the Motion to Compel Arbitration, and 
a strong individualistic view to obtain the funding. 
 Assume now that the defendant makes the named plaintiff a 
settlement offer under Rule 68 for nearly twice the expected value of 
her individual claim. The defendant knows that being a named 
plaintiff in this sort of lawsuit brings all manner of unwanted 
attention, and it suspects that few others, if any, would be willing to 
serve in that capacity. Additionally, of those who might be suitable to 
assume the lead plaintiff role, few have as compelling a claim as this 
named plaintiff. A strong individualistic view of claims enables the 
named plaintiff to profit handsomely from her claim sale; the opposite, 
collectivist view broadens access to justice and compensation overall 
but diminishes it for one. 
In this scenario, at every turn, the named plaintiff, the court, 
and the defendant are at a conceptual crossroad. Individual property 
views of claims lead in opposite directions all throughout the suit. The 
opposite is also true. Perhaps most importantly, in this example, 
following one conceptual road—a strong individualistic conception of 
legal claims—ends the suit at the arbitration stage. Following the 
collectivist conception ends the suit when the class attempts to gain 
financing. In both cases, neither suit even gets off the ground. 
Stepping back, what the foregoing analysis reveals is this: the 
cross-cutting view provided here offers a new perspective—not one 
that resolves the debate, but one that reveals the possible futility in 
doing so. Indeed, the foregoing examples in this Part illustrate a 
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broader problem for procedure: debates within particular procedural 
arenas about the proper conception of legal claims—whether as 
individual or as more collective in nature—do not point the way 
forward on key objectives in our litigation system. 
III. A REGULATORY THEORY OF LEGAL CLAIMS 
Resolving the “intractable” debate between individualistic and 
collectivist conceptions of claims would lead our litigation system in 
normatively and conceptually incoherent directions. However, if 
resolving that debate could not yield a sound approach to questions of 
litigant autonomy, what can? 
This Article provides a new theory of legal claims—one that 
can more coherently address the foundational normative goals of our 
litigation system by permitting a less rigid approach to litigant 
autonomy—which this Article refers to as a “regulatory theory of legal 
claims.” Drawing upon insights from property theory, economic 
theory, and litigation theory, Section A develops the theory that the 
individual property rights associated with legal claims may be subject 
to regulation in appropriate circumstances. It then offers a theory of 
the judicial role, within the confines of its lawmaking power vis-à-vis 
procedural law,155 as appropriately including regulation of litigant 
autonomy. Finally, it provides a specific theory of procedure’s role as 
appropriately directed toward, among other things, reducing 
substantial transaction cost barriers to claiming. That theory of 
procedure’s role simultaneously provides the crucial first, functional 
building block of an overall regulatory framework for operationalizing 
this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims. 
Section B then applies this theory to the procedural issues 
discussed in Part II and to the class-certification disputes addressed 
by the conceptual debates in Part I. This analysis provides new 
 
 155.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (referred to as “The Rules Enabling Act”); 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (tracing the 
history and meaning of the Rules Enabling Act); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging 
and Substantive Law, 90 U. WASH. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (discussing interstitial substantive 
lawmaking by the judiciary in “procedural” decisions). The precise scope of the Court’s 
procedural lawmaking power under the Rules Enabling Act, particularly in federal question 
cases, has not been fully explored or theorized by scholars or by the Court. I begin to develop a 
theoretical basis for the scope of the Court’s procedural lawmaking power in federal question 
cases in forthcoming work. See J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Trans-Substantive” 
Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (setting forth the theoretical principle of 
procedural symmetry as one principle for operationalizing the Enabling Act limitations on the 
Court’s procedural lawmaking power). 
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insights into those procedural problems, and it reveals a number of 
benefits to the theory—including increased transparency in 
procedural decisionmaking and reduction of strategic gamesmanship 
of the sort highlighted in Part II. It also generates, for further 
consideration, a number of new potential changes to procedural 
doctrine. 
A. A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims 
Viewed across the broader litigation landscape, formalist 
conceptions of legal claims generate both negative and positive 
repercussions for important normative goals like access to justice, 
compensation, and deterrence. Thus, these conceptual dichotomies are 
unappealing on their own formalist terms in their inability to produce 
a clear and coherent path to resolving difficult questions in our 
litigation system. Instead, they produce directly conflicting answers. 
The regulatory insight from that stalemate is this: the way 
forward is to break free from absolutist views and to develop a theory 
for regulating individual autonomy over legal claims. This Section 
develops such a theory and proceeds in three Parts. Part 1 provides 
theoretical bases for departing from formalistic conceptual 
frameworks for legal claims and litigant autonomy and for adopting 
an alternative approach—a new regulatory theory of legal claims. 
Drawing insights from property theory, economic theory, and 
litigation theory, this Part posits that litigant autonomy over legal 
claims can be regulated in certain appropriate circumstances—here, 
at the very least, to correct transaction cost-based failures within the 
market for legal claims. Part 2 then builds on this regulatory theory of 
legal claims by addressing institutional expertise and power for 
regulating litigant autonomy over those claims. In particular, while it 
seems relatively uncontroversial that Congress and state legislatures 
could (and do) regulate litigant autonomy in both substantive and 
procedural laws, the litigation focus of this Article requires, and Part 2 
provides, a theoretical account of the judicial role and judicial 
lawmaking power as legitimately including the regulation of legal 
claims and litigant autonomy, including through procedural 
mechanisms. Part 3 begins a larger project of defining the nature and 
scope of procedure’s role in regulating legal claims and litigant 
autonomy. It does so by providing a theoretical account of procedure 
as appropriately directed toward addressing the particular market 
failure highlighted in Part 1—transaction cost barriers to the 
effectuation of recognized substantive rights.  
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1. Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims: From Conceptual Absolutism  
to Regulating the Market for Legal Claims 
Moving from conceptual theories of legal claims to a regulatory 
theory of legal claims is perhaps a bold step. It cuts against decades of 
individual property conceptions of legal claims embedded in various 
procedural rules and doctrines; it also challenges some of the 
foundational assumptions underlying formalist approaches to legal 
claims and litigant autonomy. Nonetheless, this Article’s regulatory 
theory of legal claims is not a radical proposal. For one, it does not 
require departure from existing judicial and scholarly approaches to 
legal claims as forms of property; indeed, if anything, many theoretical 
underpinnings and principles of property theory commend this 
Article’s approach.156 For two, this Article’s regulatory theory of legal 
claims has additional intellectual foundations in positive (and 
relatedly, transactional) economic theory, as well as litigation theory.  
Thus, the development of this Article’s regulatory theory of 
legal claims can begin, somewhat uncontroversially, with the Supreme 
Court’s long-accepted notion that legal claims are forms of property.157 
 
 156. To be clear, though, this Article’s theory does not necessarily require a foundation in 
property-based conceptions of legal claims to arrive at a conclusion that litigant autonomy can be 
restricted, at the very least, in order to effectuate foundational normative goals of the litigation 
system. That regulatory insight could potentially stem, say, from an institutional account of legal 
claims. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2010) 
(drawing upon Dworkin’s work to argue that litigant autonomy and day-in-court ideals are 
embedded in the institution of civil adjudication and therefore subject, in scope and content, to 
factors that lead the institution to serve its functions and normative purposes). Further, one 
might potentially ground in institutionally based theories the notion that, to the extent 
alienation and exclusion of legal claims are central procedural rights attendant litigant 
autonomy, those procedural rights can be restricted to take account of social costs. See, e.g., 
RONALD DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, and Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 86 (1985) 
(acknowledging the social-cost limits to the imposition of an outcome-based theory of procedural 
rights). Of course, an institutional approach to procedural rights vis-à-vis legal claims might well 
justify greater regulation of litigant autonomy in certain circumstances than would a property-
based approach; further, depending on one’s particular views regarding the values, purposes, and 
normative underpinnings of the institution of civil adjudication, an institutional baseline for 
regulating litigant autonomy might lead to different regulatory prescriptions than one grounded 
in property theory, economic theory, and litigation theory. This Article does not take on these or 
related questions here. Because this Article’s regulatory theory is designed in significant part to 
respond directly to the pathologies of our existing litigation system, it does not depart here from 
the property-based foundations of legal claims embedded in long-standing Constitutional 
doctrine and the longer span of historical approach to and understanding of legal claims. See, 
e.g., supra Part II (discussing the long history of doctrines of maintenance and champerty, 
themselves premised on a property-based conception of legal claims). 
 157.  See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (explaining that “[t]he 
hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state 
law”); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Logan for the 
proposition that a pending cause of action, “even before it is reduced to a final dollar amount, it 
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Two principal rights attendant ownership of property are the rights of 
alienation—the right to sell or transfer in whole or in part—and of 
exclusion—the right to keep non-owners from entering or using the 
property.158 Simple enough. 
It is at this preliminary stage that both rigid individualistic 
and collectivist conceptions of legal claims arguably go astray, not just 
as a matter of the normative underpinnings of our system of 
litigation,159 but as a matter of the very principles of property theory 
undergirding those formalistic conceptions. Some of the confusion 
assuredly lies here: informing the litigant autonomy debate are 
unresolved and underexplored notions of property, property rights, 
and the contours of property ownership,160 where questions regarding 
whether and to what extent alienation rights attach are both central 
 
is a ‘species of property’ ”); N.Y. State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Pataki, 261 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“There is no dispute that a legal cause of action constitutes a ‘species of property protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.’” (citation omitted)). 
 158.  Many scholars have written about the concept of property as a “bundle of rights”; a 
crucial part of that bundle is alienation. See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & 
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 319 
(1997) (“No expression better captures the modern legal understanding of ownership than the 
metaphor of property as a ‘bundle of rights.’ ”); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of 
Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996) (“The currently prevailing understanding of property 
in what might be called mainstream Anglo-American legal philosophy is that property is best 
understood as a ‘bundle of rights.’ ”). It is worth noting that similar rights of alienation and 
exclusion would not necessarily be precluded by a theory of legal claims grounded largely in the 
institutional commitments of courts rather than the property-like nature of claims. See generally 
Bone, supra note 156 (suggesting that the nature of and limitations on procedural rights derive 
from the institution—civil adjudication—in which they are embedded). 
 159.  See supra Part II and Part III.A.  
 160.  Among property scholars and policymakers, there is continued conceptual 
disagreement about the nature of property and property rights. See, e.g, PETER M. GERHART, 
PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 2 (setting out a social-morality-based theory of the nature 
of property ownership and property law as aimed at fostering and governing community 
relationships related to property); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, State of Nature Theory, 
and Environmental Protection, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 2 (2009) (“Questions about property 
rights, their origin, and their measure have been at the forefront of serious political discourse 
since ancient times.”). This Article does not seek to resolve that underlying confusion, which may 
inform the confusion underlying conceptual debates about legal claims. Further resolving this 
underlying confusion is not necessary for this Article’s central proposal of a regulatory theory for 
legal claims, even as a matter of property theory. Once property comes into existence, it moves 
around—through contract, through inheritance and intestate succession, through gifts, through 
taxation, and in other ways, including alienation. Alienation typically involves substituting one 
form of property for another, so the fact that claims are not original forms of property in, say, the 
Lockean sense is not problematic. Claims are things people receive as substitutes for their 
property, either involuntarily (through tort, for instance) or more-or-less voluntarily (through 
contract, for example). Claims are a poor substitute for money (perhaps the ideal substitute for 
property), but they are a form of compensation for property. See also, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. 
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (holding that INS had violated Associated Press’s property 
right in news stories—which had no copyright protection—by rewriting them and publishing 
them in INS’s own paper). 
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and difficult.161 Perhaps because of that confusion, or perhaps in spite 
of it, formalist conceptual dichotomies implicitly adopt equally 
formalist and extreme conceptions of property and property rights, 
conceptions that have led procedural doctrine to diverge not only from 
normative goals of our litigation system, but also in important ways 
from principles of property theory and the manner in which property 
law often functions.  
To illustrate, take the collective notions of property often 
underlying equally collectivist conceptions of legal claims. These 
include views of property as having a decidedly public character162 and 
views of property as having a collective character to maximizing group 
and individual welfare.163 The prescriptions for litigant autonomy, 
 
 161.  This debate is particularly pronounced in the world of intellectual property. Compare 
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 
(2004) (noting the “propertization” trend in intellectual property law and discussing limits in 
property law that should apply to intellectual property law), Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter 
Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993) (discussing benefits 
associated with treating trademarks like property), Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking 
Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016) (drawing parallels between the AIA’s alteration of 
the scope of vested patent rights and regulatory takings of property), Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990) (“[E]xcept in 
the rarest case, we should treat intellectual property and physical property identically in the 
law.”), Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property Infringement as Vandalism, 18 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015) (discussing the relationship between property law and 
intellectual property law), and Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The 
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 690 (2007) 
(discussing the historical application of the Takings Clause to patents), with Shubha Ghosh, 
Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After 
College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000) (arguing that private 
property’s application to intellectual property could only occur through analogy), and Davida H. 
Isaacs, Not All Property is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings 
Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007) 
(“[P]atentholders are not entitled to assert takings claims.”).  
 162.  See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS AND CLUB GOODS 143–299 (1996) (describing the features of a public good). Instead, some 
collectivists’ conceptions seem informed by a means-based conception of property. 
 163.  See, e.g., Campos, supra note 9, at 1074–79 (viewing claims as most efficiently able to 
generate deterrence and individual compensation through collective proceedings); Rosenberg, 
supra note 9, at 844; see also C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally 
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986) (noting that property law promotes “cooperative 
and productive activity” where individual welfare depends on “effective uses of resources” and 
the collective welfare depends on allocation of goods to the highest value user); Garrett Hardin, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (explaining the concept of tragedy of the 
commons and societal benefits from limitations placed on growing population). An example of 
such a collective notion of property is in the use of zoning ordinances. See generally Vill. of 
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (upholding constitutionality of 
zoning ordinance “asserted for the public welfare”). For examples of zoning ordinances, see, for 
example, S. F., Cal., Ordinance 22-15 (Feb. 3, 2015) (planning ordinance art. 2.5 § 253 governing 
height of proposed buildings and structures); City of Ladue, Mo., Ordinance 1175 (Apr. 28, 2016) 
(providing restrictions for fences (sec. IV C)). And at least with regard to litigant autonomy, these 
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though, are roughly the same. Heavy-handed restrictions, if not 
outright bans, on individual autonomy are permitted and perhaps 
required. 
However, it is a long-standing tenet of property theory that 
restraints (particularly private restraints) on alienation and exclusion 
are generally disfavored.164 This is not to say that regulations of 
property rights are never imposed on collectivist grounds. Indeed, 
courts often ground restrictions of property rights in collectivist 
notions. For instance, with zoning laws, the theory behind interference 
with property rights is that all individuals’ property values will 
increase if no individuals are allowed to, say, construct a 
monstrosity.165 Moreover, much of the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence finds that collectivist, welfare maximization concerns 
can override absolute rights to control over one’s property (with 
compensation).166 
Nonetheless, such regulations are exceptional. Just as 
individual ownership is not absolute, it is not absolutely subject to 
regulation, either. Quite the contrary. Property law proceeds from 
what one might call a “default” position that property rights ought not 
be infringed absent compelling reason. So too should any property-
grounded theory of legal claims. 
 
views share similarities with collective views of the institution of civil adjudication itself as being 
public in nature, thus imbuing legal claims with a similarly public character. See, e.g., Owen M. 
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Unmoored from the limitations of property 
theory and doctrine, though, collective, and quite broadly public, views of civil adjudication might 
well generate different, and more expansive, regulatory prescriptions vis-à-vis litigation 
autonomy—a question and its implications this Article defers to future work.  
 164.  For instance, assume a developer wishes to erect a brand-new city-center complex. If 
one hundred homeowners live in the desired area, but only ninety-nine agree to sell, the 
developer cannot force the holdout to do so. The developer could, however, take his concerns to 
city hall and convince them that the development would serve any number of city-specific 
interests. The city could then condemn the property for “public use,” and so long as reasonable 
value is provided to the holdout, the right of exclusion would likely not, under long-standing 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, trump the justifications for regulating that right. See infra notes 
173–175 and accompanying text. 
 165.  See William K. Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values, 36 
ENVTL. L. 105 (2006) (discussing how land-use regulations increase property value partly due to 
“scarcity effects,” in which an increase of scarcity of land-use for a particular purpose drives up 
surrounding property prices); see also Elizabeth Rhodes, UW study: Rules Add $200,000 to 
Seattle House Price, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 14, 2008), http://old.seattletimes.com/html/ 
businesstechnology/2004181704_eicher14.html [https://perma.cc/XWR5-GQQZ] (attributing price 
increase to land-use regulations due to their limitation on supply of land for construction). This 
theory dovetails somewhat with David Rosenberg’s theory of class actions: the most efficient use 
of property—here, legal claims—is secured not through the facilitation of maximum individual 
control over the claim, but through collectivist-driven restrictions on alienation. Rosenberg, 
supra note 9. 
 166.  See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
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This is especially true given that collectivist justifications for 
overriding litigant autonomy will often arise on a case-by-case, or 
context-by-context, basis. This is perhaps unsurprising, given a 
similar tendency in the property law context. Indeed, collectivist 
concerns regarding litigant autonomy will not arise consistently as a 
matter of degree or kind across the wide swath of the litigation 
landscape167 or even within the same procedural context.168  
On the other hand, the near-absolute conception of rights of 
alienation and exclusion underlying individualistic conceptions of 
legal claims conflicts with the fact that, as a matter of property law 
and theory, such near-absolute rights do not flow inexorably from the 
existence of property ownership.169 Yet little is provided in the way of 
theoretical justification by the Court or in the scholarship for why 
legal claims should be treated so differently from other forms of 
property. 
Property rights like alienation and exclusion are not 
unfettered. Fundamentally, the law of property will enforce as 
property “only those interests that conform to a limited number of 
standard forms.”170 The principle that property forms are fixed—
referred to as numerus clausus—is a universal feature of the property 
landscape and stands as a significant limitation not only on freedom of 
contract, but also on individual choice vis-à-vis property.171 The 
principle of numerus clausus is commended by its purpose of 
preventing the generation of high transaction costs by idiosyncratic 
property (and alienation by its initial holder)—costs that would almost 
inevitably be imposed upon third parties.172 
Further, the Supreme Court has, in any number of cases, 
regulated property rights like alienation for reasons relating to the 
 
 167.  See supra Part II. 
 168.  See infra Part III.B (pointing out how collectivist views of legal claims sometimes 
advance normative goals, including efficiency—and the associated compensation for 
individuals—in class actions, but sometimes do not). 
 169.  Pure litigant autonomy views of legal claims are not particularly consistent with how 
property rights are treated as a general matter, except perhaps in a very Lochnerian sense. See 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (setting forth a largely unbridled view of property and 
contract rights that ushered in the “Lochner” era of the same). 
 170.  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000). 
 171.  See id. at 3–4. Though frequently criticized, Merrill and Smith defend numerus clausus 
on the ground that, when new property rights are created, third parties must spend considerable 
time and resources to figure out the contours of those rights, how to avoid violating them, and 
how to acquire them; in short, idiosyncratic rights generate costs, costs that will likely not be 
internalized by those seeking to create them—in other words, these new rights become a “true 
externality.” Id. at 8. 
 172.  Id. 
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public interest, for the benefit of the courts, and to further other 
governmental interests, just to name a few.173 Courts have also 
restricted property owners’ ability to convert property in certain 
situations where doing so would harm third parties or their property 
interests.174 Finally, although the Supreme Court has held that the 
government may not completely destroy the value of one’s property 
without compensation, a property owner cannot demand that his 
property retain its same form, condition, or character.175 
The regulatory insight is this: While property law certainly 
disfavors restraints on alienation and exclusion, those rights are not 
accurately described as absolute. So too with legal claims. The next 
question, of course, is this: What are the “appropriate circumstances” 
for regulation of legal claims? 
It is at this point that insights from property theory converge 
with insights from litigation theory and positive economic theory. 
Litigation theory helps situate the property and its attendant rights 
and uses in context. Specifically, and with some admitted differences 
(discussed below), much of the functioning and character of our 
litigation system resembles that of a commodities market.176 Most 
legal claims are exchanged for some form of compensation.177 This 
 
 173.  The Court has taken a rather loose approach to what constitutes “public use” or “public 
interest” for purposes of whether the government can interfere with someone’s property rights. 
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the City of New London 
could exercise eminent domain in furtherance of their economic development plan, which met the 
“public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 
(1984) (making clear that property rights are qualified and that the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 
1967, which transferred title in real property from lessors to lessees in order to reduce the 
concentration of land ownership, constituted “public use” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment); 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that it was in the power of Congress to take into 
account, in enacting redevelopment legislation that called for the condemnation of petitioner’s 
property, aesthetic and health considerations).   
 174.  See, e.g., Licari v. Blackwelder, 539 A.2d 609 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). 
 175.  See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (holding that the state’s use of 
interest from “interest on lawyers’ trust accounts” did not constitute a regulatory taking because 
clients suffered no net loss and finding that the state was authorized to use the interest from the 
accounts to pay for legal services for the poor, as it qualified as “public use”); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that the New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Commission’s approval of a fifty-story office building on top of Grand Central 
Terminal did not constitute a taking). 
 176.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697 
(2005) (describing the litigation system as a market for legal claims); Molot, supra note 128 
(discussing skewed settlements as a market failure and providing a market-based solution); Jack 
L. Millman, Note, Structuring a Legal Claims Market to Optimize Deterrence, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
496 (2016) (proposing methods for optimizing the market for claims within the context of third-
party litigation funding). 
 177.  See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 176, at 709 (describing the typical legal claim as 
involving an exchange for compensation). 
       
264 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:221 
exchange exists against a backdrop of a public system and public 
rules.178 Nonetheless, that public apparatus explicitly encourages 
private enforcement of regulatory directives179 through a private 
contract in the form of settlement.180 In short, legal claims exist within 
a system that looks much like a market—a market for claims. 
To be clear, this market for legal claims is necessarily limited 
to economic claims exchanged (or sought to be exchanged) for 
compensation (whether through settlement or some form and degree 
of adjudication). This market would therefore generally not include 
claims for indivisible noneconomic relief.181 Nor would it include 
claims involving subject matter not typically believed appropriate for 
alienation either as a matter of property or procedural law.182 
The existence of a market for legal claims—now clarified—
yields an additional regulatory insight: among other things, regulation 
of legal claims might be warranted to correct market failures. This 
regulatory insight, however, requires qualification. Economic theorists 
have identified a number of conditions that constitute market failure 
in standard markets, such as negative externalities, transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, and agency problems.183 The market for 
legal claims, however, is not a typical market, in a number of respects. 
For one, the market for legal claims lacks the many buyers and 
sellers that tend to produce efficient market outcomes: claims can 
currently be “sold” only to a limited number of “buyers” (defendants) 
by a limited number of “sellers” (plaintiffs). To be sure, market 
 
 178.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 19, 21 (AM. LAW INST. 2016) 
(stating that res judicata applies to private settlement agreements). 
 179.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment. 
 180.  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 2 (tracing the history of the rise of settlement and arguing 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ought to better align with that litigation endpoint); 
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1996) (explaining why, in our system, it is usually better to 
settle); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations 
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991) (explaining why most cases 
settle). 
 181.  For instance, claims for purely injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) are currently not 
within the scope of this Article. However, claimants often seek some modicum of monetary relief 
under Rule 23(b)(2). See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 366–67 (2011) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to join claims for back pay with claims for injunctive relief under 
Title VII). Given the uncertainty of the law, this Article leaves specific consideration of these 
hybrid claims for another time. 
 182.  See generally Abramowicz, supra note 176, at 722–26 (discussing “procedural justice” 
and alienability); David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of 
Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 727–28 (2012) (citing examples of inalienable property). 
 183.  See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 2012); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 
2014); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). 
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conditions of bilateral monopoly (or, where there are multiple 
plaintiffs, potentially conditions of oligopsony monopoly) are not 
unique to litigation—they exist in other areas, including property and 
contract—and those conditions do not stand as a barrier to regulation 
in those contexts in certain defined situations.184 Nonetheless, as a 
general matter, what constitutes a market failure in a market 
operating under such a constraint is frequently unclear—particularly 
given that the bilateral monopoly itself can generate its own unique 
market dysfunctions.185 Moreover, this peculiarity of the market for 
legal claims, among others (such as the pronounced role and strategic 
incentives of counsel in market transactions), makes the process of 
identifying and defining market failures difficult. Accordingly, direct 
wholesale importation of market-failure definitions from capital 
market and positive economic literature to a regulatory theory for 
legal claims would be inappropriate. 
Therefore, as a starting point for designing a regulatory 
framework that flows from the theoretical notions set forth thus far, 
this Article focuses initially on one well-defined and persistent market 
failure in litigation: transaction cost barriers to the effectuation and 
exchange of recognized legal claims.186 What constitutes “appropriate 
circumstances” for the regulation of claims, then, at least includes the 
need to correct this fundamental market failure. 
 
* * * 
 
So far, this Article has offered normative and theoretical 
justifications for eschewing formalist conceptions of legal claims. It 
has then offered a theoretical justification for regulating, in 
appropriate circumstances, litigant autonomy over legal claims. It has 
done so, moreover, without requiring radical departure from the 
Supreme Court’s long-standing property-based conception of legal 
claims. It has additionally offered grounding—both as a matter of 
property theory and transactional economic theory—for the notion 
 
 184.  For example, after a buyer contracts to purchase a home, but before closing, the 
condition of that market is one of bilateral monopoly. As a consequence, there are restrictions on 
what buyers and sellers may do during that period: a buyer typically cannot do something that 
would significantly damage his credit; a seller cannot tear down the garage. In the world of 
contracts, one often finds requirements contracts, exclusive supplier contracts, and requirements 
contracts with exclusive supplier provisions—all situations characterized by bilateral monopoly, 
all situations subject to regulations in contract law. 
 185.  See supra note 184.  
 186.  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating 
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2119 (2000) (advocating for subsidized transaction costs for low-value claimants). 
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that legal claims can be regulated to reduce or prevent transaction 
cost barriers to effectuating substantive legal rights. 
It is uncontroversial that such regulation of individual 
autonomy could be embodied in the substantive law. (Indeed, many 
regulations of real property are embodied in substantive law). 
Congress or state legislatures could of course regulate litigant 
autonomy vis-à-vis particular substantive claims within statutory 
remedial schemes. The basic regulatory theory of legal claims, set 
forth above, is consistent with such regulation.  
This Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, however, was 
offered in large part as a response to the inability of formalist theories 
of legal claims to guide procedural law in normatively coherent ways. 
Indeed, proponents of those formalist theories have largely sought to 
dictate the contours of procedural law, not the content of laws 
governing primary conduct. Thus, the following Parts develop two 
additional components to this Article’s regulatory theory of legal 
claims. One, a theoretical account of whether and to what extent it is 
appropriately within the scope of the judicial role and courts’ 
lawmaking powers to regulate litigant autonomy, including through 
procedural law and decisionmaking. Second, a theoretical account of 
the role of procedure as appropriately harnessed in that regulatory 
capacity, and more specifically here, as directed toward the reduction 
of transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of recognized 
substantive rights.  
2. A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims:  
The Judicial Role and Lawmaking Power in Regulating Litigant 
Autonomy 
  Operating on the premise that claimants are often appropriately 
characterized as property holders with certain rights vis-à-vis their 
claims,187 one preliminary question is whether it is properly within the 
role of the judiciary to regulate those property interests. One 
traditional justification for government regulation of property rights is 
that the ownership of property is inextricably bound up with 
numerous public institutions and processes of the government. With 
real property, of course, the source of regulation is often legislatively 
enacted statutes or edicts issued by a democratically elected body (like 
a city council)—the democratically elected bodies with which the 
 
 187.  Again, at least as a theoretical matter, one could also operate on the premise that these 
rights are “procedural rights,” unmoored from property conceptions, rights that derive from the 
institutional exigencies of civil adjudication, and thus subject to some level of regulation by the 
judiciary. See supra note 163. 
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ownership of property is often inextricably bound. And to be sure, it 
would be entirely appropriate for Congress or a relevant state 
legislature to regulate litigant autonomy, say, by omitting a private 
right of action for enforcing a particular substantive remedial scheme 
itself188 or in a stand-alone “procedural” legislative enactment.189   
The justification for property-rights regulation by a 
government institution with which those rights are inextricably 
bound, however, has significant purchase vis-à-vis the judiciary as 
well. This is obviously true with regard to the substantive common 
law of property and judicial involvement in proceedings like the 
attachment of real property. It is likewise true with regard to legal 
claims more generally. Indeed, the fact that regulation of legal claims 
could—and in some instances, should—emerge from a democratically 
elected government body, does not diminish the justifications for 
judicial regulation of legal claims. Indeed, the judiciary is the 
government body most inextricably bound up with the ownership of 
legal claims.  
 Indeed, at least once a private right of action has been created, 
the judiciary is the government institution with which ownership of 
legal claims (even those ultimately sent to arbitration under the 
FAA190) is arguably most inextricably bound. At a basic level, the 
public provides the subsidy for the use of courts and thus for the 
bringing and pursuing of claims. State and federal procedural rules—
promulgated, at least in the federal system, by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to congressionally delegated authority—provide the pathway 
for the effectuation of claims. Courts provide the means for 
enforcement of judgments, even those reached through private 
contract. Courts enter into judgment—and thus insinuate their 
continued supervision and management of—settlements between 
parties.  
Further, courts have long had the authority to engage in 
regulation on behalf of the public interest, partly on the theory that 
the government provides the courts. For example, the “public interest” 
is one of the criteria for issuing an injunction—a criterion one might 
say permits regulation on behalf of the public. Of course, not every 
 
 188.  See, e.g., In re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 679, 707 (D.N.J. 2006) (finding 
no private right of action under the Sarbanes-Oxley certification provisions based on Congress’s 
explicit use of rights-creating language in 15 U.S.C. § 7244). 
 189.  See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (Consol. 2016) (prohibiting plaintiffs whose claims arise 
under statutes providing for penalties or minimum damages awards from bringing those claims 
as part of a class action). 
 190.  Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (providing for judicial review of arbitral 
awards). 
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injunction actually serves the public interest, and not every public 
interest justifies regulation. Along those lines, defining the scope of 
judicial authority to regulate in the “public interest” cannot 
reasonably be done only by reference to the fact that the public 
provides the courts.  
It would instead seem appropriate for the interconnectedness 
between the publicly funded judiciary and the ownership of legal 
claims to provide both partial justification for and boundaries of the 
judicial role in regulating legal claims. Thus, whether regulating 
ownership of legal claims or other forms of property, the definition of 
what constitutes the “public interest” ought to derive from—and not 
extend beyond—the functions, institutional concerns, and normative 
commitments of the judiciary and the exigencies of civil 
adjudication.191 Thus, identification of a public interest related, say, to 
the operation or character of the courts is appropriately the basis for 
judicial regulation;192 invocation of unrelated public interests might 
well constitute an inappropriate judicial exercise of regulatory 
power.193  
That said, many of the relevant “public interests” associated 
with judicial regulation of litigant autonomy—and, more particularly, 
regulation of that autonomy to address litigation market failures like 
transaction cost barriers to claiming—are intertwined with the 
functioning of courts and the normative values underlying, say, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.194 For instance, judges have an 
interest in and a normative commitment to managing their own 
dockets; they also have institutional normative commitments to 
 
 191.  In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court engaged in regulation of property subject to 
racially restrictive covenants purely for the public interest—for purely social policy and social 
justice reasons. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Good as those reasons may be as a social policy matter, the 
implications for judicial authority to regulate property rights might be described as intolerable in 
breadth—with no limiting principle, what was to stop any court, anywhere, from restricting 
property rights for any reason it liked? Untethered from any constraint on “public interest” for 
purposes of the scope of judicial regulatory authority, Shelley arguably represented an 
inappropriate exercise of judicial authority more appropriately undertaken by democratically 
accountable legislatures and regulatory agencies. 
 192.  One can already find examples of procedural regulation appropriately described as 
being more for the benefit of the courts and the public than litigants. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 
(governing settlement conferences); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (setting forth the requirements for 
class certification). 
 193.  See supra note 191 (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer).  
 194.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] should be construed, 
administered, and employed by the court . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”); infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the normative 
purposes discussed by the Rules’ drafters, including resolving claims on their merits). 
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resolving legal claims efficiently and on their merits.195 At times, 
judges even have fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duties to litigants and 
their claims, usually when those litigants’ claims are being pursued on 
a representative basis.196 
Moreover, courts have unique and particularized expertise in 
the dynamics of claiming, the litigation process, and claim resolution. 
And the value of this expertise is not diminished simply because, 
under this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, judges would be 
called to engage in “regulatory”-type analysis when making decisions 
regarding litigant autonomy over claims. Indeed, courts already 
perform this sort of analysis in various areas of the litigation 
landscape. As just one example, courts engage in regulatory-like 
balancing of normative trade-offs in procedural interpretation and 
innovation vis-à-vis individual autonomy over legal claims in the class 
certification and settlement process. As Richard Nagareda has traced 
in the context of mass torts, for instance, the process of resolving legal 
claims resembles regulatory administration.197 Any number of 
conceptual and normative considerations—individual autonomy, 
access to justice, compensation, deterrence, collectivist values like 
increasing settlement leverage for the class—are at play and in 
tension within this procedural arena. Nagareda has argued, therefore, 
that judicial review of mass settlements under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e) ought to resemble the “hard look” doctrine in 
administrative law,198 which requires administrative agencies to 
provide reasoned explanations for their choices and to explicitly 
 
 195.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (interpreting FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8 as requiring plaintiffs to set forth “plausible” claims for relief, thereby injecting 
increased merits-based consideration earlier in litigation partially on the grounds that meritless 
claims impose undue settlement pressure on defendants and clog the courts’ dockets); CHIEF 
JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2U8D-SAHR] (emphasizing that the 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure reflect the need for judges to run cases efficiently and to manage dockets). 
 196.  See, e.g., In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig., 985 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“In considering the fairness of fees the courts serve as fiduciaries, guarding the rights of 
absent class members.”); see also Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 
1975) (“Under Rule 23(e), the district court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of 
the rights of absent class members.”); Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: 
Preliminary Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833 (2011) (discussing the judge’s role as a 
fiduciary in class action and quasi-class-action fee review). 
 197.  See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 14, at 5. 
 198.  See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56–
57 (1983) (utilizing the hard look doctrine to find agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously when 
it failed to provide adequate basis and explanation for its action). 
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balance competing normative considerations.199 Nagareda’s 
prescription (and, in some cases, description200) rests upon notions 
that the judiciary has both the authority and the expertise to engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis to regulate individual autonomy over class 
claims. 
Of course, for Nagareda, the demand for a “hard look” analysis 
derives in large part from the administrative-like nature of a mass-
tort proceedings generally.201 Perhaps, then, judicial expertise vis-à-
vis legal claims, litigant autonomy, and litigation dynamics would not, 
for Nagareda, justify the “regulatory”-type decisionmaking urged by 
this Article.202 But perhaps his view would not be so limited.  
Even at the time Nagareda urged a “hard look” analysis in the 
context of mass torts, the Court had already engaged in a regulatory-
type balancing analysis outside of the mass-tort context.203 More 
fundamentally, however, the appropriateness of judicial regulation of 
legal claims has support in procedural history and theory itself—
particularly the history and structure of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Historically, the motivations for and the creation of the 
modern administrative state and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
developed largely in parallel. As Hiro Aragaki has explored, many of 
the same concerns that animated administrative regulatory reform in 
the 1920s and 1930s animated the work of the procedural reformers 
operating at the same time.204 Indeed, Pound, Clark, and other 
procedural reformers were working within a larger progressive context 
that sought, through various forms of regulation, to achieve both 
 
 199.  Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 903 
(1996). 
 200.  See, e.g., id. at 917–19 (describing an administrative-like approach to settlement 
approval and design by Judge Robert M. Parker); see also Martha Minow, Judge for the 
Situation: Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
2010, 2021 (1997) (describing the various administrative-agency-like tasks Judge Weinstein 
assumed in his development, supervision, and management of the Agent Orange class 
settlement). 
 201.  See Nagareda, supra note 199, at 948–52. 
 202.  This is, of course, a tragically unanswerable question. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, John 
C.P. Goldberg, Samuel Issacharoff, Suzanna Sherry, Tributes to Richard Nagareda, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 1401 (2010) (four separate tributes). 
 203.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (finding that individuals have a 
statutorily granted property right to Social Security benefits which can only be terminated 
without sufficient due process protections, and determining the extent of those due process 
protections by devising an administrative-like balancing test of private and public interests). 
 204.  Aragaki, supra note 6, at 1975–77 (focusing primarily on the enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act as being of a piece with Pound’s and Clark’s procedural reforms, particularly vis-
à-vis the achievement of access to justice). 
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substantive and procedural goals, like better access to justice and 
efficient and fair resolution of disputes.205  
Thus, it seems entirely within the scope of the judicial role—
both as a matter of the institutional relationship with and expertise 
regarding legal claims—to regulate litigant autonomy. A second 
question is whether and to what extent such regulation falls within 
the scope of the courts’ substantive and procedural lawmaking powers 
(and particularly, the more limited powers of the federal courts206). As 
for substantive lawmaking powers, federal courts are rather 
constrained, as they generally lack the power to make common law.207 
However, federal courts do have interstitial lawmaking power in 
relation to federal statutes.208 Unless Congress has provided to the 
contrary, courts have some leeway to interpret and give meaning to 
relevant statutes,209 to apply statutory dictates to case-specific facts, 
and to fill in statutory gaps—all of which may bear on litigant 
autonomy over claims.210 Thus, exercise of this power in ways that 
determine or impact litigant autonomy is, at least as a theoretical 
matter, appropriate vis-à-vis the balance of power between Congress 
and the judiciary.211  
 
 205.  Id. at 1969–71. 
 206.  Of course, state courts have broad powers to develop common law that may well define, 
expand, or restrict litigant autonomy over claims. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64 (1938). 
 207.  See id. 
 208.  See, e.g., Wolff, supra note 155, at 1044. 
 209. This Article does not address long-standing debates regarding the precise scope and 
proper methods of federal courts’ power in matters of statutory interpretation. For views on this 
debate see, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (setting forth the various mechanisms of textual 
analysis of statutory and constitutional provisions); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, 
and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009) (rejecting the notion that all text—
particularly as it ages—can be given reliable meaning by judges, and therefore counseling in 
favor of judicial restraint in matters now best left to the democratically accountable branches of 
government); Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 
2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism 
[https://perma.cc/EJ2Y-LDXU].    
 210.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (interpreting FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 in light of what Congress said in the Rules Enabling Act); Wolff, supra note 155, at 
1044 (discussing the federal courts’ interstitial lawmaking power vis-à-vis substantive statutes); 
see also Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 725–26 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(concluding that plaintiffs’ funding arrangement did not constitute “officious” intermeddling 
under Illinois laws prohibiting maintenance and champerty). 
 211.  See Glover, supra note 155 (setting forth a theory of “procedural symmetry,” whereby 
federal courts have power to interpret federal statutes in ways that affect the operation of 
procedural rules as a matter of separation of powers and the Rules Enabling Act, but arguing 
that the Court’s current practice of making these substantive judgments implicit or obscure 
contravenes the judicial responsibility to provide particularized analysis and reasons for 
substantive decisions in its opinions). 
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Indeed, federal courts have long exercised this interstitial 
lawmaking power to determine whether federal statutes do or do not 
provide a private right of action in the face of statutory silence—an 
exercise of power that goes to the very existence of legal claims and 
any accompanying litigant autonomy. Further, the Supreme Court has 
recently interpreted a number of substantive federal statutes in ways 
that bear directly on litigant autonomy over legal claims as a matter 
of substantive law—for instance, by either facilitating or impeding the 
class action device.212  
The scope of federal courts’ procedural lawmaking powers is 
also circumscribed, but likely still broad enough to include room for 
some regulation of legal claims and litigant autonomy. In the federal 
system, it is the Supreme Court’s task, subject to congressional 
approval, to promulgate procedural rules,213 so long as those rules do 
not have the effect of “abridg[ing], enlarg[ing], or modify[ing]” 
substantive rights.214 Federal courts then have room, within the 
(somewhat disputed215) confines of the Rules Enabling Act, to 
interpret and apply those procedural rules, even in ways that would 
affect litigant autonomy over claims, so long as any procedural 
decision does not conflict with the explicit dictates of the relevant 
substantive right. To synthesize, and as I have explored in other work, 
the federal courts’ exercise of procedural lawmaking power must not 
(1) contravene any explicit statement to the contrary by Congress or 
relevant state legislature in the substantive right or remedial scheme 
 
 212.  See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013) 
(interpreting Rule 10b–5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as not requiring proof of 
materiality at the certification stage, thereby reducing transaction costs to the effectuation of 
securities fraud claims, now more easily certifiable as a class action as a matter of substantive 
law); Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “Trial by Formula” as it would infringe 
upon defendants’ right, under Title VII, to raise defenses in individual proceedings against 
plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination, thus imposing limitations on plaintiffs’ ability to aggregate 
claims). 
 213.  Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 462–65 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (positing that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is either valid under the Enabling 
Act or not), and Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs,, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 409–10 
(2010) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (making the same basic point about the validity of Federal 
Rules), with Shady Grove, 599 U.S. at 416–19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (positing that the second 
portion of the Enabling Act should be analyzed in a specific comparison of the relationship 
between the relevant Federal Rule and the relevant state policy), and John Hart Ely, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–25 (1974) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), for ignoring the second provision of the Rules 
Enabling Act). 
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itself216 or (2) contravene a binding judicial interpretation of 
substantive law, at least without explicit change, clarification, or 
reversal of that prior substantive proclamation.  
For example, a federal court could not, say, interpret a federal 
statute that explicitly provided for a private right of action as not 
containing one. Similarly, it could not allow plaintiffs to satisfy the 
strictures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by using a statistical 
sampling of trials if the language of the relevant federal statute under 
which plaintiffs brought claims explicitly stated, or was interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to mean, that defendants have a right to rebut any 
plaintiff’s claims through individualized proof.217 In both situations, 
the federal court would have tread upon the separation of powers 
concerns underlying the Rules Enabling Act by using procedural 
decisionmaking to “abridge, modify, or enlarge” congressionally 
enacted pronouncements, whether those contained explicitly in the 
statutory text or in the Court’s interpretations of that text.218 
 
 216.  Shady Grove, 599 U.S. at 404, 410 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (describing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 as a rule that “really regulates procedure,” and thus is valid under the Enabling Act 
and also ignoring as irrelevant legislative history about the New York state legislature’s purpose 
in enacting a statute that prohibited the use of class actions to vindicate claims involving 
statutory penalties or statutory damages); id. at 418–20, 436 (Stevens, J., concurring) (urging a 
more robust analysis under the Enabling Act that would take into account substantive state 
prerogatives but concluding that because the New York legislature’s class action prohibition for 
claims giving rise to statutory penalties was not embodied in any particular substantive statute 
that provided for said penalties, applying FED. R. CIV. P. 23 in federal court did not “abridge, 
modify, or enlarge” a substantive right under the Enabling Act). The dissenting Justices in 
Shady Grove, not to mention scores of procedural theorists, may not draw the line between 
substance and procedure as Justice Stevens did in Shady Grove, between specific substantive 
statutes and stand-alone statutes that apply broadly to those substantive statutes. Id. at 443–45 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing on the substantive policies behind N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b), 
though not within the Enabling Act rubric of Hanna). I do not resolve that debate here. For the 
time being, this Article clarifies the scope of the judiciary’s procedural lawmaking power to 
regulate legal claims by reference to the existing boundaries of that power embodied in current 
Supreme Court doctrine. 
 217.  Dukes, 564 U.S. at 367 (holding that plaintiffs’ proposed “Trial by Formula” to 
overcome Rule 23 certification hurdles was prohibited by the Enabling Act, as it would ride 
roughshod over defendants’ right to rebut plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination through 
individualized proceedings); Wolff, supra note 155, at 1034–37 (noting that the relevant portion 
of Title VII regarding the right individualized defenses was not explicit about whether that right 
required individualized proceedings and concluding that the Court engaged in interstitial (but 
implicit) substantive lawmaking on that score). 
 218.  The scope of federal courts’ procedural lawmaking power under the Enabling Act is less 
clear in diversity cases, in a number of respects. One continuing question is what constitutes 
“judge-made” law versus a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure under the Erie doctrine. See, e.g., 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 458 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for not finding 
that certain Seventh Amendment interests were bound up with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59). Another is whether and to what extent the validity of federal procedural rules under the 
Enabling Act calls for analysis of state substantive policies in particular cases. See, e.g., Shady 
Grove, 559 U.S. at 425 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Enabling Act analysis should 
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Congress has not explicitly deemed legal claims arising under 
federal statutes generally, or certain legal claims in particular, as 
forms of property, individual or otherwise.219 Unless Congress (or a 
state legislature, when relevant) states otherwise, then, courts are not 
bound to formalistic conceptions of legal claims when engaging in 
procedural decisionmaking, at least not as a matter of separation of 
powers. As discussed above, though, the Supreme Court has explicitly 
held that legal claims are forms of property, and it has exhibited a 
trend toward individualistic conceptions of legal claims in certain 
areas of its jurisprudence.220 Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to 
assert that the Court had adopted one or the other formalistic 
conceptions of legal claims.221 The scope of judicial procedural 
lawmaking power, even the more limited version for federal courts, 
thus appropriately includes room for regulation of litigant autonomy 
over legal claims through procedure.  
 
* * *  
 
 The foregoing provided an account of the appropriateness of 
the judicial role in regulating litigant autonomy over claims, as well as 
the general scope of the judiciary’s substantive and procedural 
 
not simply ask whether a Federal Rule “really regulates procedure,” but should consider whether 
that rule “abridges, modifies, or enlarges” a state substantive right); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 462–
65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are either valid or 
not). Finally, there is continuing debate regarding whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be interpreted narrowly to avoid conflict with important state policies. Shady Grove, 559 
U.S. at 457–59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that all efforts should be made to 
accommodate state interests in the analysis of whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
actually conflicts with the state law). For a fuller discussion of the Court’s continued struggle for 
coherence and theoretical soundness in its Erie jurisprudence, see, for example, Stephen B. 
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010). 
 219.  Perhaps the closest Congress has come to doing so was including a “collective action” 
provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act, but in the FLSA, Congress made no explicit mention 
of a conception of legal claims, and it would be inappropriate to read the statute as doing so. For 
one, the history of the FLSA itself, as well as the “collective action” provision, suggests that it 
was intended to apply to low-wage, unorganized (non-union) workers. See FRANCES PERKINS, 
THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 247–59 (1946). Moreover, the “collective action” provision in the FLSA is 
not mandatory; indeed, it requires an affirmative choice by any would-be litigant to opt-in to the 
action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 220.  See supra Part I. 
 221.  Indeed, just last term, the Supreme Court invoked language sounding in collective 
conceptions of legal claims in issuing a holding that, to the extent statistical evidence was 
permissible in an individual case, it must also be available in a class case. See Tyson Foods, Inc. 
v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (recognizing the inherently collective nature of 
certain types of injury and stating that “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is ‘the only 
practicable means to collect and present relevant data’ establishing a defendant’s liability’ ”).  
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lawmaking powers in doing so. However, an important, related 
question remains: Is there an account of procedure itself (somewhat 
broadly defined222) that would support and then operationalize that 
judicial power? 
Answering that question comprehensively would of course 
require an equally comprehensive theoretical account of procedural 
rights and the related roles of procedure in our litigation system. Such 
a task is well beyond the scope of a single article. However, the next 
Part begins that larger project by offering a theory of procedure as 
appropriately directed toward reducing transaction cost barriers to 
claiming.  
3. A Theory of Procedure in Reducing  
Transaction Cost Barriers to the Effectuation of Substantive Rights  
This Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims calls for the 
regulation of litigant autonomy to address market failures—and in 
particular, here, transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of 
recognized legal claims. Building upon the foregoing, then, this final 
Part provides an account of the role of procedure as properly directed 
toward regulating litigant autonomy for that purpose. Before 
proceeding, a few preliminary points are in order. To begin, this 
account of procedure’s role in reducing transaction cost barriers to 
effectuating recognized rights should not be understood as prescribing 
the only role for procedure, either in our litigation system generally or 
within this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims in particular. 
Nor is it intended to suggest that this procedural role is absolute, in 
the sense that it would necessarily have to be balanced with, and at 
times against, other procedural roles when relevant and appropriate. 
Instead, the following account of procedure’s role in reducing 
transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights is 
offered here as (1) a building block toward a larger theoretical account 
of procedure and procedural rights and (2) a foundational component 
of an ultimate overall regulatory framework for operationalizing this 
Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims.  
An account of procedure as appropriately directed toward 
reducing transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of recognized 
legal claims perhaps logically begins with, and is certainly grounded 
in, the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves. The 
 
 222.  See supra Part II.B (discussing substantive doctrines like maintenance and champerty 
that are nonetheless “procedural” in nature, given that they do not govern primary human 
behavior or conduct). 
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dominant conception of procedure and of the Federal Rules, oft 
repeated over the decades in judicial opinions, casebooks, and 
scholarly works, is that procedure is the “handmaid” of substance. 
That conception of procedure drove the work of the Rules’ drafters, 
particularly Pound, who viewed procedure’s relationship with 
substance as one of aiding—not just getting out of the way of—
resolution of substantive claims on the merits. 223 
For procedure to serve as the “handmaid” of substance, Pound 
emphasized the need for judicial (as opposed to party224) discretion 
over procedure, and that  
[e]xcept as they exist for the saving of public time and maintenance of the dignity of the 
tribunals, . . . rules of procedure should exist only to secure to all parties a fair 
opportunity to meet the case against them and a full opportunity to present their own 
case; and nothing should depend on or be obtainable through them except the securing 
of such opportunity.225 
 For Pound, procedure’s role in providing a “full” and “fair” 
“opportunity” to litigants to present or defend their cases was integral 
to procedure’s role in aiding the resolution of cases on the merits. 
These interconnected purposes are reflected in Pound’s specific 
suggestions regarding the content of procedural rules—for instance, 
those regarding rules of pleading, joinder, and trials, among others—
suggestions that ultimately found expression in the Federal Rules 
themselves.226 
Pound’s view regarding the roles of procedure—and 
particularly the role of “secur[ing] to all parties . . . a fair opportunity 
to present their case”—are consistent with the role for procedure 
prescribed by this Article. For starters, to the extent transaction cost 
barriers to the effectuation of recognized substantive rights are 
present—whether as a general matter, as a product of procedural law, 
or as the result of party engineering of the procedural landscape to 
generate those costs—procedure’s prescribed role in securing an 
opportunity for litigants to present their cases would seem to involve 
 
 223.  See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1182 (stating that a basic philosophy of the 
Federal Rules is to facilitate a “determination of litigation on the merits”); Tidmarsh, supra note 
2, at 527 (noting that one key goal of the new procedural rules was “the resolution of cases on 
their substantive merits,” and did not intend for procedure to be subjugated to substance, but 
rather to be integrated with it). 
 224.  While Pound leveled any number of criticisms of the adversarial system, he accepted its 
assured survival, as the “yoke of commercialism” had long since perverted “the relation of 
attorney and client” to one of “employer and employee.” Pound, supra note 4, at 415, 417. 
 225.  Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 402 (1910). 
 226.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 527–28.  
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the reduction of those costs in appropriate circumstances.227 To put the 
point perhaps as Pound might, procedure should ensure that cases are 
resolved on the merits, not the transaction costs. 
Moreover, the law and economics insights from which this 
procedural role derived228 resonate with Pound’s theories of procedure. 
In particular, the notion that procedure should reduce transaction 
costs and error costs229 aligns with Pound’s views that procedure 
should both secure for litigants an opportunity to present their cases 
and facilitate the resolution of cases on the merits. Moreover, whether 
expressed in economic terms (as transaction and error costs) or in 
procedural terms (as opportunity for claiming and merits-based 
resolution of claims), the two roles for procedure are complementary, 
even if at times in tension. Indeed, procedure’s role in reducing error 
costs230—acknowledged as a necessary role even by those espousing 
outcome-based theories of procedure—helps blunt potential normative 
arguments that allowing procedure to reduce transaction cost barriers 
to the effectuation of claims will gin up litigation and bring claims of 
dubious merit into the system.  
Along those lines, and as with any procedural role, the role in 
reducing transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of recognized 
 
 227.  As this Article has acknowledged, various strains of procedural theory have long 
recognized that any procedural role, however dominant a given theory argues it should be, must 
be balanced against competing interests. See, e.g., supra note 156. That said, it is not the task of 
this Article to set forth to resolve long-standing debates regarding the theoretical or normative 
value and/or scope of the day-in-court ideal by settling questions of which procedural interests—
beyond the ones articulated here—matter and by how much. For particular views on these 
debates, see, for example, Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural 
Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1880 (2009) (providing a theoretical grounding for the day-in-court 
ideal, from which the authors argue the Court should almost never depart); Lawrence Solum, 
Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (arguing that participation rights are the 
touchstone of procedural rights). See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 
(1979) (discussing the notion of a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue for purposes of 
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel). 
 228.  See supra Part III.A. 
 229.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 183, at 773–76 (describing the role of procedure as one of 
reducing transaction costs and error costs); Kuo-Chang Huang, Does Discovery Promote 
Settlement? An Empirical Answer, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 241 (2009). 
 230.  See POSNER, supra note 183. Procedure’s role in reducing error costs is acknowledged 
by theorists outside the law and economics realm as well. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 156, at 
1018–25 (discussing Dworkin’s outcome-based theory of procedural rights and moral harm, 
which nonetheless takes into account error costs). Moreover, at least inasmuch as Pound believed 
that the primary purpose of adjudication was to produce outcomes that enforced the substantive 
law, he would likely consider it part of procedure’s role to reduce error costs. Like outcome-based 
and social justice theorists who would emerge later, Pound’s view that the ultimate goal for 
procedure was to bring about merits-based resolution would seemingly be offended by, say, the 
extraction of verdict, settlement, or other resolution based on nonmeritorious claims. See, e.g., 
Glover, supra note 2, at Parts I and III. 
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rights is necessarily constrained by the relevant substantive rights 
themselves. As a historical matter, procedure was inherently 
constrained by the subservient role vis-à-vis substantive rights that 
Pound ascribed to it; more formally, it is constrained by the 
substantive law because of the Rules Enabling Act, the Erie doctrine, 
preemption doctrines, and the like. This constraint, however, is also 
question-begging vis-à-vis the appropriateness of directing procedure 
toward the reduction of transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of 
claims: Specifically, and in the absence of any explicit regulation of 
litigant autonomy within a particular substantive law, is there 
anything about substantive rights qua substantive rights that limits, 
or even precludes, this theory of the role of procedure? 
At a broad level, this question highlights the substantive law 
flipside of Pound’s procedural coin. For Pound, procedure was meant 
to integrate with substantive law,231 and the ultimate social justice 
goals Pound associated with the outcomes of adjudication were 
inextricably linked with the procedures for administering substantive 
rights.232 Yet, as commentators have noted, Pound’s theories of social 
justice were decidedly thin,233and thus his prescriptions run the risk 
that procedure would facilitate the enforcement of normatively 
undesirable legal rules and therefore facilitate social injustice.  
  Since Pound’s time, far more robust accounts of social justice, 
the nature of law and moral harm, and substance-divorced roles of 
procedure have emerged.234 And in no way do I diminish their 
importance or relevance to any ultimate theory of procedure and 
procedural justice. It is important to note, though, that many of these 
concerns relate more directly to the ex post effects of any adjudicative 
judgment upon primary human behavior—ex post effects that, to be 
 
 231.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 523 n.37 (citing various of Pound’s works, including 
Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1905) (using the history of law and 
equity to argue against legal formalism vis-à-vis substance and procedure)). 
 232.  Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 4, at 406 (criticizing the formalist 
procedural and litigation system, the “sporting theory of justice,” of the early 1900s as follows: 
“The inquiry [in the cases] is not, What do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the 
inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?”). 
 233.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 530.  
 234.  Since Pound’s time, theories for justifying law—such as natural law, legal positivism, 
and morality theories—have been developed and enriched. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (law and morality); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
(1980) (natural law); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (legal positivism); JOHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (theory of justice in a pluralistic society). For discussion of some of 
procedure’s additional, substance-divorced functions, see, for example, John R. Allison, Ideology, 
Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657 (1994); Robert G. Bone, The Process 
of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 887 (1999). 
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sure, constituted one of Pound’s key, but under-theorized, goals for 
trans-substantive procedure. An account of procedure as properly 
directed toward the reduction of transaction costs to the effectuation of 
recognized rights, however, involves an interaction between substance 
and procedure that is more bound up with ex ante opportunities—
opportunities for participation in a lawsuit, and opportunities for 
presenting one’s claims to a court in the first place.  
Though obviously related to any ultimate effects of 
adjudication, the interconnectedness between the “handmaid” role of 
procedure ex ante and substantive law therefore relates less directly 
to outcome-based metrics of social justice and more directly to the 
functional nature of substantive rights. Private rights of action—
whatever their ultimate normative valence—are neither self-starting 
nor self-executing. And courts (as well as other forms of dispute 
resolution, for that matter) are accessible only through assertion, 
through procedural means, of a right to remedy under substantive 
law. If cases should be resolved on their merits (or at least not on their 
transaction costs), reduction of the financial impediments of court 
access or lawsuit maintenance seems foundational to procedure’s 
“handmaid” role ex ante.235  
Indeed, the ex post goals reflected in the text of the Federal 
Rules themselves—again, whatever their normative valence—are 
derivative of and dependent upon this related, but conceptually 
distinct, ex ante role for procedure in reducing transaction cost 
barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights. For instance, Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that procedure should facilitate the 
“determin[ation]” of claims; achievement of that goal would 
necessarily require procedural mechanisms for the bringing of 
claims—and indeed, such mechanisms can be found in the Federal 
Rules.236 More importantly, in creating these mechanisms—
 
 235.  To be sure, Congress can address transaction costs in its statutory remedial schemes, 
for instance by including statutory or treble damages provisions to ease the costs of claiming. 
This sort of substantive lawmaking is of course consistent with regulating legal claims and 
litigant autonomy set forth in this Article. Nonetheless, transaction cost barriers to claiming 
have persisted even in the face of such statutory provisions. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (involving nonmarketable claims arising under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, which provides for treble damages); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (construing narrowly the terms “prevailing 
party,” contained in numerous federal statutes providing fee awards to “prevailing part[ies],” as 
not applicable unless the legal relationship between the parties had been altered by final 
judgment or, say, a consent decree).  
 236.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 7 (defining pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 8 
(governing the sufficiency of pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (providing various opportunities for a 
party to defend against claims brought against her). 
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particularly those related to pleading—Pound and the reformers were 
guided by a view that procedural technicalities should not erect 
barriers to claiming: procedure should not discourage ordinary people 
from bringing claims to court;237 rather procedure should secure 
litigants the opportunity to present their cases. Indeed, if procedure 
has no role in securing some modicum of opportunity for litigants (and 
perhaps “ordinary” litigants in particular) to present their cases, 
procedure’s interrelationship with substantive law ex ante does not 
amount to all that much; its interrelationship ex post amounts to even 
less.  
As it turns out, though, these assertions about the weakness of 
the relationship between procedure and substance, whether ex ante or 
ex post, are less predictive than they are descriptive. Commentators 
have noted that, over the years, procedure has been reduced to 
somewhat of a second-class status; rather than being interrelated with 
substance, procedure has been shunted to the side.238 Indeed, an 
anemic or formally nonexistent interrelationship between substance 
and procedure is precisely the sort of relationship the Supreme Court 
has described in recent cases. A prominent example comes from the 
majority opinion in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 
authored by the late Justice Scalia. There, the Supreme Court 
described substantive rights as “merely formal,”239 thereby accepting 
the descriptive reality that substantive rights are not self-executing as 
normatively tolerable or even desirable.240 The Court’s description of 
substantive rights as “merely formal,” though perhaps the most 
blatant in language, is nonetheless an unsurprising outgrowth of the 
Court’s rigidly formalistic (and arguably theoretically unsound241) 
 
 237.  See Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 522–25. 
 238.  Id. at 516. 
 239.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310; see also Glover, supra note 138, at 3073 (“In 
abandoning the idea that arbitration agreements cannot impair parties’ practical ability to bring 
federal statutory claims, the Court effectively reduced federal substantive causes of action to 
mere formalities.”). Even in Italian Colors, the Supreme Court acknowledged, begrudgingly, that 
notions of effective vindication of statutory rights might cover filing and administrative fees in 
arbitration—transaction costs—that would make access to the forum impracticable. Italian 
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11. This equivocation on the point seemed to reflect, at best, a 
grudging acceptance of its prior dictum to that effect in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 
531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000), but possibly a willingness to retreat from that dictum in the future. 
Glover, supra note 138, at 3073. 
 240.  Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (stating that the existence of a substantive right does 
not carry with it a procedural path to vindication). 
 241.  See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 218 (arguing that formalism is unsound policy); 
Glover, supra note 155.  
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views of “procedure” and “substance” that have long existed in its Erie 
and Hanna jurisprudence.242  
Under a “merely formal” conception of substantive rights, it 
would not necessarily be impermissible for procedural law to reduce 
transaction costs to claiming.243 However, neither the Court’s decisions 
in Shady Grove and Italian Colors nor the formalism undergirding 
those opinions would consider it either the appropriate role of 
procedure or the dictate of substantive rights to reduce those costs. 
Indeed, the Court in Italian Colors makes clear that private parties 
may engineer the procedural landscape in ways that increase those 
costs, at least in arbitration. Pound, I daresay, would shudder at these 
thoughts.244 
The Court’s “merely formal” conception of substantive rights, 
however, is not just problematic for Pound. Without an opportunity for 
vindication, substantive rights amount to little or nothing as a matter 
of property theory (worth nothing) and as a matter of certain long-
standing strains of rights theory (actually nothing).245 And this notion 
that one role for procedure is to secure an “opportunity” for the 
vindication of these substantive rights, lest they amount to nothing, 
also undergirds the Rules Enabling Act itself, which calls for 
consideration of the interaction between substantive rights and 
relevant procedures.246 
The Court’s “merely formal” conception of substantive rights is 
also in tension with Congress’s long-standing, frequent reliance upon 
private litigation to achieve regulatory directives.247 Congress and 
 
 242.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 414–15 
(2010) (advocating for the Sibbach method, which produces “a single hard question of whether a 
Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure”); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13–14 
(1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy 
and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”); see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 218, at 
25–26 (describing the Court’s Erie jurisprudence as “wooden”). 
 243.  Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1277 (2014) (explicitly invoking such considerations in Judge Posner’s certification and issue 
classing decisions). 
 244.  Tidmarsh, supra note 2, at 515, 520 (noting that Pound believed that judges, not 
parties, should exercise control over procedure; noting also that Pound spoke out vigorously 
against legal formalism). 
 245.  This notion derives in part from John Locke’s insight that “ubi jus ibi remedium” 
(rights without remedies) are empty rights. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT § 20, at 12 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1690).  
 246.  See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 218, at 27–31 (arguing that the Rules Enabling Act, 
among other things, calls for consideration of the interaction between the substantive right at 
issue and the relevant procedure). 
 247.  Cf. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2010) (explaining how “Congress’s difficulty in controlling 
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legislatures know well that substantive rights are not self-executing: 
when they wish to calibrate (or recalibrate) the reach of rules 
governing primary conduct, they frequently adjust the procedures that 
enable, or disable, the effectuation of those rights. Other times, but 
operating under a similarly less formalistic conception of substantive 
rights, legislatures recalibrate the contours of the substantive right in 
ways that either facilitate or frustrate the ability of claimants to 
access transaction cost reducing procedures.248 
Finally, the “merely formal” descriptor that the Court assigns 
to substantive rights misrepresents the actual contours of the very 
jurisprudence that generated it. Further, that descriptor obscures the 
very real ways in which some of the holdings in the Supreme Court’s 
facially formalistic, procedural jurisprudence are driven in large part 
by substantive judgments—and more to the point, judgments about 
the interaction between the underlying substantive law and relevant 
procedural mechanisms.249 In fact, many of the Court’s recent class 
action “procedural” holdings have been driven in large part by the 
extent to which the Court is comfortable (or not) with that interaction 
of procedure and substance as a matter of facilitating or frustrating 
claiming.250 In short, the Court’s conceptual formalism is somewhat 
fictive.251 Behind the formalist veil, even the current Court recognizes 
and accounts for a close interrelationship between procedure and the 
effectuation of substantive rights. Whatever the view of particular 
justices regarding the proper contours of that interrelationship, it 
seems that it cannot credibly be a view that substantive rights are 
“merely formal.”  
 
* * * 
 
  The notion that procedure may appropriately be directed toward 
the reduction of transaction cost barriers to the effectuation (or 
 
the administrative state can cause . . . reliance upon private lawsuits, which provide a 
mechanism for Congress to bypass unwilling agencies and opposing presidents”). 
 248.  See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring 
heightened pleading for securities fraud in order to make claiming harder, but accepting the use 
of the fraud-on-the-market theory for securities fraud claims, which makes claiming as a class 
action easier); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (Consol. 2016) (prohibiting the use of class actions for 
claims for statutory penalties). 
 249.  Glover, supra note 155. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id. Ironically, the facially, but somewhat fictively, formalist analysis potentially 
exacerbates the transaction costs and error costs generated by uncertainty in the substantive 
law. See POSNER, supra note 183.  
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opportunity to effectuate) of substantive rights is not merely a 
theoretical one. That notion also provides a means for operationalizing 
this Article’s overall regulatory theory of legal claims, which I 
undertake in the following Section. By doing so, the next Section 
demonstrates ways in which this Article’s regulatory theory of legal 
claims generates new and more coherent procedural paths for our 
litigation system—paths the formalist conceptual views struggle to 
identify.  
B. The Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims Applied 
Moving from formalistic conceptual theories to a regulatory 
theory of legal claims must not only be justified as a theoretical 
matter; it must be justified as a functional matter. This Section 
therefore revisits the difficult litigation problems presented in Part II, 
as well as the conceptual debate regarding class claims from Part I, 
through the lens of this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims. 
This analysis generates new insights on these problems, as well as 
different, and more normatively coherent, potential regulatory 
prescriptions regarding litigant autonomy than those generated by 
dichotomous conceptual theories. Those insights, and the potential 
procedural prescriptions they generate, commend the theoretical shift 
urged by this Article. 
1. Applying the Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims  
to Rule 68 Offers of Settlement to Named Plaintiffs 
Recall from Part II the basic problem at the intersection of 
Rule 68 offers of settlement and class actions. Before a class is 
certified, the defendant offers to settle with the named plaintiff. On 
the one hand, exchange of the named plaintiff’s claim with the 
defendant pre-certification appears a straightforward example of 
smooth functioning in the market for legal claims. On the other hand, 
the gambit by the defendant, presumably, is to eliminate or devalue 
all the absent class members’ claims by leaving them without a named 
plaintiff. 
If the defendant succeeds, assuming the Rule 68 settlement 
offer is not of sufficient value to cause the defendant to change or 
internalize the costs of its behavior, the “smooth” exchange between 
the named plaintiff and defendant would not just frustrate deterrence. 
It would destroy the value of the remaining class members’ claims, 
and in a particular way: absent the class mechanism, many (or 
perhaps all) remaining plaintiffs would now face the significant 
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increase in transaction costs associated with pursuing claims 
individually. These transaction costs—generated by the named 
plaintiff’s exchange of her claim—represent the particular form of 
litigation market failure that may be addressed under this Article’s 
theory. 
Here, there is additional justification for potential regulation. 
Although the class is not yet certified, the named plaintiff is in an 
advantageous position vis-à-vis settlement negotiations because of her 
relationship to and membership in the class. Specifically, given the 
defendant’s strategic gambit, the plaintiff is likely able to leverage the 
power of the class to obtain a more favorable settlement than she 
otherwise could on her own.252 She extracts more value for her 
property than she could otherwise by exploiting the value of absent 
class members’ property253—the defendant’s willingness to settle with 
the named plaintiff presumably stems in significant part from its hope 
that settlement with the named plaintiff will functionally resolve the 
entire class action—a hope worth considerable value if realized. Thus, 
the named plaintiff receives a windfall by leveraging the considerable 
value to the defendant of the transaction-cost market failure 
generated by the alienation of her claim. 
Those espousing a collectivist view of legal claims might well 
point to this particular normatively undesirable state of affairs both as 
evidence of its theoretical soundness and as support for maintaining 
the formalist status quo. Indeed, this scenario reinforces the notion, 
embedded in many collectivist views, that claims of related conduct 
against the same defendants are inextricably intertwined, their 
fortunes tied, and, therefore, their property interests collective as 
opposed to individual. Those notions, in turn, would guide procedural 
law toward a remedy whereby named plaintiffs’ rights to alienate 
claims are restricted or deemed nonexistent. Either way, the 
collectivist view remedies the market failure; there is no need for a 
different approach to legal claims. There are a number of difficulties 
with this. 
It is unclear whether the formalist collectivist theory of class 
claims has much, if anything, to say about the functional relationship 
between the named plaintiff’s claim value and the claim value of other 
putative class members. Formal collectivist conceptions lose their 
functional force when no class has been certified, and thus no entity 
 
 252.  See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing 
the power of aggregate stakes at the bargaining table); Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 427 (same). 
 253.  See supra Part III.A (property law disfavors third-party exploitation of others’ property 
interests for their own benefit). 
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has emerged. In order to dictate remedies in this scenario, then, 
collectivist theories of legal claims would have to recognize the 
existence of informal entities or collective units—joined, perhaps, by 
collective welfare,254 public purpose,255 or shared interest that might 
be frustrated or destroyed by collective action problems and the like,256 
just to name a few. As a matter of theory, the collectivist view would 
likely support this recognition, if it does not already. Then the real 
problems emerge. 
Consider the world that a formalist collective view of legal 
claims, untethered to formalist notions of litigation entities, would 
create. Begin with the pre-certification Rule 68 settlement offer 
scenario presented here. Many groups with similar injuries caused by 
the same defendants do not become part of a certified class, for any 
number of reasons.257 Moreover, settlements often inform other 
settlements of similar claims.258 Thus, would an individual in such a 
group who, say, needed compensation quickly be prohibited from 
settling if it could be argued that her settlement would establish a low 
ceiling for future settlements involving similar injuries by the same 
defendant? Could any member of a group who suffered similar 
injuries, even by different defendants, be similarly restricted, either 
on the grounds that the group’s claims are inextricably intertwined or, 
more broadly, that the public interest in punishing and preventing 
wrongdoing requires such a prohibition? If grounded in the stringent 
dictates of formalist conceptions of legal claims, justification for 
interference with litigant autonomy is potentially without limit. 
Further, and at least to the extent such interference is grounded in a 
“public interest” unrelated to the integrity or functioning of the courts, 
it arguably constitutes an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. 
This Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims would suggest 
different and, in the main, more constrained prescriptive responses. 
For one, instead of an outright ban on the named plaintiff’s right to 
alienate her claim under a Rule 68 settlement, regulation could be 
directed toward the party most directly responsible for imposing—
 
 254.  See Rosenberg, supra note 9 (arguing for a collective conception of class claims).  
 255.  See generally CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 162 (describing the features of a public 
good). 
 256.  See id. at 324–26 (describing the concept of collective action and the concept’s 
associated issues).  
 257.  See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp 2d 740 (E.D. La. 2011); In re 
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47253 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 7, 2016).  
 258.  See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil 
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 975 (2010) (“[P]rior settlements are a benchmark or 
reference point from which to consider the merits of future, similar cases.”). 
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indeed the party whose explicit aim it is to impose—the problematic 
transaction costs on remaining plaintiffs. Under that approach, 
embodied perhaps in an amendment to Rule 68 or Rule 23, the 
defendant would be required, after making a settlement offer to the 
named plaintiff, to find a suitable substitute named plaintiff, and, if 
none can be found, to retract the offer. This change would likely 
reduce the number of Rule 68 settlement offers made to named 
plaintiffs—a good result vis-à-vis the market failure of transaction 
cost barriers to the effectuation of absent class members’ substantive 
rights. Moreover, this change does little, at least formally, to interfere 
with the named plaintiff’s right of alienation; it still permits the 
named plaintiff to settle, just likely not at the supra-compensatory 
rate available prior to rule change. This latter result is not troubling; 
indeed it is desirable: the supra-competitive settlement amount 
available to the named plaintiff only exists because the current 
regulatory structure permits that plaintiff to exploit the transaction 
costs against absent class members’ claims to her own advantage. The 
regulatory notion is to remove incentives for either defendants or 
named plaintiffs to impose these costs, all the while preserving the 
named plaintiff’s freedom to exchange her claim. 
However, this particular regulatory prescription is ultimately 
suboptimal under this Article’s regulatory theory. Fundamentally, 
defendants are not loyal to the class; they are certainly not fiduciaries 
of the class.259 Indeed, defendants would likely be incentivized to 
select affirmatively suboptimal named plaintiffs, thus potentially 
leaving in place transaction cost barriers to effective realization of 
class claims.260 
Named plaintiffs, however, could be described as having some 
modicum of fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with, and duties 
to, the pre-certified class.261 As such, the autonomy of the named 
plaintiff to alienate her claim is arguably appropriately subject to 
regulation, at least when exercising that right would (or very likely 
would) generate transaction costs to the plaintiff class’s effectuation of 
their legal claims. Another potential, and narrowly tailored, form of 
procedural regulation, therefore, would be a requirement that the 
 
 259.  Even the class attorney may not be sufficiently loyal to the class pre-certification. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes to 2003 amendment (suggesting the need for interim 
counsel with fiduciary duties to the class pre-certification). 
 260.  Such barriers could take the form of additional litigation expenditures needed to obtain 
compensation for the plaintiff class that would roughly equal what could have been obtained 
with the original, more suitable, named plaintiff with fewer expenditures.  
 261.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also supra Part III.A (discussing the quasi-fiduciary duties of 
third parties in certain relationships with property owners). 
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named plaintiff, as a precondition to accepting a Rule 68 offer, remain 
in the class until class counsel, exercising good faith efforts, identifies 
a suitable replacement. This regulatory response—which could be 
embodied in an amendment to either Rule 68 or Rule 23, or even as an 
interpretation of a named plaintiff’s duties as set forth by the Advisory 
Committee Notes to Rule 23—would likely work well in the sorts of 
class actions typified by a relatively deep bench of suitable and willing 
named plaintiffs, as both the transaction costs for replacement would 
be low, and the interference on the named plaintiff’s right of 
alienation, in terms of time, would also likely be minimal. 
However, this response may be insufficient to address the 
transaction cost market failure in some instances: First, in cases 
where it is apparent that there is no plentiful supply of suitable 
replacement named plaintiffs. Or, second, even in cases like the ones 
described above, but wherein the transaction costs associated with 
identifying a new named plaintiff (and, if defendants continue the 
pick-off gambit, another named plaintiff, and so on down the line) 
mount in ways that significantly impede the ability of classes to 
proceed with their claims. In such instances, prohibiting settlements 
with the named plaintiff may be warranted. A narrowly tailored 
approach would counsel in favor of a case-by-case restriction of the 
named plaintiff’s right to alienate her claim—though any debate by 
the Rules Advisory Committee would need to question whether the 
transaction costs associated with a case-by-case approach (as the issue 
would likely require briefing) would dwarf the transaction costs it 
would reduce, therefore suggesting the possible need for a 
straightforward ban. 
This last regulatory proposal—a ban on named plaintiff 
settlements—sounds much like the one required by the collective 
approach to legal claims. While it is not the endeavor of this Article to 
settle upon any particular regulatory prescription, if application of the 
regulatory theory of legal claims leads to a conclusion that named 
plaintiffs cannot accept Rule 68 offers of settlement, is the theory 
really any different, much less better, than the formalist collectivist 
conceptual view? 
I believe the answer is yes. First of all, the regulatory theory of 
legal claims imposes upon any procedural regulation a number of 
limiting principles, which are largely absent in the prescriptive 
dictates of formalist conceptual views. Indeed, even though one of the 
prescriptions set forth here is the same as that generated by a 
collectivist view of claims, its theoretical underpinnings—and 
therefore its ultimate reach—are completely different. Specifically, 
because any restriction upon the right to alienate one’s legal claims is 
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grounded in a theory of procedure as reducing transaction-cost market 
failures (generated here by the pick-off settlement), that restriction 
necessarily will not be justified across the litigation landscape simply 
because various parties’ claims are “inter-connected” or “bound up 
with the public interest.” In contrast, both the justification for 
regulation of litigant autonomy and the particular design of any 
regulatory mechanism in a particular context would stem from the 
foundations—and limitations—of this Article’s theory.  
For example, this Article’s theory explicitly calls for 
consideration of the specifics of the relevant procedural context—here, 
Rule 68 pick-off settlements—to determine whether and to what 
extent regulation is justified. And in the Rule 68 pick-off context, 
justification for some level of restriction of a party’s right to alienate a 
claim is rather strong, at least as a matter of sensitivity to transaction 
cost barriers to claiming. Drawing specifically from the property 
theory foundations of this Article’s theory, justification for regulation 
in this context is bolstered by the fact that the named plaintiff is in 
somewhat of a functional fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with 
other class members and their property interests.262  
Justification for regulation under this Article’s theory, 
however, does not come without limitation. Generally speaking, then, 
the foundations of this Article’s theory would tend to steer such 
regulation toward mechanisms that interfere as little as possible with 
the right of alienation. To operationalize these broader principles, 
consider as an example the following possible regulatory mechanism. 
Instead of simply prohibiting named plaintiffs from accepting Rule 68 
settlement offers (the prescription that flows necessarily from the 
collectivist view of legal claims), the designation of named plaintiff 
status could be conditioned upon the refusal of any such settlement 
offer as part of a named plaintiff’s duties to the class pre-certification. 
This regulatory mechanism certainly (though justifiably) interferes 
with the named plaintiff’s right to alienate her claim, but it does so 
more narrowly, and perhaps more tolerably as a matter of property 
law and theory, through a form of consent. 
2. Applying the Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims  
to Alternative Litigation Finance 
By its own terms, alternative litigation funding facilitates the 
effectuation of substantive claims by reducing transaction costs 
associated with litigation. Prohibitions on the alienation of legal 
 
 262.  See supra Part III.A. 
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claims, currently in the form of maintenance and champerty laws, but 
potentially in the form of any number of proposed regulations on 
litigation finance,263 prevent the use of funding arrangements to 
reduce those costs. To the extent the effect of litigation funding on 
reducing transaction costs to claiming is descriptively accurate,264 
prohibitions on those subsidies of litigation are inconsistent with this 
Article’s theory of legal claims and the role of procedure to reduce the 
transaction costs of claiming. 
Here, those committed to a strong individual autonomy view of 
legal claims would offer their conceptual view as a remedy: 
maintenance and champerty laws are inconsistent with 
individualistic, absolutist views of property rights, and thus should be 
jettisoned. Perhaps (though not certainly) because of the dominance of 
this individualistic conception of legal claims in the procedural 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, this prescription is already 
becoming reality.265 However, the individualistic conceptual approach 
has difficulties. First, it is limited in its ability to provide guidance for 
procedural decisionmaking vis-à-vis litigation finance beyond the 
point of sale of claims (champerty) or the point of obtaining funding 
for pursuing claims (maintenance). Second, even as to the elements of 
alternative litigation finance for which it can provide prescriptive 
guidance, it paints with too broad a brush. 
 
 263.  See, e.g., Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
388 (2016) (proposing modifications to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to regulate potential 
conflicts of interest in litigation financing); Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1155 (2015) (suggesting a paradigm shift in viewing and regulating litigation 
funding from a “legal ethics paradigm” to an “incorporation paradigm”); Martin J. Estevao, Note, 
The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 
(2013) (discussing measures to “prevent predatory behavior and ensure reasonable profits for 
[litigation financing companies]”); Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond, CENTER ON CIVIL 
JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/civiljustice/ 
2015-fall-conference [https://perma.cc/7XV8-PG2A] (Panels Two (Professors Geoffrey Miller, 
Maya Steinitz, Bradley Wendel, Michael G. Faure, and Jef De Mot; Joshua Schwadron and 
Travis Lenkner) and Four (Professors Arthur Miller, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, J. Maria 
Glover, Victoria Shannon Sahani, and Stephen Gillers; Michael Fishbein), discussing possible 
regulations of litigation finance).  
 264.  Some have expressed concern that the funding terms leave plaintiff with little 
compensation. See, e.g., Steinitz, supra note 106, at 1277, 1322. To the extent litigation funding 
effectuated claiming but did not confer compensatory benefit to the plaintiff, this Article’s 
conception of procedure’s role vis-à-vis transaction costs would perhaps not be offended in the 
abstract. That conception, however, is tied to fundamental precepts of property, which would 
frown upon the funders’ complete devaluation of plaintiffs’ claim; it is also tied to a market of 
claims that are pursued for compensation. See supra Part III.A. 
 265.  See, e.g., Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 
consistent trend across the country is toward limiting, not expanding, champerty’s reach.”). 
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As to the first difficulty, the individualistic conception of legal 
claims, grounded as it is in near-absolutist views of property rights, 
would likely prescribe the elimination of maintenance and champerty 
laws or any other such prohibitions. That is likely the end of its 
regulatory journey. However, those laws prohibiting litigation finance 
are only the beginning of the overall regulatory road. The aim of 
maintenance and champerty laws is to restrict directly the ability of 
third-party litigation funding to reduce transaction cost barriers to 
effectuation of substantive claims. Other existing procedural rules and 
doctrines, however, make no mention of financing at all. Yet, they are 
being used indirectly to impose additional transaction costs on 
subsidized plaintiffs. 
For instance, defendants frequently seek discovery of 
communications involved in obtaining litigation financing—the deal 
documents themselves—and communications with the funder that 
occurred after that deal was signed.266 Apart from the relatively rare 
situation in which the defendant has a legitimate defense under state 
law champerty or maintenance doctrines,267 the only relevance of 
these documents is that they reflect either the litigation funder’s or 
the party’s assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims 
and the damages estimate.268 This satisfies relevance in a technical 
sense, but it is not the sort of information that should be used at 
trial.269 At bottom, these are less discovery requests than they are 
mechanisms to impose significant transaction costs upon plaintiffs 
who need litigation funding—perhaps significant enough to impede 
efforts by plaintiffs to use litigation funding at all. 
The few courts that have addressed these issues have by and 
large extended work product protection to such communications.270 
However, the requirements in the discovery rules for claiming 
privilege271—which require plaintiffs to create a privilege log—enable 
 
 266.  See Glover, supra note 126 (citing all cases with published opinions on the issue). 
 267.  See Del Webb Cmtys., 652 F.3d at 1156 (“The consistent trend across the country is 
toward limiting, not expanding, champerty’s reach.”). 
 268.  Glover, supra note 126. 
 269.  For instance, a funder’s assessment of the plaintiff’s likely recovery should not be used 
to influence the fact finder’s resolution of the claim’s merits, any more than an adversary should 
be able to call its adversary’s attorneys to testify about the legal weakness of their client’s case. 
See, e.g., Mister v. Ne. Ill. Commuter R.R. Corp., 571 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that party 
admission can be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403); Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (stating the trier of fact should not be invited to 
treat candid internal assessments of the strength of the party’s legal position as evidence of 
guilt). 
 270.  Glover, supra note 126. 
 271.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). 
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the requests alone to impose transaction costs upon a funded plaintiff. 
Indeed, these costs are unique to funded plaintiffs and additional to 
those associated with discovery into the merits. The creation of a 
privilege log is well known to be a burdensome task, and in the 
context of litigation finance, perhaps particularly so. All told, 
obtaining, setting up, and using litigation funding can generate 
hundreds, if not thousands, of email communications and 
documents.272 If one role of procedure is to reduce transaction cost 
barriers to claiming, these discovery requests achieve the opposite: 
they impose a penalty. 
The individualistic conceptual view of legal claims has little, if 
anything, to say about discovery requests, privilege logs, and work 
product privilege. Theoretically, perhaps, an individualistic conception 
of legal claims might demand reform to the extent these practices 
actually eliminated litigation-funding outfits or stopped those outfits 
from financing any claims under a certain value, thereby indirectly 
restraining alienation. However, even that theoretical possibility is 
speculative. These claims would likely be lumped together 
conceptually with all the other unmarketable claims, like those in the 
Court’s individualistic arbitration jurisprudence. That is to say, wholly 
disregarded.  
This Article’s regulatory theory, however, would address these 
and other indirect restrictions on alienation for purposes of litigation 
funding. This regulatory theory may call for amendment to or 
particularized interpretation of procedural law to prevent the 
imposition of additional, funded-litigation-specific transaction costs. 
For instance, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) could be amended 
to declare communications with litigation financing entities per se 
irrelevant—though this is likely overbroad.273 Alternatively, Rule 26 
could be amended to provide near-categorical protection under the 
work product doctrine to litigation-funding documents. It could read: 
“This Rule does not contemplate that a party claiming 
communications with a litigation financing entity has to describe the 
nature of the documents or materials withheld pursuant to the work 
product privilege.” 
This Article’s regulatory theory would also, of course, provide 
guidance regarding direct prohibitions on litigation finance—guidance 
that would differ in important respects from that provided by the 
 
 272.  Glover, supra note 126; supra Part III.  
 273.  Imagine a plaintiff, funded by a third-party financer, wished to sue that financer for 
breach of contract. Those documents would be directly relevant, as Rule 26(a) currently 
prescribes, to a party’s claims or defenses. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
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individualistic conception of claims. Both the individualistic 
conception of legal claims and this Article’s theory of legal claims 
would call for the elimination of champerty laws, which prohibit the 
selling of one’s claim to another. However, there are real concerns 
about litigation funding’s normative valence vis-à-vis the integrity and 
functioning of litigation and the judicial system in the context of 
maintenance—in particular, concerns that funders will support 
litigation not to reduce an impecunious party’s transaction costs, but 
to coax a would-be plaintiff to bring suit so that the funder may 
achieve its own goals and to settle its own scores.274 In addition to 
ginning up (arguably) wasteful litigation, such practices obscure the 
“real party in interest” from the court. 
The near-absolute conception of property rights undergirding 
the individualistic view of legal claims would likely not impose 
restrictions on a funder’s ability to coax a claimholder to litigation in 
this way. And to be sure, this Article’s regulatory theory of legal 
claims, limited as it currently and necessarily is to guiding procedure 
toward the reduction of transaction costs to claiming, does not speak 
directly to this normative concern. In contrast with the individualistic 
conceptual theory of legal claims, however, the regulatory theory 
leaves room for exploring (1) whether procedure may appropriately 
regulate litigant autonomy when it interferes with systemic interests 
of the courts, the judicial system, and the judicial function,275 and (2) if 
so, whether the benefits and potential effectiveness of such regulation, 
motive-based as it may be in the situation of a litigation funder with 
ulterior motives,276 outweigh its downsides either to litigant autonomy 
or to other interests to which procedural regulation may appropriately 
be directed. Again, it is not (and cannot be) the aim of this Article to 
provide an answer for all possible questions—including this last one 
regarding maintenance. What the foregoing analysis demonstrates, 
 
 274.  See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of maintenance and champerty laws, as well 
as the controversial funding, by Peter Thiel, of Hulk Hogan’s lawsuit against Gawker). 
 275.  See, e.g., supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations of courts to issue injunctions 
restricting property use grounded in the “public interest,” but noting that interests directly 
bearing upon the judicial function and integrity of the courts might appropriately constitute a 
“public interest” for which the judiciary can regulate). Further, any such procedural regulation 
would have intellectual foundations in the already existing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 
which gives judges the authority to sanction parties who bring litigation for improper purposes. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 276.  Motive-based regulations are those aimed at people’s motives—here, the motives of the 
funder and the claimant. They are difficult to enforce, given their focus on subjective intent, and 
they create perverse incentives for individuals to cover their tracks. They are also somewhat 
inconsistent with the objective character of property regulations that restrict “improper use,” 
which are agnostic to say, the motive of neighbor A in filling his lawn with prohibited ornaments 
and statutes; whether he likes that décor or just wants to annoy his neighbor is irrelevant. 
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however, is that this Article’s theory can provide guidance on difficult 
litigation issues in a way that is more normatively coherent and 
transparent than existing formalist theories and frameworks. 
3. A Regulatory Approach to Legal Claims in the Context  
of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 
Recall that mandatory arbitration agreements, particularly 
(though not necessarily) those with class action waivers, have been 
shown to reduce, if not eliminate, the ability for plaintiffs to vindicate 
their claims in any forum.277 The Supreme Court’s procedural 
arbitration jurisprudence enables and even incentivizes278 these sorts 
of contracts. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that, among other 
things, the Supreme Court’s procedural jurisprudence is strongly 
undergirded by an individualistic conception of legal claims. 
Individualistic views of claims, at their core, call for largely 
unfettered rights of claim exchange. In property, such free exchange is 
commended by the notion that it tends to promote efficient exchange 
and thus property is directed toward its highest-value use. In the 
context of mandatory arbitration agreements, however, it is far from 
clear that claims are being exchanged toward their highest-value use; 
indeed, most would-be plaintiffs do not even realize that they are 
making the exchange in the first place. Consumers and employees 
suffer a distinct informational disadvantage relative to the drafting 
corporations with regard to both the meaning of key legal terms in the 
agreement279 and with regard to the nature of the exchange of their 
legal claims. Regarding the latter, even if consumers are aware that 
by accepting a job or obtaining a cell phone they are exchanging their 
legal claims ex ante for arbitration, they are not aware that they are 
likely exchanging them ex post for no dispute resolution at all, given 
the surrender of procedural mechanisms, like the class action, that 
would defray the often high transaction costs of bringing their 
claims.280 Thus, those future legal claims are exchanged for perhaps 
 
 277. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 1, at 9, 11 (finding that of the 
tens of millions of consumers who use consumer financial products or services that are subject to 
arbitration clauses, only 1,847 individual disputes were filed with the AAA). 
 278.  See Glover, supra note 138, at 3076, 3092 (noting that it would be unwise for corporate 
counsel not to include arbitration clauses and class action prohibitions in contracts with 
employees, consumers, and the like). 
 279.  See Edward L. Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 
1915–16 (2000). 
 280.  See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (finding 
that without the cost-sharing enabled by class procedures, no single merchant could afford the 
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nothing at all: despite claims by corporations that mandatory 
arbitration agreements confer value to consumers because the cost 
savings associated with arbitration (or, more likely, no arbitration) are 
passed on to consumers in the form of lower-cost goods,281 empirical 
research does not support this claim.282 
Taking the strongest collectivist view of legal claims—that they 
are not purely individual property—and the collectivist view of 
claimants—that they are not purely individual property holders—
would suggest the need for restrictions upon the rights of consumers 
and employees to alienate their claims through these contracts, on the 
theory that their future claims are intertwined with those of others 
and with public interests.283 Fundamentally, this is of course a non-
starter: at the very least, it is wholly impractical to ban consumers 
from purchasing goods or employees from accepting jobs, particularly 
when—at least in the consumer context—all sellers of a particular 
good use the same basic contract, and it is nonnegotiable. Moreover, it 
would be equally impractical to regulate an exchange individuals have 
little to no idea they are making 284 
 
transaction costs of an antitrust expert—estimated to be around a million dollars—required to 
prove their claims). 
 281.  Empirical research does show that arbitration generates cost savings in comparison to 
litigation, but those costs tend to be internalized by the contract drafters. Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration 
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336–39 (2007) 
(discussing the reasons why arbitration arguably is less costly than litigation); Theodore 
Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
871 (2008) (presenting evidence that companies include arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts not because it is less costly but because it precludes aggregate consumer actions). 
 282.  See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 10, at 5 (finding that despite the 
large amount collected, no empirical evidence supported the claim that mandatory arbitration 
contracts produced cost savings for consumers). 
 283.  One of the relevant public interests is that of public precedent and judicial opinions. 
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 774, 
799–800 (2008) (providing cell phone contract to illustrate that much of what is traditionally 
public becomes private in private dispute settlements); Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 148, at 
809, 838 (arguing that the open nature of judicial proceedings themselves is a public value lost in 
the wave of arbitration). See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 11, at 1085–87 
(discussing the public value of written opinions). Another is the loss of public proceedings, 
whether or not the cases actually go to trial. Another is the public’s interest in deterring 
corporations from wrongdoing—at least to the extent mandatory arbitration agreements with 
class action waivers amount to exculpatory clauses for defendants. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 
148, at 378, 430 (arguing that corporate wrongdoing is deterred by class action liability). 
 284.  See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, in ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW: SELECTED READINGS 59, 61 (Donald A. Wittman ed., 2002) (arguing that 
public regulation is better when information related to wrongdoing is “difficult to communicate 
to private parties because of its technical nature”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public 
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 
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Assume, however, that the collectivist view did not require 
such an extreme response. Presume instead that the collectivist view 
of legal claims called for restrictions upon the terms of the contracts 
themselves—perhaps on the theory that, given the uniformity of the 
contracts and the transactions, the public interests at stake, and the 
collective action problems to claiming in these contexts, the future 
claims are properly considered as part of a collective. On that theory, 
those claims should not be disentangled ex ante. However, as with all 
applications of the conceptual approaches to legal claims, even when 
selectively deployed, there are difficulties. 
Once more, the collective prescription goes too far. As a 
preliminary matter, it is difficult to conceptualize future interests as 
either primarily individual or primarily collective in this context. Even 
if the drafters’ strategic gambit suggests the potential for collective 
claims, one might accuse the conceptual framework of jumping the 
gun. Be that as it may, public values such as judicial precedent, public 
proceedings, and even deterrence are no doubt important—perhaps so 
much so in any particular case as to justify regulation of property 
rights or freedom of contract—but those values are present in nearly 
all cases.285 Absent any other restriction on the dictates of this 
conception of legal claims, the formalist collectivist conception—
though still perhaps appealing in the clarity of its content and 
prescriptive consequences—is also still troubling in its tendency not to 
impose limiting principles. 
Nonetheless, perhaps this flaw of formalism would be tolerable 
if the negative transaction cost consequences for legal claims in the 
context of mandatory arbitration agreements flowed exclusively, or 
even primarily, from improper conception of claims. Moreover, an 
individualistic conception of claims undoubtedly undergirds the 
Court’s adoption of near-absolute principles of freedom-of-contract 
conceptions in these cases—principles that in turn justify these 
exchanges. That said, the provisions in these contracts that have 
generated the most concern among scholars, Congress, courts, 
regulatory agencies, and litigants were crafted with near-explicit 
recognition of the collective character of a great number of future 
 
91 VA. L. REV. 93, 97 (2005) (arguing that Congress should delegate the responsibility to create 
private rights of action to agencies charged with administering the relevant statute because the 
agency has superior information about the effects of private suits on overall enforcement 
strategy). 
 285.  For instance, Owen Fiss’s view regarding the value of the creation of judicial precedent 
and the scourge of settlement would call for no settlement. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 
11; Fiss, The History of an Idea, supra note 11 (defending his views from Against Settlement). 
       
296 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:221 
claims.286 To some degree, then, that collective conception was the 
genesis of some of the problematic provisions. Drafters of these 
agreements, therefore, relied on two completely opposite conceptions of 
legal claims in formulating, providing, and compelling the 
enforcement of contractual provisions that impose transaction cost 
barriers to the effectuation of substantive claims. Those transaction 
costs, therefore, do not flow exclusively from one conception or the 
other; the transaction costs, not the conceptual theory, are the gambit. 
Indeed, what unifies the problematic contractual provisions in 
arbitration agreements is that they impose transaction cost barriers to 
claiming. Some provisions eliminate collective procedures. Some 
include forum selection clauses requiring travel to far-flung fora or 
include fee-shifting provisions that require claimants to incur heavy 
expenses just to bring their claim—both stymied to greater and lesser 
degrees under unconscionability doctrine.287 Others prohibit 
individuals from sharing expert evidence with others similarly 
situated in order to reduce the often exorbitant transaction costs 
associated with developing an expert report.288 
Moreover, contractual provisions aimed at reducing these 
transaction costs have proved ineffective—a wholly unsurprising fact 
given the overall strategic goals of those drafting the contracts. For 
instance, the arbitration clause at issue in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
Concepcion289 purported to correct the failure by providing that it 
would pay any claimant’s arbitration fees, and, among other things, 
that it would provide a bonus payment of five thousand dollars to any 
claimant whose ultimate arbitral award exceeded any of AT&T’s prior 
settlement offers to that claimant.290 As a matter of offsetting 
transaction costs, this contractual response by AT&T seemed sound 
enough. As a practical matter, it was wholly ineffective: even after the 
revision of its arbitration clause, very few claimants brought their 
claims in arbitration versus AT&T; even fewer obtained 
 
 286.  See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); David Korn & David 
Rosenberg, Concepcion’s Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel 
Solution, 46 MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151 (2013) (suggesting that a court certify a class of plaintiffs 
subject to mandatory arbitration agreement with class prohibitions before sending them to 
arbitration; once in arbitration, the plaintiffs arbitrate individually, but proceed from a collective 
posture vis-à-vis pre-trial discovery cost sharing and the like); Nagareda, supra note 37, at 1115. 
 287.  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 148, at 1745–46 (discussing first-generation arbitration 
clauses, which contained particularly draconian provisions). 
 288.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 
S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 705521, at *4 (discussing whether confidentiality 
clauses vis-à-vis evidence sharing in arbitration contracts would be enforceable). 
 289.  563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 290.  Id. at 351–52. 
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compensation.291 This is unsurprising for a host of reasons, one of 
which AT&T was no doubt well aware: consumers by and large tend 
not to read their contracts292 nor do they understand key contractual 
terms, even potentially favorable ones.293 
To reduce transaction costs to effective vindication of claims in 
the context of mandatory arbitration agreements, any regulatory 
response must account for the transactional context in which the 
claims operate. The most prominent regulatory response in existence 
is the  rule recently promulgated by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) prohibiting the use of mandatory 
arbitration agreements in certain financial products in the financial 
industry.294 The CFPB rule’s broad prohibitions on freedom of contract 
are grounded in a number of concerns that reach far beyond those 
associated with transaction cost barriers to claiming. These concerns 
are beyond the scope of this Article’s regulatory framework; some are 
likely beyond the scope of this Article’s entire regulatory theory of 
legal claims. 
Whatever the normative valence of the CFPB rule, it would 
have limited reach, if it issues.295 The CFPB has limited jurisdiction, 
and the rule would almost assuredly not reach any number of 
industries or entities that use mandatory arbitration agreements. 
Moreover, the future of the CFPB itself is currently a bit uncertain, 
both as a matter of whether it will be allowed to maintain its current 
independence from the executive,296 and as a matter of whether 
 
 291.  See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 136, § 3, at 51. 
 292.  See, e.g., id. § 3, at 28–29 (noting that very few consumers read arbitration contracts, 
and even those who do generally do not understand what arbitration is). 
 293.  See id. § 3, at 23 (finding that seventy-five percent of people do not know what 
arbitration is). 
 294.  On May 6, 2016, and pursuant to § 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Public Law 111-203), the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(Bureau) proposed to establish 12 CFR part 1040, which would (1) prohibit covered providers of 
certain consumer financial products and services from using an agreement with a consumer that 
provides for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties to bar the consumer from filing 
or participating in a class action with respect to the covered consumer financial product or 
service; and (2) require a covered provider that is involved in an arbitration pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement to submit specified arbitral records to the Bureau; and (3) apply to 
certain consumer financial products and services. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Establish 12 CFR Part 1040 (May 6, 2016), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CFPB_Arbitration_Agreements_Notice_of_Proposed_Rulemak
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7YE-PLKN]. 
 295.  The comment period for this proposed rule closed on August 22, 2016; no rule has 
issued as of January 1, 2017.  
 296.  On October 11, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
struck down the structure of the CFPB as violating Article II of the Constitution. See PHH Corp. 
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 4–6 (D.C. Cir. 2016). As an independent agency 
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Congress makes various changes to the source the CPFB’s creation 
and authority, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act—which is one of the many targets of the new 
administration.297  
The procedural provisions in mandatory arbitration 
agreements engineer the litigation landscape in a very particular 
way—namely, so as to generate transaction costs to the effectuation of 
substantive rights. Of late, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the 
FAA—a procedural law, in the non-Rules Enabling Act sense298—as 
appropriately directed toward reducing (or at least not intentionally 
generating) transaction costs to the effectuation of substantive rights. 
A heavily individualistic conception of litigant autonomy undergirds 
and enables the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence permitting—perhaps 
even endorsing—that engineering of the litigation landscape.299 
According to this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims, however, 
situations in which contractual provisions engineer the litigation 
landscape in such a way are precisely those for which judicial 
regulation of litigant autonomy is warranted.  
The most direct regulatory response that flows from this 
Article’s regulatory theory—and one that happens to be more 
consistent with both the text of the FAA and the view of procedure 
that originally animated the FAA300 rather than current Supreme 
Court FAA jurisprudence—would be a judicial one. A broad response, 
grounded in the notion that procedure is appropriately directed 
toward reducing transaction costs to the effectuation of recognized 
rights, would involve a reinterpretation of the FAA as not permitting 
the inclusion of contractual procedural provisions that are designed to 
generate such costs. A narrower response—one that might better 
 
headed by a single Director, removable only for cause, CFPB’s structural departure from 
historical practice “ma[de] a significant difference for the individual liberty protected by the 
Constitution’s separation of powers” because the single director possesses more unilateral 
authority than the multi-member commission. Id. at 36. The court remedied this violation by 
striking down the for-cause removal provision of the Dodd-Frank Act. See id. at 38–39. On 
November 18, 2016, CFPB petitioned for a rehearing en banc. See Respondent Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) (No. 15-01177). 
 297.  See, e.g., Ryan Tracy, Donald Trump’s Transition Team: We Will “Dismantle” Dodd-
Frank, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-transition-team-
we-will-dismantle-dodd-frank-1478800611 [https://perma.cc/W9JZ-TP3W]. 
 298.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315–20 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the FAA governs procedure, and therefore should yield in the presence of 
federal statutes governing substantive legal rights). 
 299.  See Glover, supra note 155 (arguing that underlying the Court’s recent arbitration 
decisions was a substantive judgment about the normative value of low-value class action suits). 
 300.  See Glover, supra note 138, at 3059–64. 
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balance litigant autonomy and freedom-of-contract principles and 
transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights—
might involve a more as-applied approach, whereby contracts 
containing procedural provisions designed to generate transaction 
costs would be struck down if and when they prevent or severely 
impede the effectuation of recognized substantive rights. Under that 
narrower approach, contractual provisions might be allowed on a case-
by-case basis (for instance, if they do not actually generate significant 
transaction costs to claiming) or for other compelling reasons largely 
beyond the scope of this Article’s current framework.301  
Either regulatory suggestion, of course, requires a change in 
the Court’s current interpretation of the FAA. These approaches also 
call for the Court to move away from the formal individualistic views 
of litigant autonomy and legal claims that undergird its FAA 
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, these judicial regulatory solutions are 
perhaps the cleanest of all: from procedural doctrine the problem 
came; from procedural doctrine the problem should depart. Order 
could be restored to the galaxy. 
4. Coming Full Circle: A Regulatory Approach to Legal Claims  
in the Contexts of Class Action Opt-Outs and Class Unity 
This Article began by tracing the contours of a long-standing 
conceptual debate in the class action context about whether the class 
device is best viewed as a collection of individuals, who should retain 
 
 301.  For instance, one way in which an arbitration agreement might seek to prevent 
claimants from effectuating substantive claims is to prohibit any cost-sharing procedures. Italian 
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the arbitration agreement in 
Italian Colors prohibited class actions as well as any form of cost-sharing among individuals in 
arbitration). Whether it is appropriate to strike down such prohibitions on the grounds that 
procedure’s role is to reduce (or at least not generate) transaction costs to claiming would depend 
upon the precise cost-sharing mechanism being banned. For instance, both established contract 
principles and litigation practice allow for the confidential exchange of evidence in a lawsuit and 
for the confidentiality of settlement. These practices, though not without their critics, are 
believed, among other things, to protect sensitive information, increase accuracy, promote 
settlement, and perhaps most relevant for this Article, reduce transaction costs to settlement. 
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended 
Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1480–82 (2006) (disallowing secret settlements increases 
health and other hazards to the public because parties will opt to leave the system of litigation 
altogether, removing the claims from the public eye); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Class Action Lawyers As Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (2004) (noting confidentiality practices 
“promote settlement of the current case, increase the accuracy of the litigation process, and 
reduce legal error”); Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential 
Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 438–40 (2005) 
(discussing pro-confidentiality scholars’ emphasis on cost saving and litigants’ rights to privacy 
and autonomy). This Article leaves such granular regulatory questions to later work.  
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near-full autonomy over their claims, or as an entity, wherein 
individuals tie their fortunes to one another, perhaps even so much as 
to prevent them from opting out of the class. Recall that the Court has 
moved in a decidedly individualistic conceptual direction in its class 
action jurisprudence, and particularly in its interpretation of class 
certification requirements. That individualistic view calls for class 
members to retain a great deal of autonomy over claims, and thus 
leads courts to scrutinize proposed classes under Rule 23 for near-total 
similarity among claimants at the certification stage302 and to 
approach with great skepticism any class that does not provide for opt-
outs.303 
To be sure, many of the opinions rooted in notions of individual 
autonomy of legal claims provide important protections for class 
members.304 At the same time, jurisprudence rooted in individual 
autonomy has eliminated settlement deals and left plaintiffs without 
compensation;305 it has also provided defendants with a great deal of 
ammunition for preventing the certification of classes—and thereby 
preventing the economies of scale for claiming achievable under the 
 
 302.  For an argument that this requirement misses the mark, see Bone, supra note 34, at 
651 (“[A] cohesiveness requirement . . . sends courts on a hopeless, misguided search for class 
unity.”). 
 303.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363, 366 (2011) (denying 12(b)(2) 
mandatory class claims for back pay, despite incidentally flowing from Title VII claims for 
injunctive relief, while noting that mandatory classes, “rightly or wrongly,” still exist (emphasis 
added)). 
 304.  Indeed, collectivist views of class members’ legal claims—views that often lead to a 
demand that Rule 23 disallow any opt-outs—are particularly concerning. Moreover, one can 
identify the problems of these views in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions that also include claims for 
monetary relief. See, e.g., id. at 359 (unanimously rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to certify claims 
for backpay under Rule 23(b)(2)). In order to obtain (b)(2) certification, plaintiffs are incentivized 
to downplay the compensatory elements of class members’ claims; for instance, in Dukes, the 
compensatory element was limited to backpay. Id. at 345. The problem, however, stems from the 
preclusive effects that would attach to any future class members’ claims for other forms of 
compensatory relief to which she may have been legally entitled, but which were not brought in 
the original class action. Id. at 364. Intra-class conflicts can also arise when the class for 
(monetarily valuable) injunctive and monetary is comprised of members competing for a limited 
pool of resources. See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 
F.3d 223, 236 (2d Cir. 2016) (rejecting seven billion dollar settlement proposal for a class of 
merchants certified under both 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on the grounds that class counsel could not 
represent both classes, who were competing for a limited pool of relief from defendants).  
 305.  See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Recent Developments in Nationwide Products Liability 
Litigation: The Phenomenon of Non-Injury Products Cases, the Impact of Amchem and the Trend 
Toward State Court Adjudication, and the Continued Viability of Carefully Constructed 
Nationwide Classes in the Federal Courts, SC33 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1, 23 
(1998). 
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class mechanism—under the auspices of “protecting” the various class 
members’ autonomy.306  
As with the procedural scenarios discussed above, the problem 
is not so much that either conceptual view is unable to achieve a 
“good” result at any given time. It is that procedural regulation, tied to 
formalist conception, tends to generate normatively and theoretically 
inconsistent results.307 Again, though, if the regulatory theory of legal 
claims suggested by this Article is to have persuasive force, it must 
generate different and better answers for procedural law and for the 
regulation of litigant autonomy. This Article therefore concludes by 
examining the operation of the regulatory theory of legal claims 
within the context of the hotbed of conceptual debate—class action 
certification. 
Of course, there is far more involved in debates about 
certification requirements and opt-outs than could be covered, much 
less given justice, here. Therefore, I limit the analysis here to one 
particularly thorny issue regarding litigant autonomy in the class-
certification universe—the problem of negative-value class claims at 
the certification stage. 
Under the regulatory theory of legal claims set forth in this 
Article, there is arguably little justification for limiting litigant 
autonomy in situations where, in the main, class members’ claims are 
individually marketable, unless perhaps there is some anomalous 
condition vis-à-vis the resources of the relevant group of plaintiffs.308 
In class actions made up of individually marketable claims, 
vindication of substantive rights is not particularly dependent upon 
the transaction-cost-lowering effects of class procedure. Indeed, the 
resulting exchange of those claims—via settlement—may well be 
worse for claimholders as a matter of compensation and access to 
justice through the class proceeding than had they struck out on their 
 
 306.  See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 362–63 (noting that there needs to be a case specific 
inquiry into whether class issues predominate with respect to each member’s individual claims, 
whereas there are fewer protections when in a 23(b)(2) class because the relief is collective in 
nature); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591 (1997); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Campos, supra note 9, at 
1066. 
 307.  See supra Part I.B and Part II. 
 308.  For instance, if the group of plaintiffs is a sophisticated group of wealthy investors 
claiming securities fraud, the combination of their resources and high-value claims may well 
counsel in favor of a thumb on the scale for litigant autonomy. Alternatively, if the group of 
plaintiffs is a group of industrial workers who have inhaled asbestos, their claims might be of 
high value, but their resources virtually nonexistent. There, the value of claims cannot be the 
only touchstone for determining the public nature of the claims. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
625–26. 
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own.309 Of course, this is not to say that there aren’t any number of 
systemic reasons—efficiency, as well as access to justice for claimants 
unrelated to the class in the judicial queue—that justify the joinder of 
multifarious similar claims (though such interests may not justify 
restricting litigant autonomy). 
In this relative absence of transaction costs to claiming, the 
appropriate regulatory response is likely none at all—to preserve 
existing judicial doctrine vis-à-vis Rule 23’s certification requirements 
and opt-out provisions. This is by no means an endorsement of the 
individualistic conception of claims that underlies the doctrine to be 
preserved. In this particular context, Rule 23 doctrine happens to 
align well with the notion that procedure should reduce transaction 
costs to effective vindication of recognized rights. The problem, then, is 
the basis for this happenstantially appropriate doctrine. Because it 
rests on a conceptual theory, it risks functioning a bit like a broken 
clock—right twice a day (and for the wrong reason). 
When scrutinizing a class at the certification stage, courts are 
in part worried that class members’ claims will be undersold either 
because of a lack of unity among the class (unity defined, perhaps 
ironically, as identity of individual interests)310 or because of the 
 
 309.  Perhaps the most egregious illustration of this possibility comes from nonpecuniary 
class action coupon settlements, which constitute inefficient outcomes and provide inadequate 
compensation for individual plaintiffs. See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION 
DILEMMAS 27, 83, 488–89 (2000) (noting coupon settlements are “inadequate compensation for 
the alleged wrongdoing of defendants” and, because they “impose no real cost on the defendant,” 
do not achieve deterrence); Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon 
Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 994–95 
(2002) (noting coupon settlements are structured to “maximize the gains for the corporate 
defendant while minimizing any compensation to the class,” and that class counsel often “sell out 
the interests of the class in exchange for relatively generous attorneys’ fees”); Geoffrey P. Miller 
& Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 110 
(1997) (recognizing nonpecuniary settlements create inefficiency, difficulty in valuation of 
damages, and opportunity for attorney manipulation where “counsel . . . accept[s] settlement less 
favorable to class than what counsel might obtain by further prosecution”). The Court has 
expressed similar concerns in its due process analysis regarding monetary claims embedded in 
mandatory classes for non-monetary relief. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 362–63 (“While we have never 
held [an absence of the right to opt-out violated due process] where the monetary claims do not 
predominate, the serious possibility that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read 
Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here”; noting also that the allowance of non-
predominant monetary damages in a mandatory class did not stem from Rule 23); Ortiz, 527 U.S. 
at 846–47 (“[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the due process 
principle” where “damages claims [are] gathered in a mandatory class” and “objectors to the 
collectivism of a mandatory subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no inherent right to abstain.”). 
 310.  See, e.g., Bone, supra note 34 at 654–55 (discussing the Court’s focus on similarity and 
unity among class members). 
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mandatory nature of the proposed class, if relevant.311 The economic 
transaction—the settlement—whereby claims are traded for a fair 
value for some, may well impose a negative externality upon both the 
remaining class members, who are undersold, and upon the public, 
which does not receive the value of deterrence tied to the scope of the 
wrongdoing.312 However, whether the first concern (and relatedly the 
second) actually manifests depends in large part on the value of any 
individual’s claim in the first place and the resources available, 
generally speaking, to the plaintiffs involved. In other words, whether 
there is a negative effect upon various absent class members’ 
effectuation of substantive claims depends upon whether they could 
pursue their claims individually in the first place; if they could not do 
so, the negative effect of a settlement upon their ability to claim, their 
access to justice, or their ability to obtain compensation is somewhat 
fictive. Accordingly, stringent certification requirements driven by 
individualistic conceptions of legal claims seem out of place, as Justice 
Breyer suggested in Amchem.313 
More than that, stringent certification requirements that 
demand high levels of “class unity”314 may well frustrate the ability to 
 
 311.  See, e.g., Dukes, 564 U.S. at 364 (noting protections of 23(b)(3) class counters the 
incentive to risk a class’s “potentially valid claims for monetary relief”); see also Ortiz, 527 U.S. 
at 849 (noting the certification of mandatory 23(b)(2) class actions effectively concludes all 
proceedings, save the final fairness hearing, ending the claims of all absent persons the rule is 
designed to protect); In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 
F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that (b)(2) certification was inappropriate because, among 
other things, it risked underselling plaintiffs’ monetary claims). 
 312.  See Glover, supra note 2, at 1185 (discussing the need for connection between scope of 
the wrong and scope of the compensation as it relates to deterrence). 
 313.  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). 
 314.  In class action jurisprudence, class unity is not defined, as one might think, by the 
presence of interdependence among claimants vis-à-vis normative goals, but rather—perhaps 
ironically—by identity of claims and claimant characteristics among individuals. See, e.g., Gen. 
Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). The question animating the doctrinal 
search for class unity, therefore, is an individualistic one: are the individual claims and 
claimants sufficiently similar that, in one individual’s self-interested pursuit of her litigation 
interests, she will necessarily advance the litigation interests of the other class members? 
Underlying the concept of litigation interests, in turn, is necessarily an individualistic conception 
of that term: for a plaintiff with an individually unmarketable claim, the named plaintiff’s 
pursuit of her claim—even if it differs somewhat from the unmarketable claim—arguably 
advances the litigation interests in compensation and access to justice of that first claimant. This 
is true even if the two claimants’ litigation strategies and outcomes might differ, because of the 
difference in claims, in (totally hypothetical) individual proceedings. The Court’s jurisprudence 
on class unity is not attentive to the former conception of litigation interests—a conception that 
takes into account the litigation interests in the aggregate proceeding and the relationship 
between the aggregate proceeding, and the absent plaintiffs’ ability to obtain compensation and 
access to justice. Instead, the definition of litigation interests is predicated on the individualistic, 
“day-in-court” notion of litigation, a notion of how claims might be treated in individualized 
proceedings (however unlikely such proceedings might be). 
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vindicate claims in precisely the way this Article’s view of procedure 
counsels against: when the claims of class members are unmarketable 
individually315 and/or when the group of plaintiffs is characteristically 
under-resourced, the absence of the class mechanism functionally 
means the presence of insurmountable transaction costs to claiming. 
Under this Article’s framework, then, one might offer the following 
corrective to the collectivist conception of legal claims that would have 
(over)remedied this problem: class claims (and their claimants) 
constitute an entity if, as in the context of unmarketable claims and/or 
characteristically under-resourced plaintiffs, each individual claim is 
intertwined with the claims of others in the most fundamental sense. 
There is no claim and there is no plaintiff without the unit; the 
aggregate unit is the plaintiff.316 
Freed from formalistic constraints but guided (and likewise 
constrained) by the principles set forth in this Article, the certification 
analysis would now explicitly take into account the value of the 
majority of the claims in class, as well as the resources typical of the 
parties. Further, such analysis might involve a comparison of the 
relative alienability of claims on an individual basis versus a collective 
basis.317 Neither prescription likely requires a change to Rule 23.318 If 
the claims are low-value, and are not meaningfully alienable on an 
individual basis, strict imposition of Rule 23 requirements directed at 
preserving a fictive notion of strong individual ownership and use of 
claims seem inappropriate at best. Here, inquiries regarding 
 
 315.  See Cabraser, supra note 54 (tracing Judge Posner’s class action jurisprudence, which 
determines the level of due process attendant a particular class claim based on considerations 
like claim value). 
 316.  In some respects, this is the notion David Shapiro was driving at in The Class as Party 
and Client. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 938–39. Unlike Shapiro’s more formalistic conception of 
the class as an entity, however, this Article takes the position that there are certain 
circumstances in which the normative goals of our litigation system are served by encouraging 
aggregate units; the fact that legal claims within that unit are interdependent on one another is 
a feature of any given individual’s ownership of that claim, but it is not an absolute, or even 
near-absolute, conception of either the class or the underlying class claims. 
 317.  Such an analysis is not unheard of. The class of merchants in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant presented a similar analysis. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (explaining 
no individual plaintiff’s claim was worth enough to justify the expense of the antitrust expert). 
Whether factors like expert fees ought to be considered in the certification analysis, or are more 
appropriately addressed (if at all) by, say, legislatures in crafting the contours of substantive 
law, is a question beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief discussion of the ways in which 
state legislatures have amended substantive laws to help plaintiffs avoid class certification 
hurdles, see Glover, supra note 155. 
 318.  Indeed, there is arguably a textual hook for this interpretive change in Rule 23. Rule 23 
calls for courts to ask whether the class action is a superior vehicle for the resolution of claims—
an inquiry that already asks courts to compare class resolution versus individual resolution of 
claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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commonality, typicality, and “unity”—as embodied in adequacy of 
representation requirements319—are better redirected toward 
alignment with procedure’s role in reducing transaction costs to 
effectuating substantive rights. 
Assume, however, that the specific regulatory prescriptions 
above are not adopted. Indeed, assume further that its normative 
underpinnings are rejected in favor of other concerns. Even then, the 
potentially significant payoffs that the regulatory theory of legal 
claims could generate for the class-certification debate in particular 
and procedural theory more generally are not destroyed. Particularly 
in light of the normative incoherence that results from formalist 
conceptual frameworks illustrated in Part II, analysis of the class-
certification problem under these new conditions perhaps more clearly 
reveals the benefits of this Article’s theory for procedural 
decisionmaking and design. 
Along these lines, assume that the Court’s adoption of an 
individualistic approach toward certification requirements is driven, 
at least in part, by implicit concerns about the in terrorem effect of 
class certification on defendants.320 When these in terrorem effects 
actually occur—in other words, when dubious claims nonetheless yield 
relatively high settlements from defendants—this result is no less 
troubling for procedure’s role in effectuating claims than when 
claiming is disabled. At the very least, such settlements constitute 
error costs; they also represent a failure of procedure to “resolve 
claims on the merits.”321 Approaching class certification analysis using 
this Article’s regulatory theory of legal claims would first lift the veil 
on this normative trade-off by eliminating the formalist conceptual 
language about plaintiffs’ individual autonomy.322 
 
 319.  See, e.g., Bone, supra note 34, at 657 (arguing that the typicality and commonality 
requirements collapse into the adequacy of representation requirement). 
 320.  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International for one of the few cases in which 
the Court explicitly sets forth reasons for disallowing class actions—namely, the in terrorem 
effect on defendants. 559 U.S. 662, 663–65 (2010).  
 321.  Glover, supra note 2, at Part II. 
 322.  Indeed, to the extent the possibility of an in terrorem effect on defendants exists in any 
given case, it would fit within this Article’s regulatory framework: the extraction of a nuisance 
settlement (or worse) from a defendant has a negative effect on deterrence. Such a 
determination, however, would necessarily have to rest on some measure of an evaluation of the 
viability of plaintiffs’ legal theories, and their likelihood of success on those theories. The former 
is an appropriate consideration at the time of certification; the latter is almost assuredly not. 
See, e.g., Glover, supra note 155 (arguing that some of the Supreme Court’s recent class 
certification decisions were driven by largely unspoken determinations about the viability of 
plaintiffs’ legal theories; that these determinations are appropriate under Rule 23, Supreme 
Court precedent, and the Rules Enabling Act; and that the Court has a duty to make these 
determinations explicit); Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63 
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Further, these transparency gains would have real 
consequences. By requiring courts to make explicit the normative and 
theoretical underpinnings of its approach to class certification, the 
regulatory theory could in turn reveal either the need for other, 
different, and possibly unseen regulatory steps. To the extent the 
Court believes that class certification (and, perhaps, certification of 
class actions involving low-value claims in particular323) imposes in 
terrorem effects on defendants, the explicit expression of that concern 
would draw attention to the need for regulations that address directly 
the problem of nuisance settlements.324 For instance, although current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence requires courts to engage in merits-
based inquiries when those inquiries overlap with certification 
requirements,325 that has not led courts, including the Supreme Court, 
to expressly evaluate whether plaintiffs’ underlying substantive 
theories are legally cognizable.326 To illustrate, the Title VII class 
claims in Dukes, as presented by the class, likely satisfy Rule 23 
certification requirements (even as ratcheted up by the Court in that 
same case). Under plaintiffs’ “conduit” theory of discrimination under 
Title VII, there was a common question as to whether Wal-Mart’s 
corporate culture, effectuated through discretion-based 
decisionmaking, resulted in discrimination against women. For the 
Court, there was an unstated preliminary question—whether Title VII 
permitted proof of discrimination through a conduit theory. The Court 
implicitly answered this preliminary question in the negative, 
expressing its holding largely in procedural language under Rule 
23(a). Had it been explicit about its Title VII conclusion, however, the 
procedural consequences under Rule 23(a) would have followed 
 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149 (2010) (counseling judges against conflating certification standards 
with standards for summary judgment). 
 323.  See Glover, supra note 155 (arguing that the Court’s class action arbitration 
jurisprudence reflects a substantive judgment that certain types of class actions—like low-value 
consumer class actions—are not worth facilitating because, among other reasons, they generate 
in terrorem effects for defendants). 
 324.  This call for the Court to regulate normative problems caused by, or intertwined with 
particular procedures is not completely new. As Richard Nagareda has explained, the Court’s 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly constituted an attempt to regulate, through pleading 
rules, normatively undesirable practices in the discovery process, a move he referred to as 
“regulatory indirection.” Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex 
Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 674 (2011).  
 325.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 n.6 (2011) (clarifying Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)). 
 326.  Such evaluation occurred, but was not made explicit, about plaintiffs’ theory of Title 
VII in Dukes, 564 U.S. at 360. See also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and 
Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) (arguing that the Court’s decision in 
Dukes involved numerous Title VII policy judgments). 
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naturally and without much need for comment. The more direct 
route—whereby the Court would have explained why, as a matter of 
Title VII law, plaintiffs’ “common question” was not legally 
cognizable—would have generated needed clarification in the 
substantive law. It also would have provided a guide for lower courts 
to likewise weed out legally impossible, and therefore unmeritorious, 
suits at the certification stage—thereby reducing the number of suits 
that may generate problematic in terrorem effects. 
Alternatively, or in addition, the Rules Advisory Committee, or 
more informally, the authors of the Manual for Complex Litigation, 
could create a preliminary (and perhaps nonbinding) summary-
judgment-type procedure for issuing a merits-based opinion that 
would follow quickly on the heels of class certification.327 This could 
reduce a class’s leverage at the settlement table where claims are of 
dubious merit, both by reducing factual information asymmetries 
between the parties about claim value, and by reducing the level of 
variance facing defendants in their settlement calculus.328 
In the end, then, the regulatory theory of legal claims reveals 
regulatory pathways for harmonizing the often competing normative 
considerations at work. Freed from formalist constraints regarding the 
conception of claims, assume first that the Court’s normative concerns 
about in terrorem effects remain in place, and assume further that 
mitigation of such effects is a theoretically valid procedural purpose.329 
However, assume also that the Court accepts as descriptively accurate 
the existence of normatively undesirable transaction-cost market 
failure generated by stringent certification requirements in low-value 
class actions. Explicit expression of the way in which normative 
concerns about in terrorem effects actually dictate procedural doctrine 
in turn highlights the need for direct regulation of those in terrorem 
effects. Such direct regulation thereby potentially makes room for the 
 
 327.  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 2, at 1730 (making a similar suggestion, though 
introducing the possibility of financial penalties (e.g., the other party’s costs) for parties who 
proceed with litigation after the issuance of an unfavorable preliminary judgment who then lose 
in a binding judgment); Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 203 
(suggesting the introduction of nonbinding evaluations of the merits of a case earlier in the 
litigation process). 
 328.  See, e.g., Glover, supra note 2, at 1732–34 (discussing how information asymmetries 
and variance distort settlement values). 
 329.  This Article does not address whether the generation of in terrorem effects for 
defendants constitutes a market failure in the litigation system, nor whether it should be the 
purpose of procedure to mitigate those effects. In prior work, however, I have argued that 
procedure should seek to produce more accurate settlement values, in part by providing merits-
based assessments earlier in the litigation process, and particularly in class litigation involving 
high levels of variance. Glover, supra note 2, at 1764–68. 
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regulation of other important interests. Indeed, this approach opens 
up a potential regulatory pathway for procedure to reduce transaction 
cost barriers to claiming in the subset of class actions involving low-
value claims. Along these lines, the specific regulatory prescriptions 
set forth in this Section are of course not the only ones we could adopt. 
Instead, as here, they illustrate the ways in which the regulatory 
theory in this Article points in new and different directions for the 
achievement of key normative goals of our litigation system. 
 
* * * 
 
Of course, there are possible alternatives to the problem of 
transaction cost barriers to the effectuation of substantive rights—
alternatives that likewise do not require reversion to formalist 
conceptual frameworks. For instance, one could design a less 
expensive system of dispute resolution and procedure where, ideally, 
supplemental financing is unnecessary and unmarketable claims are 
fewer, perhaps along the lines of the fast-track for claims in the 
United Kingdom. Such ideas are the subject of future work and are 
beyond the scope of this Article. As necessary as such reforms may be, 
they are not likely to supplant our current system. Accordingly, they 
would not replace, wholesale, this Article’s regulatory theory for 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the ways in which long-standing 
conceptual debates about legal claims and litigant autonomy that 
occur within specific procedural contexts play out across the broad 
swath of the litigation landscape. This cross-cutting analysis reveals 
that formalist conceptions of legal claims as either individualistic or 
collectivist cannot provide a coherent path toward resolving many of 
the most difficult questions facing procedural decisionmaking in 
particular and our litigation system in general.  
Our approach to litigant autonomy therefore should not and 
cannot derive from absolutist views. Instead, this Article offers a 
theory for regulating individual autonomy over legal claims. Grounded 
in principles of economic theory and litigation theory—as well as the 
intellectual foundations of property underlying modern conceptions of 
legal claims—this theory posits that litigant autonomy can be 
regulated in appropriate circumstances, such as to reduce transaction-
cost market failures that impede the effectuation of substantive 
rights. More than that, it is properly within the role and lawmaking 
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power of the judiciary to engage in such regulation, including through 
the use of procedural mechanisms. Operationalizing this Article’s 
theory within the very procedural contexts that formalist conceptions 
struggled to address, this Article’s theory points a way forward for 
navigating the interrelationship of procedure, substantive rights, and 
the ownership of claims in an increasingly complex litigation 
landscape.  
